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. . . [M]ysticism might be characterized as the study of those propositions
which are equivalent to their own negations. The Western point of view is
that the class of all such propositions is empty. The Eastern point of view
is that this class is empty if and only if it isn’t.
Raymond Smullyan [174]

Abstract
In this thesis we are concerned with developing formal and representational mech-
anisms for reasoning with inconsistent information. Strictly speaking there are two
conceptually distinct senses in which we are interested in reasoning with inconsis-
tent information. In one sense, we are interested in using logical deduction to draw
inferences in a symbolic system. More specifically, we are interested in mechanisms
that can continue to perform deduction in a reasonable manner despite the threat of
inconsistencies as a direct result of errors or misrepresentations. So in this sense we
are interested in inconsistency-tolerant or paraconsistent deduction.
However, not every case of inconsistent description is a case of misrepresentation.
In many practical situations, logically inconsistent descriptions may be deployed as
representations for problems that are inherently conflicting. The issue of error or mis-
representation is irrelevant in these cases. Rather the main concern in these cases is to
provide meaningful analyses of the underlying structure and properties of our logi-
cal representation which in turn informs us about the salient features of the problem
under consideration. So in this second sense, we are interested in deploying logic as a
representation to model situations involving conflict.
In this thesis we adopt a novel framework to unify both logic-as-deduction and
logic-as-representation approaches to reasoning with inconsistent information. From
a preservational view point, we take deduction as a process by which metalogical prop-
erties are preserved from premises to conclusions. Thus methodologically wemay be-
gin by identifying inconsistency-tolerant deduction mechanisms and then investigate
what additional properties of inconsistent premises are preserved by these mecha-
nisms; or alternatively we may begin by identifying properties of inconsistent logical
descriptions and investigate which deductive mechanisms can preserve these proper-
ties. We view these as two aspects of the same investigation. A key assumption in this
work is that adequate analyses of inconsistencies require provisions to quantitatively
measure and compare inconsistent logical representations. While paraconsistent log-
ics have enjoyed considerable success in recent years, proper quantitative analysis of
inconsistencies seems to have lapsed behind to some extent. In this thesis we’ll ex-
plore different ways in which we can compare and measure inconsistencies. We hope
xi
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to show that both inference and analysis can fruitfully be brought to bear on the issue
of inconsistency handling under the same methodological scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
It is customary nowadays to begin a thesis with some remarks about the motivation
behind the work. This is typically done with the aid of an example. This thesis is
no exception. We shall begin with the following imaginary scenario which we shall
call the information fusion problem. Consider a situation in which an object O may
be located in one out of nine distinct possible locations represented by a 3 × 3 grid.
Information about the location of O is encoded in a simple propositional language
with p’s representing the rows and q’s representing the columns (see figure (1.1)).
Furthermore, complex expressions are generated using the usual Boolean connectives
{¬,∧,∨} with their usual truth conditions. We are interested in locating O, and infor-
mation is gathered from various sensors or sources about the location of O.
q1 q2 q3
p1 × ×
p2
p3
Figure 1.1: A simple logical representation of an object’s location.
Suppose we receive two messages:
A : p1 B : ¬q2
From the received messages we conclude that the possible location of O is:
C : (p1 ∧ q1)∨ (p1 ∧ q3)
1
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Our example highlights several important methodological points. The first is the
obvious point that information about the state of the world can be encapsulated in a
formal language. The practical corollary of this is that more expressive formal lan-
guages are required for more demanding representational tasks. But more impor-
tantly, since a more expressive language may involve a greater computational cost,
the choice of language should be gauged in terms of the representational task at is-
sue. In our example it is clear that a simple propositional language suffices for the
representational task.
The second point is that contextual information is often crucial to a reasoning task.
In our example, the background information is that the object O is located in exactly
one and no more then one location, and that there are exactly nine possible locations
of O. It is only in the context of this background information that we can deduce C
from A and B. More importantly, background information is not always explicitly
stated in a given situation.
Thirdly, our example illustrates how the process of reasoning can be viewed as
exploration in the space of possibilities – eliminating some and further exploring oth-
ers. Our symbolic representations A and B impose certain restrictions on the space of
possibilities. These expressions have truth conditionswhich inform us that the world is
one way but not another. Furthermore, this information is compositional in the sense
that the aggregate of A and B is simply the aggregate of their restrictions on the space
of possibilities. The conclusion C is simply what is possible relative to the restrictions
imposed by A and B together with the background information.
Finally, our example also illustrates the role and importance of uncertainties in rea-
soning. If we want to know whether O is located at p1 ∧ q1, the information given is
insufficient to answer our question. In this sense, the given information is incomplete
with respect to our query. Now just as it is possible that we may have incomplete
information, it is equally possible that we may have too much information – we may
receive a third message:
D : p3
D is not consistent with A since our background assumption is that the nine loca-
tions are distinct and no physical object can be at different places at the same time. In
short, there is no guarantee that the information we gather from different sources is ei-
ther complete or consistent. The possibility of misrepresentation or error is a genuine
threat in the process of information fusion.
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1.2 Two Approaches to Inconsistencies
As the title suggests, the purpose of this thesis is to examine and develop formal and
representational mechanisms for reasoning with inconsistent information. Strictly
speaking there are at least two conceptually distinct senses in which we are interested
in reasoning with inconsistent information. In one sense, we are interested in using
logical deduction to draw inferences in a symbolic system. This is the traditional ap-
proach to AI where a logic is used to perform deduction over a logical description
or a knowledge base representing various states of the environment external to the sys-
tem. But we are interested in more then that. As we have illustrated with the problem
of information fusion, we are interested in mechanisms that can continue to perform
deduction in a reasonable manner despite the threat of inconsistencies. In these cases,
our logical descriptions are inconsistent essentially because they have misrepresented
the external environment. So in this sense our deduction must be fault tolerant – it
must operate under the explicit assumption that the input data may be erroneous or
unreliable. However, not every case of inconsistent description is a case of misrepre-
sentation. Consider for instance,
• negotiation amongst agents with conflicting goals, e.g. selling at the highest
price vs buying at the lowest price
• constitutions or legal documents in which incompatible rules apply to the same
situation, e.g. you must obey the speed limit vs you must maintain a speed that
is consistent with the other traffic
• software requirements engineering process in which different stake-holders
have different and incompatible requirements, e.g. ease of use vs advanced fea-
tures
• faulty artifacts and systems in which expected behaviours diverge from their
observed behaviours, e.g. brake lights should be on when braking occurs vs no
brake lights when braking
• constraint satisfaction problems that are over-determined, e.g. no one should
work more then 8 hours in any given work day vs there is a shortage of staff to
cover all work days
In these cases, our logical descriptions may be inconsistent because they correctly
represent situations or problems involving conflict in one form or another. So there
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need not be any misrepresentation involved. The main issue in these cases is not fault
tolerant deduction per se but an analysis of the structure and the underlying prop-
erties of our logical representation which in turn informs us about the nature of the
situation or problem under consideration. Of course to provide such an analysis, our
logical description must capture the salient features of the problem at some appropriate
level of abstraction. But this is very much a question of the representational efficacy
of the formal language and not so much a question about deduction. So in another
sense, we are interested in deploying logic as a representation to model situations and
problems involving conflict.
In terms of using a formal language to model real world problems, there is a subtle
question as to whether inconsistency in the strictly logical (proof theoretic or model
theoretic) sense is the right formalism for modelling conflicts. Conceivably, we can
deploy a very different formalism to represent these problems so that the resulting
representation is no longer inconsistent in the strictly logical sense. But to do so is
to miss an important point. What makes an over-constrained scheduling problem
interesting and difficult is precisely that the real world cannot meet its demands. A
change in formalism may allow us to find hidden structures of the problem more
easily or to perform computation over the representation more efficiently, but this by
itself would not resolve the underlying conflict. There is a genuine sense in which the
salient feature of conflict is captured in terms of logical inconsistency.
So a map of our conceptual space should include at least two distinct senses of
‘reasoning with inconsistent information’:
Inconsistency Inconsistency
as error as conflict
Logical deduction as inference
√
Logical description as representation
√
Figure 1.2: Reasoning with inconsistent information: a conceptual map
Underlying these different senses of ‘reasoning with inconsistent information’ is
of course the traditional distinction between the proof theory and the model theory
of a logic. From a purely theoretical standpoint, these are of course distinct and inde-
pendent approaches to studying logic. But from a computational and system design
standpoint, it makes good sense to consider a single symbolic system that can in-
corporate both the functionality of a prover and the functionality of an analyst for
handling inconsistent information. Viewed as a fault tolerant reasoner our prover
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should provide support for drawing inferences from inconsistent and erroneous data.
But viewed as a modeller of problems our analyst should provide support for ex-
tracting useful information and patterns from data that represent situations involving
conflicts. The overall architecture of such a hybrid system is depicted in figure (1.3).
analyst
inconsistent
description
conclusions
queries
prover-
?
-
ﬀ
?
6





*

Figure 1.3: A hybrid symbolic system for handling inconsistent information
Indeed, the idea of such a hybrid system is not new. In [172; 173], Slaney and
co-workers have proposed and implemented the system SCOTT (Semantically Con-
strained OTTER) and more recently MSCOTT (Multi-SCOTT) which combines the
first-order resolution prover OTTER with the finite model generator FINDER (Fi-
nite Domain Enumerator). For our purposes here, we need not be concerned about
the detailed workings of SCOTT. Figure (1.3) doesn’t in fact capture the structure of
SCOTT – for instance, FINDER and OTTER do not communicate directly with each
other. The main point is that SCOTT is a system that combines both reasoning and
modelling to accomplish its task. The overall philosophy behind SCOTT is to inject
some intelligence into a prover by providing semantic information to assist in proof
search.
Stated as such, the aim of SCOTT is clearly directed towards theorem proving. So
in this respect, the role of FINDER is mainly to provide assistance to OTTER. But we
need not think of our hybrid system merely as a theorem proving system. For our
purposes, it would be more advantageous to view such a system as a practical reason-
ing system. Firstly, it is practical in the sense that, unlike SCOTT, its target domain
of application need not be limited to proving mathematical theorems. Like many tra-
ditional knowledge base systems such as relational or deductive databases, we can
view our hybrid system as a symbolic system for representing and reasoning with
information about the external environment. So in this sense, the knowledge base of
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the system may include empirical information of various sorts. Secondly, our hybrid
system is also practical in the sense that it is goal directed. The goal of the system
may be specified by its immediate user, or alternatively the system may operate as a
component of a larger complex system. In either case, what our hybrid system does
with its knowledge base depends on what the user or the rest of the system wants.
This view of our hybrid system is of course more open-ended. But it does capture
both senses of reasoning with inconsistent information within the framework of a sin-
gle system. As a fault tolerant reasoning system for handling information fusion, the
emphasis is perhaps on deduction where the role of the analyst is to assist the prover.
But as a modelling system for representing problems or situations, the emphasis is
perhaps on analysis where the role of the prover is to assist the analyst. In this thesis,
our aim is to explore the theoretical foundation for such a system. In particular we
would like to offer a novel theoretical underpinning of the interaction between the
analyst and the prover. We would like to consider how inference and analysis can
fruitfully be brought to bear on the issue of inconsistency handling under one and the
same conceptual scheme.
1.3 Symbolic and Numeric Approaches to Uncertainty
In a broader context, the problem of reasoning with inconsistent information is of
course a special case of themore general problem of reasoningwith uncertainties. Like
reasoning with inconsistent information, reasoning with uncertain information can be
viewed as an inference problem as well as a representation problem. In recent years,
AI researchers have focused on two general approaches to uncertainty which closely
parallel our interests in the use of logical deduction to draw inferences and the use of
logical description as a representation. In the traditional symbolic approach the empha-
sis is on developing logical mechanisms for handling uncertainty. This includes de-
veloping new deduction mechanisms together with corresponding semantics for rea-
soning with uncertain information. The symbolic approach has a long history dating
back to the works of Newell and Simon on General Problem Solver [133], McCarthy’s
works on circumscription [128], Reiter’s works on Default logics [151], Doyle’s works
on Truth Maintenance Systems [63] and de Kleer’s extension to Assumption-based
Truth Maintenance Systems [54; 55]. In contrast, the emphasis of the more recent nu-
meric approach is on the representation of uncertainty. Here, the key concern is to
develop quantitative methods for measuring uncertainties. This includes approaches
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that are based on complete ordering, e.g. fuzzy set theory and its offspring possibility
theory, as well as approaches that are based on counting, e.g. statistical or probabilis-
tic methods (for a review see chapter 1 and 2 of [95]). In this thesis we would like
to consider the symbolic and numeric approaches to inconsistency within the gen-
eral framework of our hybrid symbolic system. Indeed, a main assumption behind
this thesis is that these two approaches should not be viewed as competing strate-
gies for managing inconsistency. On the one hand, there is no doubt that we need to
develop inference mechanisms that can perform deduction in a principled way in an
environment in which inconsistencies may arise. The underlying assumption is that
on occasions it may be desirable to tolerate the presence of inconsistencies rather than
revising one’s data. This is especially important in situations in which the turn-over
rate of information is much higher than the rate at which consistency checks can be
made. On the other hand, there is also a need to develop theoretical and conceptual
tools to analyse inconsistencies. In some situations, it may be more desirable for a
user to clearly identify data that are in conflict before any decision or action is taken.
Perhaps the inconsistencies have no bearing on the overall objective of the user, e.g.
it is unlikely that an inconsistent description of the colour of the seats in an aircraft is
relevant to the overall safety of the aircraft. Even in cases where corrective measures
must be taken toward inconsistencies, it is unclear that a single action would suffice.
In some cases, corrections must be performed gradually over time and there may be a
need to provide a more quantitative way to monitor the progress of the repair.
1.4 Preservation and Measuring Inconsistent Information
Our main strategy for integrating the symbolic and numeric approaches, the logic
as deduction and logic as representation views of knowledge representation, is to
develop a very general methodology for comparing different inconsistency tolerant
inference mechanisms quantitatively. This is a departure from standard methods for
comparing inference mechanisms. Typically, comparisons between different inference
mechanisms are drawn along the lines of
1. set theoretic relations (inclusion): we askwhether conclusions of onemechanism
can be deduced by another mechanism for a given set of premises.
2. proof theory, i.e. axioms or derivable inference rules: we askwhether the axioms
or inference rules of one mechanism can be derived by another mechanism.
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3. computational complexity: we ask whether one mechanism is computationally
more expensive (space and time) than another mechanism.
Our strategy here is rather different. We would like to provide a novel and useful
way to compare inference mechanisms in terms of various quantitative properties
or measurements that can be preserved from a given set of premises to conclusions.
We envision that a key role of the analyst in our hybrid system is to provide such
quantitative analyses of the input data. The key issue here is the notion of preservation.
In the standard account of inference, the validity of an inference is defined in terms
of the preservation of truth relative to the class of standard two-valued models – in
a valid inference it is not possible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is
false. Truths are transmitted from premises to conclusions in valid inferences. But
this account is unhelpful for inconsistent premises since, according the standard two-
valued semantics, inconsistent premises cannot be true together. So for inconsistent
premises, there is simply no truth to be preserved. For information that is uncertain,
we need a more pragmatic approach to the notion of preservation. The general idea is
that, apart from the standard semantic or model theoretic properties, there may well
be other metalogical properties that are transmitted from premises to conclusions in
an inference. Presumably some of these properties would be of interest to a user of
the system, depending of course on the user’s overall objective. And on occasions, it
may even be desirable to preserve these properties in an inference. So the role of the
analyst here, at least in part, is to keep the user (and the prover) informed about the
hidden structure and properties of the input data and perhaps to serve as an adviser
for selecting the appropriate inferencemechanism to preserve the properties of choice.
Of course the requirement that an inference mechanism preserves more then truth
in the standard models also implies that the mechanism, though sound, would not
be complete with respect to standard valid inferences. Such a mechanism would in
general preserve truth in the standard models but not all truth preserving inferences
would be provable. The use of sound but incomplete as well as unsound but complete
reasoning has already been investigated by Levesque in [119] from the point of view
of computational complexity and Schaerf and Cadoli [162] from the point of view of
approximate reasoning. But for us, the use of incomplete reasoning is an interesting
paraconsistent approach to inconsistency. In general we agree that there is a need to
adopt a weaker inference mechanism to perform deduction with inconsistent input
data. But from a preservationist point of view adopting weaker inference mechanisms
is not enough, we need to understand how different sound but incomplete inference
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mechanisms would preserve different properties of different inconsistent premises. In
this respect we have at least two options within which to proceed.
1. we can identify sound but incomplete provers and investigate which additional
properties they can preserve (or fail to preserve).
2. we can identify properties of inconsistent logical descriptions and investigate
which prover can preserve (or fail to preserve) these properties.
These two options are really two aspects of the same picture. Viewed more ab-
stractly (see figure (1.4)), the preservational approach takes deduction to be an opera-
tion, C, defined over a formal language Φ, i.e. C : ℘(Φ) −→ ℘(Φ). Given a (partially
or totally) ordered set (S,≤), a metalogical property is simply a function from ℘(Φ) to
S, i.e. f : ℘(Φ) −→ S. From the preservational point of view, the crucial question is:
given an arbitrary Γ ⊆ Φ, what is the relation between f(C(Γ)) and f(Γ) in terms of the
ordering ≤?
r
℘(Φ)
Γ
r
℘(Φ)
C(Γ) r
S
f(C(Γ))
f(Γ)
-
f
6
C









*
f
Figure 1.4: An abstract view of Preservation
It is easy to see that this abstract view of preservation captures the standard notion
of the soundness and completeness of a logic. Let C be the closure under deduction
of a logic L, and let members of S be collections of models defined according to a
fixed semantics, take the ordering on S to be the usual inclusion ordering ⊆. Let f be
the function which assigns to each Γ ⊆ Φ, the collection of models for Γ , i.e. every
element of the collection is a model of Γ . Then to say that the logic L is sound and
complete with respect to S is precisely to say that f(C(Γ)) = f(Γ) for every Γ ⊆ Φ. The
10 Introduction
soundness of L is captured by the inclusion f(Γ) ⊆ f(C(Γ)), whereas the completeness
of L is captured by the inclusion, f(C(Γ)) ⊆ f(Γ).
This abstract view of preservation is extremely minimal. In figure (1.4), we make
no assumption about the nature of the set S or the function f. But different f and
S would in fact give us different ways to partition ℘(Φ). For each x ∈ S, the set
f−1[x] = {Γ ⊆ Φ : f(Γ) = x} obviously forms an equivalence class. Similarly, this is
true with respect to the deductive closure C. Since we are interested in both inference
and analysis, we are interested in both deductive closures C and functions f that can
distinguish between different inconsistent sets. Moreover, since we want to provide
quantitative ways to distinguish inconsistent sets, our interest is in those functions f
that range over different numerical sets S, e.g. Smay simply be N, [0, 1] or even [0, 1]n.
To take one particular example from probabilistic inference, the uncertainty of a
proposition A is defined as by
U(A) = 1− P(A) (1.1)
In (1.1), P(A) is the probability thatA is true. It is a straightforward consequence of the
Kolmogorov Axioms for probability that if B is deducible from A in classical propo-
sitional or first order logics, then U(B) ≤ U(A), i.e. U(B) 6> U(A) given that ≤ is the
usual total ordering on [0, 1]. In particular, this means that for any classical inference
if we begin with a single premise with small uncertainty (high certainty), then any
one of its conclusions can only have small uncertainty (high certainty). Conversely,
the uncertainty of a conclusion is large only if the uncertainty of its (single) premise
is large (see [3; 4] for more details). Accordingly, in the limiting case in which the
uncertainty of a premise A is zero, U(A) = 0, then the uncertainty of its conclusion B
must be zero, U(B) = 0. Not surprisingly, this just is the classical notion of deductive
validity.
Clearly, the uncertainty measure U is one of many different properties that can be
transmitted from premises to conclusions in an inference. But as we have suggested
earlier, the preservation approach to inference is sensitive to the issue of developing
theoretically meaningful ways to measure, compare and analyse inconsistent data.
This is particularly important when we are using logic as a representation. Consider
again a very simple example in which we are modeling negotiation by agents with
conflicting objectives. Suppose we have 3 agents negotiating over 3 issues represented
by a set of propositional variables {p1, p2, p3}. In the first round of the negotiation
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the agents’ positions are represented by
Γ0 = {p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3, ¬p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ¬p3, p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬p3}
In the second round the agents’ positions are represented by
Γ1 = {p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3, ¬p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3, p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ p3}
Are there significant differences between Γ0 and Γ1? The answer is ‘no’ if we take C
to be the closure under deduction of classical logic and f to be the standard mapping
of sets of formulae to their classical models. As far as classical C and standard f are
concerned, Γ0 and Γ1 belong to the same equivalence class. But if we are interested in
monitoring the progress of the negotiation, then the answer is a definite ‘yes’. Clearly
in the second round of the negotiation the agents reach an agreement about p3 even
though there is no general agreement about p1 or p2. The take home message of our
example is this: even at a very simple propositional level different inconsistent logical
descriptions are endowedwith very different combinatorial structures and properties.
An inference mechanism that fails to differentiate between Γ0 and Γ1 also fails to rec-
ognize potentially important and useful information for the user. Thus in the design
of an inference mechanism that can handle and tolerate inconsistencies, we need to
pay attention to these underlying combinatorial structures and properties.
What kind of analysis must the analyst in our hybrid system provide in order to
distinguish between Γ0 and Γ1? Since a main assumption in this thesis is that logical
descriptions are information bearing, a natural starting point would seem to be the
traditional information theory of Shannon – it provides a theoretical foundation for
measuring the amount of information in a set of data. But as it stands, the standard in-
formation theory is inadequate since it typically treats inconsistent data as containing
either maximum amount of information or no information at all (see [6] for instance).
In this respect, we are interested in both extending standard information theory to
cover inconsistent data and in finding alternative ways to measure and compare in-
consistent data. These alternatives are more or less what we may call a divide and
conquer method for handling inconsistency. The basic strategy is to divide an incon-
sistent set into (not necessary consistent) subsets, depending on howwemake the cut,
we get different ways to measure and classify sets.
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1.5 Representation of Inconsistent Information
What makes one quantitative analysis more fruitful and meaningful then another?
There is no fast and easy answer to this question. The answer to the question is largely
dependent on the underlying objective of the user in possession of the logical descrip-
tion. But minimally, it would be desirable if the analysis can be reused across different
representational formalisms. This would show that the properties so specified are in-
variant under different formalisms, and hence that they are not just incidental features
of a particular formalism. One way in which we can demonstrate this is to actually
apply the concepts and analyses developed for one formalism to another. In this re-
spect, there are two natural ways to proceed. Since inconsistencies often occur within
intensional linguistic contexts involving various form of modalities, a natural way to
extend the expressive power of a propositional language to introduce modal opera-
tors for the corresponding doxastic, epistemic or deontic contexts.1 This gives us a
direct way to study inconsistency within a modal context. But doing so also raises an
interesting issue about the choice of modal logics. The weakest modal logic adequate
for Kripkean binary relational semantics is the logic K. Although in Kwe can provide
a binary relational model for {A, ¬A}, the following rule is derivable in K and any
of its extension:
[ ECQ] A ¬AB
So in any binary relational model adequate for the logic K, any world which ver-
ifies {A,¬A} would be a world which also verifies B for any B. For the purpose
of modelling intensionalized inconsistencies then, the standardmodal logics and their
corresponding Kripkean semantics seem to be out of place. How canwe avoid the rule
[ ECQ]? One possible option is to adopt modal logics that are strictly weaker then K
and to develop alternative semantics for these logics. In particular, we need a provide
semantics for modeling {A,¬A} without also modelling B for any B. This is the
approach taken by Fagin and Halpern [67], Jaspars [98], Massacci [127] and Rantala
[148]. In this thesis, we’ll be looking at weaker modal logics for the representation of
intensionalised inconsistencies.
While extending propositional languagewithmodalities is one directionwhichwe
may take to explore representational issues of inconsistency, another direction is dia-
grammatic reasoning systems where information is encoded not as a linear sequence
of symbols but as two dimensional figures or diagrams. Indeed many forms of propo-
1 See [75] for more details concerning the distinction between extensional and intensional contexts.
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sitional reasoning can be represented as graphs or hypergraphs. So it is natural for us
to explore these formalisms for representing inconsistent information.
1.6 Overview
In chapter two, we’ll carry out the preservational approach to analyse various stan-
dard inference mechanisms based on reasoning from consistent subsets. We’ll intro-
duce various quantitative measurements for inconsistency and investigate the preser-
vational properties of these mechanisms in light of these measurements.
In chapter three, we’ll highlight the well known connection between reasoning
from maximal consistent subsets and the standard default reasoning developed by
Reiter. The implication is that the kind of preservational analyses offered in chapter
three have direct counterparts in default reasoning. We’ll also address a criticism
offered by Belnap against reasoning based on maximal consistent subsets (and hence,
indirectly against default reasoning). We’ll point out that Belnap’s own amendment
does not in fact resolve the very difficulty he raised. We’ll propose an amendment to
Belnap’s’ amendment.
In chapter four, we’ll look at the issue of preservation from the point of view of un-
certainties that are transmitted from premises to conclusions. As we have already seen
in the single premise case the uncertainty of a classical conclusion is always bound
by the uncertainty of the premise. But for a set of premises this is no longer true for
classical logic. Although the uncertainty of each premise in a set may be small, the
uncertainty of a conclusion may turn out to be prohibitively high. In this chapter,
we’ll investigate uncertainty phenomena in light of inconsistency. This leads to some
surprising results and conjectures.
In chapter five, we’ll introduce the paraconsistent logic QC developed originally
by Besnard and Hunter in [34; 91; 92]. We outline a particular strategy to use (half of)
QC logic as an assistant to analyse inconsistent data. We’ll also consider using this
strategy to study over-constrained problems.
In chapter six, we’ll investigate the use of modal logics for representing incon-
sistency. The family of modal logics presented here is a generalization of those devel-
oped by Jennings and Schotch in [100; 101; 164; 165]. Instead of treatingmodality as an
unary operator, we take modality to be a multi-ary operator. The models developed
here combine both relational semantics and neighbourhood semantics. A complete-
ness proof is given utilising the technique developed by Brown and Apostoli [11; 9;
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In chapter seven, we’ll look at a hypergraph representation of a covering theoretic
measurement of inconsistency. We’ll develop a general notion of n-satisfiability on
hypergraphs and show that the compactness statement of n-satisfiability on hyper-
graphs is equivalent to BPI in ZF set theory. We give a syntactic characterization of
n-satisfiability on hypergraphs in terms of a resolution style proof procedure. A gen-
eral notion of consequence relations based on hypergraphs will also be introduced.
We’ll conclude with a discussion of a conjecture of Cowen relating BPI and complex-
ity theory.
Finally in chapter eight, we present the conclusions and directions for future work.
For completeness, we have also included several appendices at the end.
1.7 Notation
In subsequent discussions we’ll assume the simplest logical language – propositional
language – and examine various inconsistent tolerant formal mechanisms therein. We
assume that Φ is a set of propositional formulae generated from propositional atoms
or variables, {p1, q1, p2, q2, . . .}, with the usual boolean connectives, ¬,∧,∨,⊃. We
use A, B, C, . . . , to denote formulae, > for any tautology, ⊥ for any contradiction,
Γ , Σ, ∆, . . . , to denote sets of formulae, and A, B, . . . , to denote subsets of a set of
formulae. From time to time we’ll use ‘Γ, ∆’ and ‘Γ ∪ ∆’ interchangeably especially if
∆ is a singleton. We assume the equivalence between A ⊃ B and ¬A∨ B.
There are many extensionally equivalent ways to characterize classical logic. We
give the standard Hilbert style axiomatic definition here. By a deduction of A from a
(possibly infinite) set Γ , we mean a finite sequence 〈A1, . . . , An〉 such thatAn = A and
for each i ≤ n, Ai is either an axiom, a member of the set Γ , or obtained by modus
ponens from two previous formulae Aj and Ak where j < k < i. We use ` to denote
the classical deducibility relation and Cn(Γ) to denote {A ∈ Φ : Γ ` A}. A set of
formulae Γ is inconsistent if Γ ` ⊥, otherwise Γ is consistent. A theory T is a set of
formulae that is closed under `, i.e. A ∈ T iff T ` A.
From time to time we’ll also make use of the fact that Cn is a compact Tarskian
closure operator over Φ, i.e. Cn has the following properties:
Inclusion Γ ⊆ Cn(Γ)
Monotonicity Γ ⊆ ∆ =⇒ Cn(Γ) ⊆ Cn(∆)
§1.7 Notation 15
Idempotence Cn(Cn(Γ)) = Cn(Γ)
Compactness Cn(Γ) = Φ =⇒ Cn(Γ ′) = Φ for some Γ ′ ⊆fin Γ
As usual we’ll use the standard set theoretic abstraction notation {x| P(x)} for the
set of objects that has the property P. Notations of operations and functions defined
on sets are given in the usual way. Where f and g are functions defined over the same
sets, we use f−1 to denote the inverse of f, i.e. f−1 = {〈y, x〉 : 〈x, y〉 ∈ f}. f ◦ g is
the composition of g and f, i.e. for each x, f ◦ g(x) = g(f(x)). f  A is the restriction
of f to A, i.e. f  A = {〈x, f(x)〉 : x ∈ A}. f[A] is the image of A under f, i.e. f[A] =
{f(x) : x ∈ A}. Note that inverse, composition, restriction and image need not apply
only to functions, they can be defined for relations as well. We take an injection to be
a 1 − 1 function, a surjection to be an onto function, and a bijection to be an injective
and surjective function. A cartesian product of A and B, denoted by A × B, is defined
by setting A × B = {〈x, y〉| x ∈ A ∧ y ∈ B}. A binary relation R defined on A is any
subset of the cartesian product A × A (or A2). For readability we write xRy or Rxy to
denote 〈x, y〉 ∈ R. A binary relation R defined on A is reflexive if for all x ∈ A, xRx.
R is symmetric if for all x, y ∈ A, xRy → yRx. R is antisymmetric if for all x, y ∈ A,
(xRy ∧ yRx) → x = y. R is connected if for all x, y ∈ A, x 6= y → (xRy ∨ yRx). R is
transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ A, (xRy ∧ yRz) → xRz. A binary relation is an equivalence
relation if it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. A binary relation is a partial ordering
if it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. A binary relation is a total ordering or
linear ordering if it is connected partial ordering relation. A partial ordering set or poset
is a pair 〈A,≤〉 where ≤ is a partial ordering defined on A. A poset 〈A,≤〉 is well
founded if every nonempty subset of A has a ≤-minimal element (equivalently there is
no infinitely descending ≤-chain). A total ordering set or toset is a pair 〈A,≤〉 where ≤
is a total ordering defined on A. A well ordering set or woset is a well founded poset.
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Chapter 2
Paraconsistent Inference and
Preservation
2.1 Introduction
Correct reasoning is usually characterised as patterns of inference which preserve
truth. According to the standard view an inference is valid if it is impossible for its
premises to be true but its conclusion false. While not incorrect, the standard view is
unhelpful when we are confronted with inconsistent data. Since all inconsistent sets
are unsatisfiable in the standard two-valued semantics, inferences licensed by classical
logics become unprincipled in the presence of inconsistencies.
Many proposals and remedies are available to achieve inconsistency tolerant rea-
soning. They include both semantic and syntactic approaches:
1. introduce additional truth values to alter the semantics [12; 21; 37; 138]
2. introduce additional semantic parameters such as nonstandard possible worlds,
setups or situations to evaluate formulae [68; 155; 157]
3. introduce labels or annotations into the object language, typically attached to
formulae, to represent inconsistencies [41; 108; 124]
Undoubtedly, many semantic and syntactic innovations are involved in these ap-
proaches. In [99], Jennings et al have proposed a more pragmatic account of reasoning
according to which the aim of logic is to provide a theory of reasoning which speci-
fies the procedures for preserving important metalinguistic properties of premise sets.
Accordingly, a practical reasoning system provides procedures by which a set of sen-
tences having some metalinguistic properties can be unfailingly extended to a larger
set with the same properties.
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From this preservation-theoretic framework we can articulate two strategies for
studying reasoning: the first is the identification of important metalinguistic proper-
ties of premises, and the second is the discovery of mechanisms that preserve these
properties. Provisionally, no restriction is imposed on the kind of properties to be
studied, except the properties in question must be strictly non-monotonic, i.e. not
closed under supersets. Our main objective in this chapter is to carry out a program
of research which takes the notion of preservation seriously and to give an analysis
of various inconsistency tolerant reasoning strategies therein. Note that in stating
our objective, we have implicitly endorsed a set theoretic presentation of premises
and conclusions. But this assumption is inessential to the underlying methodologi-
cal point. If premises and conclusions are modelled as different abstract data types,
e.g. as multisets or lists, we can rephrase all our definitions accordingly. In any case,
we are interested in inconsistency-tolerant inferences, whatever ways premises and
conclusions are presented, and their preservational properties.
2.2 Paraconsistent Inferences
One common approach to handling inconsistencies resulting from information fusion
from multiple sources is to fragment an inconsistent set into maximal consistent sub-
sets and then extract conclusions by applying classical inference to these subsets. This
approach was first introduced by Rescher and Manor [152; 153; 154; 156] and more
recently extended by Benferhat et al [25; 27; 26; 28; 29; 32; 33; 31; 30].
In this section we present similar but slightly more general inference mechanisms
to extract conclusions from an inconsistent set. As we shall see in the next chapter,
the inference strategies presented here are expressively equivalent to reasoning from
maximal consistent subsets. In our framework, an inference is a ternary relation be-
tween a premiss set Γ , a consistent constraint set Σ and a conclusion A.
Definition 2.2.1
Let Γ be a premiss set and Σ be an arbitrary but fixed consistent set which we call a
constraint set on Γ . Then a subsetA of Γ is Σ-inconsistent iffA∪Σ is inconsistent, else
A is Σ-consistent. A maximal Σ-consistent subset of Γ is a subset of Γ which has no
proper Σ-consistent extension.
The main motivation behind definition (2.2.1) is that we need to be able to distin-
guish between different types of information in certain reasoning tasks. For instance,
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some information may have higher priority than others or it may provide us with spe-
cific knowledge of a domain. The role of Σ in definition (2.2.1) is to rule out data in Γ
that is bad relative to Σ. Intuitively, we may think of Σ as a set of secured or prioritized
data, or even just a set of background beliefs of an agent at a given time. But more
concretely, it is similar to the idea of integrity constraints in database theory where
the known relationships between various data elements are specified. To illustrate,
consider the following example:
Example 2.2.1
The following information about a particular individual is obtained through a ques-
tionnaire:
marital status = married
age = 1
In countries in which the legal age for marriage is 18, the above information is in-
consistent.1 In such cases, we need to check our data against the following integrity
constraint:
marital status = married ⊃ age > 17
So the idea to view an inference as a ternary relationmakes sense both theoretically
and practically from the point of view of information processing. In many knowledge
base and knowledge representation systems there are additional restrictions imposed
on the knowledge base language used to express information available in Γ , the integrity
constraint Σ and the query language for expressing the inferred conclusion A. In a
relational database for instance, Γ is a set of negation free positive facts and integrity
constraints in Σ are negated closed formulae. In a deductive database, Γ can contain
either positive facts or rules whose heads are atoms and bodies are literals. These
restrictions not only provide a greater degree of control over inference in terms of
what can be derived from what, but in some cases they are indispensable to reducing
the complexity of inferences (see Wagner [179] for more discussion).
For our purpose, we’ll assume thatΣ is an arbitrary but fixed constraint set. The set
of all maximal Σ-consistent subsets of Γ is denoted byMΣ(Γ). Given a Σ-inconsistent
premiss set Γ , an element A ∈ Γ is a Σ-witness if {A} is Σ-consistent, otherwise A is
a Σ-villain. We define the safe part of Γ as, SΣ(Γ) =
⋂
MΣ(Γ). We say that a subset
1In different counteries the integrity contraint may be different. As far as we know, no country cur-
rently permit legal marriage of children of age one
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A ⊂ Γ is large iff A ∈ MΣ(Γ) and for each B ∈ MΣ(Γ), |B| ≤ |A|. We use LΣ(Γ) to
denote the set of all large subsets of Γ . A subset A of Γ is a minimally Σ-inconsistent
subset if it is Σ-inconsistent and no proper subset of A is Σ-inconsistent. The set of all
minimally Σ-inconsistent subset of Γ is denoted byMIΣ(Γ). The Σ-inconsistent part of
Γ is defined by:
InΣ(Γ) =
⋃
MIΣ(Γ)
A set H is a hitting set of a collection of sets, C = {Si : i ∈ I}, if for every i ∈ I,
Si ∩ H 6= ∅. H is a minimal hitting set if none of its proper subsets are hitting sets of C.
Given the notion of minimal hitting set,MΣ(Γ) andMIΣ(Γ) are interdefinable.
Proposition 2.2.1
Let Σ be an arbitrary but fixed constraint set and Γ be any premise set.
1. A ∈MΣ(Γ) ⇐⇒ Γ \A is a minimal hitting set ofMIΣ(Γ).
2. B ∈MIΣ(Γ) ⇐⇒ B is a minimal hitting set of {Γ \A : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}.
3. |MΣ(Γ)| ≥ max{|B| : B ∈MIΣ(Γ)}, moreover equality holds if |MIΣ(Γ)| = 1.
4. |MIΣ(Γ)| ≥ max{|Γ \A| : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}, moreover equality holds if |MΣ(Γ)| = 1.
Proof:
(1. ⇒) Suppose A ∈ MΣ(Γ) but Γ \ A is not a hitting set of MIΣ(Γ). Then for some
B ∈ MIΣ(Γ), (Γ \ A) ∩ B = ∅. This implies that B ⊆ A which is impossible given the
Σ-consistency of A. Hence, Γ \ A must be a hitting set. Suppose that Γ \ A is not a
minimal hitting set ofMIΣ(Γ), then there must be a proper superset A′ ⊃ A such that
Γ \A′ is a hitting set ofMIΣ(Γ). Since Γ \A′ andA′ are disjoint, A′ cannot contain any
B ∈MIΣ(Γ). This implies that A′ is Σ-consistent which contradicts the maximality of
A.
(1. ⇐) Let A be an arbitrary but fixed subset of Γ such that Γ \A is a minimal hitting
set ofMIΣ(Γ). Then by the disjointness of Γ and Γ \A for no B ∈MIΣ(Γ) do we have
B ⊆ A. Hence A is Σ-consistent. Since every proper subset of Γ \A is not a hitting set
ofMIΣ(Γ), every proper superset ofAmust contain some B ∈MIΣ(Γ). HenceAmust
be maximally Σ-consistent.
(2. ⇒) Consider an arbitrary B ∈MIΣ(Γ). From (1) above, for every A ∈MΣ(Γ), Γ \A
is a minimal hitting set ofMIΣ(Γ). So every Γ \Amust intersect B. Hence B is a hitting
set of {Γ \A : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}. Suppose that B is not minimal. Then there exists a proper
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subset B′ ⊂ B such that B′ is a hitting set of {Γ \ A : A ∈ MΣ(Γ)}. Since Γ \ A and A
are disjoint for every A ∈ MΣ(Γ), for no A ∈ MΣ(Γ) do we have B′ ⊆ A. But this is
impossible since B ∈ MIΣ(Γ), B′ must be Σ-consistent. Hence, B must be a minimal
hitting set.
(2. ⇐) Let B be a minimal hitting set of {Γ \ A : A ∈ MΣ(Γ)}. Suppose that B is
Σ-consistent. Then for some A0 ∈ MΣ(Γ), B ⊆ A0. This implies that B ∩ (Γ \A0) = ∅
which is impossible since B is a hitting set of {Γ \A : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}. Hence, B must be
Σ-inconsistent. Suppose that B is not minimally Σ-inconsistent. Then there must be a
proper subset B′ ⊂ B which is minimally Σ-inconsistent. From (2. ⇒) above, B′ is a
minimal hitting set of {Γ \A : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}. This contradicts the assumption that B is
a minimal hitting set.
(3) If B is the largest minimal Σ-inconsistent subset of Γ , then for each B ∈ B, B \ {B}
is Σ-consistent. There are exactly |B|many such sets. Hence there are at least |B|many
maximal Σ-consistent subsets of Γ . Clearly |MΣ(Γ)| = |B| if B is the only minimal
Σ-inconsistent subset.
(4) From (1) if A ∈MΣ(Γ) , then Γ \A is a minimal hitting set ofMIΣ(Γ). So if Γ \A is
the largest such set, then there are at least |Γ \A|many minimal Σ-inconsistent subsets
of Γ since (Γ \A) ∩ B 6= ∅ for each distinct B ∈MIΣ(Γ). Clearly in the event that A is
the only maximal Σ-consistent subset of Γ , we have |MIΣ(Γ)| = |Γ \A|.
We now define the following notions of consequence in terms of MΣ(Γ). Given
proposition (2.2.1), each of the following consequences can be defined in terms of
MIΣ(Γ) as well.
Definition 2.2.2
Σ-universal-consequence A ∈ CUΣ(Γ) iff for each A ∈MΣ(Γ), A ` A
Σ-existential-consequence A ∈ CEΣ(Γ) iff for some A ∈MΣ(Γ), A ` A
Σ-argued-consequence A ∈ CAΣ(Γ) iff there exists some Ai ∈ MΣ(Γ) with Ai ` A
and for every Aj ∈MΣ(Γ), Aj 6` ¬A.
Σ-safe-consequence A ∈ CSΣ(Γ) iff SΣ(Γ) ` A
Σ-large-consequence A ∈ CLΣ(Γ) iff A ` A for each A ∈ LΣ(Γ).
As usual for x ∈ {SΣ, UΣ, AΣ, LΣ, EΣ}, we can define the corresponding inference
relation `x by setting Γ `x A iff A ∈ Cx(Γ). The following proposition is an easy
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consequence of our definitions.
Proposition 2.2.2
Let Σ be an arbitrary but fixed constraint set on Γ whereMΣ(Γ) 6= ∅,
1. SΣ(Γ) = Γ \ InΣ(Γ)
2. CSΣ(Γ) ⊆ CUΣ(Γ) ⊆ CAΣ(Γ) ⊆ CEΣ(Γ)
3. CSΣ(Γ) ⊆ CUΣ(Γ) ⊆ CLΣ(Γ) ⊆ CEΣ(Γ)
Proof:
(1) SΣ(Γ) ⊆ Γ \ InΣ(Γ): Let A ∈ SΣ(Γ). Then A ∈
⋂
MΣ(Γ). Suppose to the contrary
that A ∈ InΣ(Γ). Then there must be some B0 ∈MIΣ(Γ) such that A ∈ B0. But by the
minimality, B0 \{A}must be Σ-consistent. So there must be someA ∈MΣ(Γ) such that
(B0 \ {A}) ⊆ A. But by the initial assumption A ∈
⋂
MΣ(Γ) and so A ∈ A. But then
(B0 \ {A}) ⊆ A and {A} ⊆ A. Hence B0 ⊆ A which contradicts the assumption that
B0 ∈MIΣ(Γ). Hence we must reject the assumption that A ∈ InΣ(Γ).
Γ \ InΣ(Γ) ⊆ SΣ(Γ): Let A ∈ Γ but A 6∈
⋂
MΣ(Γ). Then there must be some A ∈MΣ(Γ)
such that A ∪ {A} is Σ-inconsistent, for otherwise A ∪ {A} is Σ-consistent for every
A ∈ MΣ(Γ) and thus A ∈
⋂
MΣ(Γ) contradicting the initial assumption. Hence there
must be some B0 ∈MIΣ(Γ) such that B0 ⊆ A ∪ {A} and A ∈ B0. Hence A 6∈ Γ \ InΣ(Γ)
as required.
(2) CSΣ(Γ) ⊆ CUΣ(Γ): Clearly the containment holds since
Cn(
⋂
MΣ(Γ)) ⊆
⋂
A∈MΣ(Γ)
Cn(A)
CUΣ(Γ) ⊆ CAΣ(Γ): we assume that A 6∈ CAΣ(Γ) and show that A 6∈ CUΣ(Γ). By
the definition of CAΣ, A 6∈ CAΣ(Γ) implies that A ∈ CEΣ(Γ) and ¬A ∈ CEΣ(Γ). Let
A0 ∈ MΣ(Γ) be such that ¬A ∈ Cn(A0). Towards a contradiction we assume that
A ∈ ⋂{Cn(A) : A ∈ MΣ(Γ)}. Thus in particular A ∈ Cn(A0). But this is impossible
sinceA0 is Σ-consistent and thusA0 must be consistent. This contradicts our previous
claims.
CAΣ(Γ) ⊆ CEΣ(Γ): the containment follows directly from the definitions.
(3) CUΣ(Γ) ⊆ CLΣ(Γ): since LΣ(Γ) ⊆MΣ(Γ),⋂
A∈MΣ(Γ)
Cn(A) ⊆
⋂
A∈LΣ(Γ)
Cn(A)
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Hence CUΣ(Γ) ⊆ CLΣ(Γ) as required.
We note that for particular Σ and Γ , CAΣ(Γ) and CLΣ(Γ) may be incomparable,
i.e. CAΣ(Γ) 6⊆ CLΣ(Γ) and CLΣ(Γ) 6⊆ CAΣ(Γ). To take an example Σ = ∅ and Γ =
{p, ¬p, ¬p∨ q}. Clearly q ∈ CAΣ(Γ) but q 6∈ CLΣ(Γ).
The relative (set inclusion) ordering of Σ-consequences is summarised in fig-
ure (2.1). Downward arrows indicate proper set inclusions.
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Figure 2.1: Inclusion ordering of Σ-consequences
From an inferential perspective, we can view CSΣ(Γ) and CEΣ(Γ) as reasoning
strategies along a continuum. On the one hand, the Σ-safe consequence can be char-
acterized as a species of skeptical inference since it regards any conflicting data as
suspect and thus allows a reasoner to draw conclusions only from the safe part of
a premiss set. Where the safe part of a premiss set is empty, CSΣ(Γ) contains only
classical theorems. Σ-existential consequence, on the other hand, can be character-
ized as a species of liberal inference since it allows a reasoner to draw conclusions
from any Σ-witness or cluster of Σ-witnesses of a set. So in the presence of both A
and ¬A in a set Γ , where A and ¬A are both Σ-witnesses of Γ , CEΣ(Γ) contains both
A and ¬A individually (but not A ∧ ¬A). With respect to CUΣ(Γ), it is more liberal
then CSΣ(Γ) but still remains cautious overall by accepting only the intersection of
the classical consequences of all maximal Σ-consistent subsets of a premiss set. As
for CAΣ(Γ), the main idea is to accept only those conclusions which we have direct
arguments in their favour and no direct arguments for rejecting them. The notion of
an argued-consequence forms the basis of the notion of an argument systemwhich has
been studied extensively in recent years ([36; 136; 159]). Argument systems have a
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game-theoretic flavour which makes them particularly suitable for modelling a vari-
ety of multi-agent systems ([160; 161; 177]).
One of the most peculiar features of Σ-argued consequence is captured in propo-
sition (2.2.3). It highlights the fact that although an argued consequence has no direct
refutation, each may still be rebutted when evidence is pooled together in some sense.
Proposition 2.2.3
1. For eachA ∈ CAΣ(Γ),A is Σ-consistent but CAΣ(Γ) is not Σ-consistent in general.
2. If Σ = ∅, then CAΣ(Γ) is pairwise Σ-consistent.
Proof:
(1) If A ∈ CAΣ(Γ) is Σ-inconsistent, then Σ ` ¬A and for some A ∈ MΣ(Γ) A ` A.
Hence Σ ∪ A ` ⊥, a contradiction.
To see that CAΣ(Γ) is not Σ-consistent in general, the following example suffices:
Σ = {r∧ s}
Γ = {p∧ q, ¬p∧ q}
∆ = {p∨ ¬r,¬p∨ ¬s}
We can easily verify that every member of ∆ is a Σ-argued consequence of Γ but ∆ is
not Σ-consistent.
(2) To see that CA∅(Γ) is pairwise ∅-consistent, it suffices to observe that if A,B ∈
CE∅(Γ) are such that {A,B} is ∅-inconsistent, then there must be distinct A,B ∈M∅(Γ)
such that A ` A and B ` B but A ` ¬B and B ` ¬A. Hence A,B 6∈ CAΣ(Γ), a
contradiction.
Finally for CLΣ(Γ), the main idea is to accept only the intersection of the classical
consequences of all Σ-large subsets of Γ , i.e.
CLΣ(Γ) =
⋂
A∈LΣ(Γ)
Cn(A)
Note that the notion of largeness naturally induces a total ordering onMΣ(Γ). This
gives us amethod to combine different strategies to obtain different consequences. For
instance, we can define a new consequence CSLΣ by setting
CSLΣ(Γ) = Cn(
⋂
L(Γ))
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Similarly, CELΣ and CALΣ can be defined accordingly. More generally, given a total
or partial ordering≤ onMΣ(Γ)we can apply any one ofCSΣ,CUΣ,CAΣ, andCEΣ to the
≤-maximal (or the≤-minimal) elements ofMΣ(Γ) to obtain a variety of consequences.
The introduction of orderings forms the basis for a variety of preferential systems and
semantics. Priest’s LPm for instance is a paraconsistent logic whose consequence re-
lation is defined in terms of the selection of LP models that are minimal with respect
to the usual ⊆ ordering (see [138] for more details).
We note that by setting Σ = ∅, we recover the paraconsistent consequences de-
fined in [29]. We also note that in our definitions Σ only provides side constraints on
premises. We can in fact allow Σ to be used directly to derive conclusions. We have
the following stronger notions of consequence:
Definition 2.2.3
Σ-universal-consequence* A ∈ C∗UΣ(Γ) iff for each A ∈MΣ(Γ), A ∪ Σ ` A
Σ-existential-consequence* A ∈ C∗EΣ(Γ) iff for some A ∈MΣ(Γ), A ∪ Σ ` A
Σ-argued-consequence* A ∈ C∗AΣ(Γ) iff for everyAj ∈MΣ(Γ),Aj ∪Σ 6` ¬A and there
exists some Ai ∈MΣ(Γ) such that Ai ∪ Σ ` A.
Σ-safe-consequence* A ∈ C∗SΣ(Γ) iff SΣ(Γ) ∪ Σ ` A
Σ-large-consequence* A ∈ C∗LΣ(Γ) iff A ∪ Σ ` A for each A ∈ LΣ(Γ).
It is easy to verify the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2.4
1. For x ∈ {UΣ, EΣ, SΣ, LΣ}, Cx(Γ) ⊆ C∗x(Γ).
2. For some Γ and Σ, CAΣ(Γ) and C∗AΣ(Γ) are incomparable.
3. C∗AΣ(Γ) is pairwise Σ-consistent, but not Σ-consistent in general.
Proof:
(1) Follows from the fact that Cn is monotonic.
(2) The following example suffices:
Σ = {r} Γ = {p∧ q, ¬p∧ q, ¬q}
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It is straightforward to verify that
(¬q∨ s)∧ r ∈ C∗AΣ(Γ) ¬q∨ ¬r 6∈ C∗AΣ(Γ)
(¬q∨ s)∧ r 6∈ CAΣ(Γ) ¬q∨ ¬r ∈ CAΣ(Γ)
(3) To see that C∗AΣ(Γ) is pairwise Σ-consistent, it suffices to observe that if A,B ∈
C∗EΣ(Γ) are such that {A,B} is Σ-inconsistent, then there must be distinctA,B ∈MΣ(Γ)
such that Σ∪A ` A and Σ∪B ` B but Σ∪A ` ¬B and Σ∪B ` ¬A. HenceA,B 6∈ CAΣ(Γ),
a contradiction.
To see that C∗AΣ(Γ) is not Σ-consistent in general, the following example suffices:
Σ = {t}
Γ = {p∧ r, ¬p∧ r,¬r}
∆ = {(p∧ r)∨ (q∧ s), (¬q∧ r)∨ (¬q∧ s), (¬r∨ ¬s)}
We can verify that every member of ∆ is a Σ-argued consequence* of Γ but ∆ is in-
consistent and hence also Σ-inconsistent. Note that our example also shows that the
structural rules known as monotonicity and transitivity fail for both CAΣ and C∗AΣ.
Moreover, the relative set inclusion ordering of the Σ-consequences* is analogous
to figure (2.1).
2.3 Some Structural Properties
Although all our inference relations are defined in terms of the classical `, strictly
speaking they are not consequence relations in the Tarski-Scott sense. We follow the
terminology of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor in [116] and list some structural prop-
erties commonly used for comparing nonmonotonic systems in table (2.1). We’ll use
|∼ to denote an arbitrary inference relation. Note that in stating these structural prop-
erties no assumption is made about the underlying syntax of the language. The intu-
itive contents of these structural rules are fairly straightforward. Reflexivity says that
any member of a set of assumptions is deducible. Monotonicity says that previously
deduced conclusions are deducible from any enlarged set of assumptions. Transitiv-
ity says that once a lemma is generated, ‘cut and paste’ of deductions is possible to
generate new deductions. Truth says that all tautologies are deducible. Consistency
says that all classically consistent sets remain consistent. Left logical equivalence says
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that classically equivalent assumptions can be interchanged in deductions. Cautious
monotonicity says that assumptions can be safely accumulated if they are each de-
ducible. Right weakening says that classical consequences of deducible conclusions
are also deducible. Finally supraclassicality says that deducibility is an extension of
classical inference.
A ∈ Γ
[Reflexivity]
Γ |∼A
A a` B Γ, B |∼C
[Left Logical Equivalence]
Γ,A |∼C
Γ |∼A
[Monotonicity]
Γ, Γ ′ |∼A
Γ |∼A Γ |∼B
[Cautious Monotonicity]
Γ,A |∼B
Γ,A |∼B Γ |∼A
[Transitivity]
Γ |∼B
Γ |∼A A ` B
[Right Weakening]
Γ |∼B
` A
[Truth]
Γ |∼A
Γ ` A
[Supraclassicality]
Γ |∼A
Γ |∼⊥
[Consistency]
Γ ` ⊥
Table 2.1: Some structural properties of inference.
Relative to a fixed consistent constraint set Σ and a premise set Γ withMΣ(Γ) 6= ∅,
we can summarise the structural properties of our inference relations with table (2.2).
The properties of the corresponding ∗ versions are completely similar. We use ‘(∗)’ to
denote both versions of an inference relation, ‘+’ and ‘−’ to indicate that a structural
rule holds or fails to hold respectively. The proof is routine calculation; we leave it to
the reader.
The failure of transitivity in the case of `EΣ and `AΣ highlights an important con-
ceptual distinction between these two inference strategies on the one hand and the
remaining strategies on the other. Implicit in cases of `SΣ, `UΣ and `LΣ are the selec-
tion of a single Σ-consistent set of assumptions that are either implicitly or explicitly
represented by Γ . We can think of these assumptions as the set of available assump-
tions. Once the selection is completed, all permissible deductions are restricted to
the use of these available assumptions. In other words, there is a single set of Σ-
consistent available assumptions fixed for all permissible deductions in these cases.
Cutting and pasting of permissible deductions are thus also permissible since the ag-
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`(∗)SΣ `(∗)UΣ `(∗)AΣ `(∗)LΣ `(∗)EΣ
Reflexivity − − − − −
Monotonicity − − − − +
Transitivity + + − + −
Left Logical Equivalence + + + + +
Right Weakening + + + + +
Truth + + + + +
Consistency + + + + +
Cautious Monotonicity + + − + +
Supraclassicality − − − − −
Table 2.2: Some structural properties of Σ-consequences.
gregate of the assumptions used are always a subset of the set of Σ-consistent avail-
able assumptions. So transitivity holds for `SΣ, `UΣ and `LΣ. This is however not
the case for `EΣ and `AΣ. The set of available assumptions in these two cases are not
Σ-consistent even though assumptions used in any given permissible deduction form
a Σ-consistent subset. Cutting and pasting of permissible deductions may result in
impermissible deduction since the aggregate of the assumptions used may turn out to
be Σ-inconsistent. Hence transitivity fails for both `EΣ and `AΣ.
2.4 Properties of Sets
In this section, we introduce two different properties of inconsistent sets. The first
allows us to measure the relative level of incoherence of a premise set. The second
provides a measurement of the relative quantity of empirical information of a premise
set.
2.4.1 Level of Incoherence
Some inconsistent sets are clearly more unstable or incoherent then others. Consider,
for instance,
Example 2.4.1
Γ = {p∧ q, ¬p∧ q, ¬q} ∆ = {p, ¬p, q}
Clearly, there is a sense in which Γ is less stable, i.e. more incoherent, then ∆. More
specifically, we can define a function to measure the relative level of incoherence of a
set. By an n-covering of a set Γ , we mean a collection, C = {A1, . . . ,An}, of non-empty
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subsets of Γ such that Γ =
⋃ C (where n ≤ ω). Elements of an n-covering are called
clusters. An n-covering is Σ-consistent iff each of its clusters is Σ-consistent.
Definition 2.4.1
The `Σ-value of a set Γ is defined as:
`Σ(Γ) =

0 if Γ = ∅ or Γ ⊆ {A : ` A}
the cardinality of the least
Σ-consistent covering of Γ
up to and includingω
if such a covering exists
∞ otherwise
We use C`Σ(Γ) to denote the set of all `Σ(Γ)-fold coverings of Γ . The sentence ‘`Σ(Γ) =∞’ does not say that Γ has infinite Σ-level; rather it says that Γ has no Σ-level at all.
So we must distinguish between `Σ(Γ) = ∞ and `Σ(Γ) = ω. More specifically if Γ
contains a Σ-villain, then `Σ(Γ) = ∞. Also observe that if `Σ(Γ) = n 6= ∞, then there
must be a Σ-consistent n-covering of Γ .
Though the `Σ function offers us a natural way to classify inconsistent sets, it is
sensitive to the syntax of the premises. Consider for instance,
Example 2.4.2
Σ = {q} Γ = {p∧ ¬p} ∆ = {p,¬p}
According to our definition, the Σ-level of Γ and the Σ-level of ∆ are distinct –
`Σ(Γ) = ∞ but `Σ(∆) = 2. However, other less syntax-sensitive means to classify
inconsistent sets are available. In [80], Grant proposes three model theoretic means to
classify inconsistent first order theories. To our knowledge, Grant is the first to offer
such systematic classifications of inconsistent theories.
2.4.2 Quantity of Empirical Information
Some inconsistent data are less informative than others. While we agree that it is
difficult to come up with a useful definition of value of information, we do not agree
with Aisbett and Gibbon in [6] that inconsistent data provides no information to a
decision maker. What is and what isn’t informative seems to depend, at least partly,
on the goal of the agent in possession of the data. For a tax auditor, inconsistencies in a
taxpayer’s records are useful information for detecting possible fraud. Inconsistencies
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may also be useful in cases where they are deployed as directives to guide learning or
as indicators for faulty components in a complex system. Hence we need to develop
a theoretical framework to distinguish different sorts of inconsistent data. In [123],
a definition for measuring the amount of semantic information of an inconsistent set
is given. In this section we give a definition for measuring the amount of empirical
information in an inconsistent set.
By a quasi-model of Γ , we mean any two-valued model of anyA ∈MΣ(Γ). Taking
Γ to be a set of empirical data, i.e. data about the state of the world, we may intuitively
interpret each quasi-model as representing a possible state of the world according to
Γ . To define the relative quantity of empirical information of an inconsistent set, we
first define the following function:
Definition 2.4.2
The λΣ-value of a set Γ is defined as:
λΣ(Γ) =

0 if Γ = ∅ or Γ ⊆ {A : ` A}
|MΣ(Γ)| ifMΣ(Γ) 6= ∅
∞ otherwise
In effect, the λΣ-value is just the number of maximal Σ-consistent subsets of Γ . In terms
of the relation between `Σ and λΣ, it is straightforward to show the following:
Proposition 2.4.1
For any Γ ⊆ Φ, `Σ(Γ) = n =⇒ λΣ(Γ) ≥ n, for 1 ≤ n < ω
Proof:
If `Σ(Γ) = n, then there must be a Σ-consistent covering of Γ . Each cluster of such a
covering of Γ is Σ-consistent and thus can be extended to a maximally Σ-consistent
subset of Γ . There are n distinct and pairwise inconsistent clusters and thus there are
n distinct and pairwise inconsistent extensions. Hence n ≤ λΣ(Γ) as required.
Since Σ-villains are Σ-inconsistent and tautologies do not contribute any informa-
tion about the world, we may disregard them when we are considering the amount
of empirical information of a set. We let the root of Γ , R(Γ), be the set of propositional
atoms occurring in the set
⋃
MΣ(Γ) − {A ∈ Γ : ` A}, i.e., R(Γ) is the set the proposi-
tional atoms occurring in Σ-witnesses that are not tautologies. In counting the number
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of quasi-models of Γ , we are only concerned with the number of equivalence classes of
quasi-models with respect to R(Γ). So the maximum possible number of such equiv-
alence classes is 2|R(Γ)|. We use QR(Γ)(Γ) to denote the collection of such equivalence
classes of quasi-models. We note that |QR(Γ)(Γ)| ≤ 2|R(Γ)|.
Definition 2.4.3
The quantity of empirical information of Γ is given by:
IΣ(Γ) =

|R(Γ)|− log2 |QR(Γ)(Γ)| if λΣ(Γ) = 1
|R(Γ)|− log2 λΣ(Γ) if λΣ(Γ) > 1
0 otherwise
When λΣ(Γ) = 1, IΣ(Γ) is based on the ratio between 2|R(Γ)| and |QR(Γ)(Γ)|. When
λΣ(Γ) > 1, IΣ(Γ) is defined by a decreasing function of the λΣ-value of Γ . Intu-
itively, the λΣ-value of Γ provides one possible way to measure the amount of conflict
amongst the Σ-witnesses. When λΣ(Γ) = 1, there is no conflict and when λΣ(Γ) > 1
it means that there are conflicts amongst the Σ-witnesses. Moreover, the higher the
λΣ-value of Γ , the more Σ-inconsistent subsets reside amongst the Σ-witnesses. If
λΣ(Γ) = k > 1, then by taking the union of each distinct pairA,B ∈MΣ(Γ) there are at
least k(k−1)2 many ways to generate Σ-inconsistent subsets amongst the Σ-witnesses.
Consider the following example:
Example 2.4.3
Let Σ = {s}.
Γ1 = {p∧ q, ¬p∧ r, ¬s}
R(Γ1) {p, q, r}
|R(Γ1)| 3
λΣ(Γ1) 2
IΣ(Γ1) 2.00
Γ2 = {p∧ q∧ r, ¬p∧ q∧ r, p∧ ¬q∧ r, ¬s}
R(Γ2) {p, q, r}
|R(Γ2)| 3
λΣ(Γ2) 3
IΣ(Γ2) 1.42
Table 2.3: A comparison of two sets.
In table (2.3), R(Γ1) and R(Γ2) are identical. Moreover, since ¬s is a Σ-villain s is not
in R(Γi), i = 1, 2. The λΣ-value of Γ1 is lower and so the amount of conflict in the set of
Σ-witnesses in Γ1 is also lower. Consequently, IΣ(Γ1) > IΣ(Γ2).
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2.5 Σ-Forced Consequence
In this section we introduce a new paraconsistent consequence, called Σ-forced con-
sequence, based on the notion of Σ-level. Σ-forced consequence is a generalization of
a paraconsistent consequence operator introduced in [164; 167].
Definition 2.5.1
Σ-forced consequence: A ∈ CFΣ(Γ) iff for each C ∈ C`Σ(Γ), A ` A for some A ∈ C
Σ-forced consequence*: A ∈ C∗FΣ(Γ) iff for each C ∈ C`Σ(Γ), A ∪ Σ ` A for some A ∈ C
where C`Σ(Γ) is the set of all `Σ(Γ)-fold coverings of Γ .
In other words, A is a Σ-forced consequence of Γ iff for every `Σ(Γ)-fold covering of
Γ , there is a cluster which classically implies A. Again, the main difference between
CFΣ and C∗FΣ is the role Σ plays in deriving conclusions. Similarly to the previous
results, any Σ-forced consequence is a Σ-forced consequence*, i.e. for any Γ ⊆ Φ,
CFΣ(Γ) ⊆ C∗FΣ(Γ).
We also note that CFΣ and C∗FΣ are defined relative to the Σ-level of a set. Since
the Σ-level of a set is not closed under supersets in general, CFΣ and C∗FΣ are both
non-monotonic with respect to Γ . However, if we define Σ-forced consequence and
consequence* relative to a fixed n, for n ∈ N, (i.e., replace ‘every `Σ(Γ)-fold covering’
with ‘every n-covering’ in the definition), then the resulting notions of consequence
are monotonic with respect to Γ . Nonetheless, these consequences are unprincipled
when `Σ(Γ) > n. From a nonmonotonic reasoning perspective, it would be of some
theoretical interest to study a varying-Σ approach to Σ-consequence. For instance, it
is easy to see that for a fixed premise set Γ , if Σ′ ⊇ Σ, then CxΣ(Γ) ⊆ CxΣ′(Γ), where
x ∈ {E,A, F, L,U, S}. In effect, we need to distinguish between two kinds of nonmono-
tonicity – those with respect to the premise set and those with respect to the constraint
set. This is particularly interesting in modelling agents who are endowed with meta-
beliefs that govern and provide constraints on lower level beliefs. Intriguing as it may
be, however, we will not work out the details of the varying-Σ approach here.
On the assumption that a premise set Γ does not contain any Σ-villain, the relation-
ship between Σ-forced consequence and other Σ-consequences (of Γ ) is summarized
in figure (2.2). Downward arrows indicate set inclusions.
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Figure 2.2: Inclusion ordering of Σ-consequences.
2.6 Preservation
In this section we will focus on the preservational properties of our inference mech-
anisms in terms of the `Σ, λΣ and IΣ values of premise sets. We can characterise the
preservational property of a consequence operator C both locally and globally. The
local characterisation specifies the effect of extending the premise set by a single con-
sequence; whereas the global characterization specifies the effect of extending the
premise set by the entire consequence set. These notions are given formally in the
following definitions:
Definition 2.6.1
Let C be a consequence operator defined over the languageΦ, i.e., C : ℘(Φ) −→ ℘(Φ).
We say that C is
locally `Σ-preserving iff for any Γ ⊆ Φ and A ∈ C(Γ), `Σ(Γ) = n only if `Σ(Γ,A) = n
globally `Σ-preserving iff for any Γ ⊆ Φ, `Σ(Γ) = n only if `Σ(Γ, C(Γ)) = n
locally λΣ-preserving iff for any Γ ⊆ Φ and A ∈ C(Γ), λΣ(Γ) = n only if λΣ(Γ,A) = n
globally λΣ-preserving iff for any Γ ⊆ Φ, λΣ(Γ) = n only if λΣ(Γ, C(Γ)) = n
locally IΣ-preserving iff for any Γ ⊆ Φ and A ∈ C(Γ) with R(A) ⊆ R(Γ), IΣ(Γ) = n
only if IΣ(Γ,A) = n
globally IΣ-preserving iff for any Γ ⊆ Φ,
1. R(C(Γ)) ⊆ R(Γ)
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2. λΣ(Γ) = 1 only if λΣ(Γ, C(Γ)) = 1
3. IΣ(Γ) = n only if IΣ(Γ, C(Γ)) = n
We note that to show that a consequence operator is not globally x-preserving, it suf-
fices to show that it is not locally x-preserving.
Proposition 2.6.1
1. For x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}, any globally x-preserving consequence operator is also
locally x-preserving.
2. Let C1 and C2 be consequence operators such that for any Γ ⊆ Φ, C1(Γ) ⊆ C2(Γ).
If C2(Γ) is locally (or globally) x-preserving, then C1(Γ) is locally (or globally) x-
preserving for x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}.
Proof:
(1) We’ll assume that C is globally x-preserving and consider each case in turn:
(`Σ): We note that `Σ is a monotonically increasing function over ⊆-ordering of Φ.
Hence given that Γ ⊆ (Γ ∪ {A}) ⊆ (Γ ∪ C(Γ)) holds for any A ∈ C(Γ), we have
`Σ(Γ) ≤ `Σ(Γ,A) ≤ `Σ(Γ, C(Γ))
By the initial assumption C is globally `Σ-preserving and thus `Σ(Γ) = n implies that
`Σ(Γ, C(Γ)) = n and hence `Σ(Γ,A) = n as required.
(λΣ): Similar to `Σ. λΣ is also monotonically increasing.
(IΣ): There are two cases to consider:
(λΣ(Γ) = 1): Then by (1) and (2) of definition (2.6.1), we have λΣ(Γ, C(Γ)) = 1 and
R(Γ) = R(Γ,A) = R(Γ, C(Γ)). It follows that λΣ(Γ,A)) = 1 for every A ∈ C(Γ). Hence it
follows that
|R(Γ)|− log2 |QR(Γ)(Γ)| = |R(Γ, C(Γ))|− log2 |QR(Γ,C(Γ))(Γ, C(Γ))|
= |R(Γ,A)|− log2 |QR(Γ,A)(Γ,A)|
i.e. IΣ(Γ) = IΣ(Γ,A) as required.
(λΣ(Γ) > 1): Then by the previous result, λΣ(Γ) = λΣ(Γ,A) for each A ∈ C(Γ) and
R(Γ) = R(Γ,A) = R(Γ, C(Γ)). Hence,
|R(Γ)|− λΣ(Γ) = |R(Γ,A)|− λΣ(Γ,A)
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i.e. IΣ(Γ) = IΣ(Γ,A) as required.
(2) The cases for `Σ and λΣ are straightforward given that these functions are both
monotonically increasing and that C1(Γ) ⊆ C2(Γ). We’ll consider the case for IΣ:
(i) C2 is globally IΣ-preserving. If λΣ(Γ) = 1, then λΣ(Γ, C2(Γ)) = 1 by (2) of definition
(2.6.1). So by the monotonic increasing property of λΣ, λΣ(Γ, C1(Γ)) = 1. By (1) of def-
inition (2.6.1) and the assumption that C1(Γ) ⊆ C2(Γ), we have R(Γ) = R(Γ, C2(Γ)) =
R(Γ, C1(Γ)). Hence we have
|R(Γ)|− log2 |QR(Γ)(Γ)| = |R(Γ, C2(Γ))|− log2 |QR(Γ,C2(Γ))(Γ, C2(Γ))|
= |R(Γ, C1(Γ))|− log2 |QR(Γ,C1(Γ))(Γ, C1(Γ))|
i.e. IΣ(Γ) = IΣ(Γ, C1(Γ)) as required.
If λΣ(Γ) > 1, then by themonotonic increasing property of λΣ and the fact thatC1(Γ) ⊆
C2(Γ), we have λΣ(Γ) = n implies that λΣ(Γ, C1(Γ)) = n. In either case C1 is globally
IΣ-preserving on the assumption that C2 is globally IΣ-preserving.
(ii) C2 is locally IΣ-preserving. Consider an arbitrary A ∈ C1(Γ) with R(A) ⊆ R(Γ).
Given C1(Γ) ⊆ C2(Γ), A ∈ C2(Γ) follows. Hence by the local IΣ-preserving property
of C2, IΣ(Γ) = n implies IΣ(Γ,A) = n. But A was arbitrary so for any A ∈ C1(Γ)
with R(A) ⊆ R(Γ), we have IΣ(Γ) = n implies IΣ(Γ,A) = n. Hence C1 is locally IΣ-
preserving.
We can summarize proposition (2.6.1) with figure (2.3). Arrows indicate implica-
tions between two statements.
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Figure 2.3: Local and global preservation for C1 ⊆ C2
Thus by propositions (2.2.4) and (2.6.1), to show that a Σ-consequence is x-
preserving it suffices to show that itsΣ-consequence* counterpart is x-preserving (note
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the exception for CAΣ and C∗AΣ). And to show that a Σ-consequence is not globally
x-preserving it suffices to show that it is not locally x-preserving. In terms of the clas-
sical consequence operator Cn however, it is clear that for x ∈ {`∅, λ∅, I∅} Cn is neither
locally nor globally x-preserving (since for an inconsistent Γ , Cn(Γ) = Φ).
Proposition 2.6.2
1. For every x ∈ {EΣ, AΣ, FΣ, LΣ, UΣ, SΣ}, C(∗)x fails to be globally IΣ-preserving.
2. For every x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}, CAΣ fails to be globally and locally x-preserving.
3. For every x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}, C(∗)EΣ fails to be globally and locally x-preserving.
4. For every x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}, C∗AΣ is locally x-preserving but not globally x-
preserving.
5. For x ∈ {λΣ, IΣ}, C(∗)FΣ is not globally and locally x-preserving, but are globally
and locally `Σ-preserving.
6. For x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}, C(∗)LΣ fail to be globally and locally x-preserving.
7. For x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ}, C(∗)UΣ and C(∗)SΣ are locally and globally x-preserving. Moreover,
C
(∗)
UΣ and C
(∗)
SΣ are locally IΣ-preserving but not globally IΣ-preserving.
Proof:
(1) It suffices to observe that A ` A ∨ B is a valid classical rule and thus using right
weakening if A ∈ C(∗)x (Γ), then A∨ B ∈ C(∗)x (Γ) for any B. Hence R(C(∗)x (Γ)) 6⊆ R(Γ).
(2) It suffices to show that CAΣ is not locally x-preserving for x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}. We give
counterexamples for each case:
(`Σ): Clearly s∧ t ∈ CAΣ(Γ) for the following Σ and Γ :
Σ = {¬s∨ ¬t∨ ¬q, ¬s∨ ¬t∨ ¬r} `Σ(Γ) = 2
Γ = {p∧ q, ¬p∧ r, s, t} `Σ(Γ, s∧ t) = 3
(λΣ, IΣ): Clearly p∨ (¬s∨ ¬t) ∈ CAΣ(Γ) for the following Σ and Γ :
Σ = ∅ λΣ(Γ) = 2
Γ = {p, ¬p∧ s, ¬p∧ t} IΣ(Γ) = 2
λΣ(Γ, p∨ (¬s∨ ¬t)) = 4 IΣ(Γ, p∨ (¬s∨ ¬t)) = 1
(3) It follows from propositions (2.2.2), (2.6.1) and (2) above.
(4) We consider each case in turn:
§2.6 Preservation 37
(`Σ): Let A ∈ C∗AΣ(Γ) and let C = {C1, . . . , Cn} be a Σ-consistent covering of Γ that
witnesses `Σ(Γ) = n. We claim that for each i ≤ n, Ci ∪ {A} is Σ-consistent and thus{
C1 ∪ {A}, . . . , Cn ∪ {A}
}
is a Σ-consistent covering of Γ ∪ {A}. The claim clearly holds
since for each i ≤ n, Ci is contained in some A ∈ MΣ(Γ) and for every A ∈ MΣ(Γ),
Σ ∪ A 6` ¬A. So for each i ≤ n, Σ ∪ Ci 6` ¬A. By the minimality of n, `Σ(Γ,A) = n as
required.
(λΣ): similar to the `Σ case.
(IΣ): Consider any A ∈ C∗AΣ(Γ)with R(A) ⊆ R(Γ). There are two cases to consider:
(λΣ(Γ) = 1): Then by ordinary classical logic the following equality holds:
|QR(Γ)(Γ)| = |QR(Γ,A)(Γ,A)|
So IΣ(Γ) = IΣ(Γ,A) as required.
(λΣ(Γ) = n > 1): Then by the previous result C∗AΣ is λΣ-preserving and thus
|R(Γ)|− log2 λΣ(Γ) = |R(Γ,A)|− log2 λΣ(Γ,A)
Hence IΣ(Γ) = IΣ(Γ,A) as required. Failure of global preservation for C∗AΣ follows
immediately from (3) of proposition (2.2.4).
(5) For `Σ-preservation, it suffices to show that C∗FΣ is globally `Σ-preserving. Assume
that `Σ(Γ) = n. We note that by the minimality of n, `Σ(Γ, C∗FΣ(Γ)) ≥ n. Consider an
arbitrary but fixed Σ-consistent covering of Γ , C = {C1, . . . , Cn}. Let
C∗ =
{
Cn(Σ ∪ Ci) : i ≤ n
}
We claim that
(a) Γ ∪ C∗FΣ(Γ) ⊆
⋃ C∗: If A ∈ Γ , then clearly A ∈ ⋃ C∗ since C is an n-covering of Γ .
If A ∈ C∗FΣ(Γ), then every n-covering of Γ contains a cluster which together with Σ
classically implies A. In particular for C, there must be a j ≤ n such that Σ ∪ Cj ` A,
i.e. A ∈ Cn(Σ ∪ Cj). Hence A ∈
⋃ C∗.
(b) `Σ(
⋃ C∗) = n: trivial given that for each i ≤ n, Ci is Σ-consistent.
(c) `Σ(Γ, C∗FΣ(Γ)) = n: from (a) and (b) above, we have Γ ⊆
(
Γ ∪ C∗FΣ(Γ)
)
⊆ ⋃ C∗. But
`Σ(Γ) = `Σ(
⋃ C∗) = n, hence `Σ(Γ, C∗FΣ(Γ)) = n.
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To verify that C(∗)FΣ is neither λ-preserving nor IΣ-preserving, it suffices to consider the
following example where (p∨ ¬q)∨ (¬r∨ ¬s) ∈ CFΣ(Γ):
Σ = ∅ λΣ
(
Γ, (p∨ ¬q)∨ (¬r∨ ¬s)
)
= 6
Γ = {p, q, ¬q,¬p∧ r, ¬p∧ s} λΣ(Γ) = 4
(6) It suffices to show that for x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ} CLΣ fails to be locally x-preserving. We
consider each case in turn:
(`Σ): We can modify the example used in (2). Clearly s∧ t ∈ CLΣ(Γ) for the following
Σ and Γ :
Σ = {¬s∨ ¬t∨ ¬q, ¬s∨ ¬t∨ ¬r} `Σ(Γ, s∧ t) = 3
Γ = {u∧ p∧ q, u∧ ¬p∧ r, ¬u∧ s, ¬u∧ t} `Σ(Γ) = 2
(λΣ, IΣ): Again a modification of the example used in (2) suffices. Clearly p ∨ (¬s ∨
¬t) ∈ CLΣ(Γ) for the following Σ and Γ :
Σ = ∅ IΣ(Γ, p∨ (¬s∨ ¬t)) = 3
Γ = {p, q, r, ¬p∧ ¬q∧ ¬r∧ s, ¬p∧ ¬q∧ ¬r∧ t} λΣ(Γ) = 2
IΣ(Γ) = 4 λΣ(Γ, p∨ (¬s∨ ¬t)) = 4
(7) The first part of the statement is straightforward since we have
C∗UΣ(Γ) =
⋂
A∈MΣ(Γ)
Cn
(
Σ ∪ A
)
The second part of the statement is also straightforward since for any A ∈ C∗UΣ(Γ)
with the property that R(A) ⊆ R(Γ), IΣ(Γ) and IΣ(Γ,A) are clearly equal.
The preservational properties of our Σ-consequences and Σ-consequences* are
summarized in table (2.4). ‘+’ (‘−’) indicates that the relevant property is (is not) pre-
served.
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local global
`Σ λΣ IΣ `Σ λΣ IΣ
CEΣ − − − − − −
CAΣ − − − − − −
CFΣ + − − + − −
CLΣ − − − − − −
CUΣ + + + + + −
CSΣ + + + + + −
local global
`Σ λΣ IΣ `Σ λΣ IΣ
C∗EΣ − − − − − −
C∗AΣ + + + − − −
C∗FΣ + − − + − −
C∗LΣ − − − − − −
C∗UΣ + + + + + −
C∗SΣ + + + + + −
Table 2.4: Preservational properties of Σ-consequences.
2.6.1 Maximality
Since for each consequence operator C we can define a consequence relation |∼C such
that 〈Γ,A〉 ∈ |∼C iff A ∈ C(Γ), we may speak of the consequence relation |∼C as being
induced by C. Furthermore we say that |∼C is (locally or globally) x-preserving iff C
is. One important fact is that strictly speaking there is no smallest (locally or globally)
x-preserving consequence relation, x ∈ {`Σ, λΣ, IΣ}. By this we mean that for a fixed x
the intersection of all x-preserving consequence relations (induced by their respective
consequence operators) is in fact empty. However, it is possible that two consequence
operators C1 and C2 may be related in such a way that (1) C1 is (locally or globally)
x-preserving butC2 is not, and (2) for any Γ , C1(Γ) is contained inC2(Γ). In such a case
it is natural to ask whether |∼C1 can be extended maximally within |∼C2 to a (locally
or globally) x-preserving consequence relation. In fact, this is exactly the situation at
hand. For instance, CUΣ is globally `Σ-preserving but CLΣ is not (moreover for any Γ ,
CUΣ(Γ) ⊆ CLΣ(Γ)). So a natural question is whether |∼CUΣ can be extended maximally
to a `Σ-preserving extension within |∼CLΣ . Such maximal extensions are theoretically
interesting since they allow us to deduce more conclusions while still preserving the
relevant property in question.
2.6.2 Special Conditions
Another theoretically interesting question is whether there are special conditions un-
der which a particular inference mechanism can preserve a property even though the
mechanism does not preserve the property in general. We may think of these special
conditions as application conditions which allow us to use certain inference mecha-
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nisms to preserve certain properties. For instance, if each maximal Σ-consistent subset
of a premise set Γ has the same cardinality, then CLΣ(Γ) is identical to CUΣ(Γ). So the
λΣ value of Γ is preserved by CLΣ in this case even though CLΣ is neither locally nor
globally λΣ-preserving in general. For instance, the following fact allows us to use
C∗AΣ to globally preserve the `Σ value of Γ when λΣ(Γ) = n < ω.
Proposition 2.6.3
For any Γ ⊆ Φ, `Σ(Γ) = λΣ(Γ) = n < ω =⇒ `Σ(Γ, C∗AΣ(Γ)) = n.
Proof:
We’ll assume that Γ is arbitrary and that `Σ(Γ) = λΣ(Γ) = n < ω. We construct a
Σ-consistent n-covering of Γ ∪C∗AΣ(Γ). LetMΣ(Γ) = {A1, . . . ,An}. Let C = {B1, . . . ,Bn}
be an arbitrary but fixed Σ-consistent n-covering of Γ where the enumeration of C is
such that for each i ≤ n, Bi ⊆ Ai. This is clearly possible since every cluster in C is
Σ-consistent. For each Ai ∈MΣ(Γ)we define:
A∗i =
{
A ∈ Cn(Σ ∪ Ai) : ¬A 6∈
n⋃
j=1
Cn(Σ ∪ Aj)
}
Clearly, A∗i ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ Ai). Hence each A∗i is Σ-consistent. It is straightforward to
verify that
n⋃
i=1
A∗i = C∗AΣ(Γ)
We now define
C′ = {B1 ∪ A∗1, . . . , Bn ∪ A∗n}
C′ is clearly a Σ-consistent n-covering of Γ ∪C∗AΣ(Γ). Since Γ ⊆ Γ ∪CAΣ(Γ) and `Σ(Γ) =
n, by theminimality of n and themonotonic increasing property of `Σ, `Σ(Γ, C∗AΣ(Γ)) =
n as required.
2.6.3 Combining Inference Mechanisms
Finally, we have not considered the effect of combining different inference mecha-
nisms. For instance by taking the union and intersection of |∼CFΣ and |∼CUΣ we can
obtain two new consequence relations. Clearly, |∼CFΣ ∩ |∼CUΣ is both non-empty and
`Σ-preserving (since CFΣ and CUΣ are both `Σ-preserving). Again from the point of
view of section (2.6.1), |∼CFΣ ∪ |∼CUΣ is a more interesting option since it extends both
|∼CFΣ and |∼CUΣ .
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have applied a preservation-theoretic approach to analyze and com-
pare six different inconsistency tolerant inference mechanisms. The crux of our moti-
vation is to demonstrate that truth is not the only property worthy of preservation. Which
properties are to be preserved in an inference can depend on our interests and goals.
As the late Jon Barwise puts it:
. . . the study of valid inference as a situated activity shifts attention from
truth preservation to information extraction and information processing. Valid
inference is seen not as a relation between sentences that simply preserves
truth, but rather as a situated, purposeful activity whose aim is the ex-
traction of information from a situation, information relevant to the agent.
([16], p.xiv)
In a broader context, the notion of preservation can provide a theoretically rich
framework for understanding a variety of formalisms. In future work, we hope to
extend our approach to analyse belief revision mechanisms, nonmonotonic reasoning
systems and other practical reasoning systems.
42 Paraconsistent Inference and Preservation
Chapter 3
Rescher-Mechanism
3.1 Introduction
A common complaint against reasoning based on maximal consistent subsets is that
it is too sensitive to the underlying syntax of the logical representation. This may
result in information being isolated, and thereby preventing useful information to be
extracted. Consider the following example:
Example 3.1.1
Two information sourcesmay disagreewith respect to pwhile not disagreeing in other
respects: Γ = {p∧ ¬q,¬p∧ (q∨ r)}
In our example, there is a sufficiently clear sense in which neither ¬q nor q∨ r are
directly involved in an inconsistency, though they are conjoined with something that
is inconsistent. Splitting Γ into consistent subsets will prevent us from deducing the
potentially useful information r. Hence according to Belnap,
. . . Rescher’s method gives wildly different accounts depending on just
how many ampersands are replaced by commas, or vice versa. It depends
too much on how our . . . subtheory . . . is itself separated into sentential
bits. (page 544 [8])
Belnap’s criticism is fair. It is intuitively implausible that an inference mechanism
for handling inconsistent information should give wildly different conclusions for mi-
nor syntactic variations in the logical representation. But Belnap’s criticism also ap-
plies to other formal mechanisms for handling inconsistency such as belief revision.
A syntax-based revision of Γ with rwould require us to give up at least one member of
Γ (see Nebel’s [131; 132]). This may incur unwanted information loss.
In 1979 [23], Belnap proposed a particular amendment to Rescher’s strategy for
reasoning with maximal consistent subsets. In 1989 [24] Belnap changed his mind and
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made a further amendment to his earlier amendment. More recently in [87], Horty
explicitly endorsed Belnap’s second amendment to address a related problem in han-
dling inconsistent instructions and commands. In actual fact, Belnap’s suggestions
on both occasions amount to the same strategy of finding different ways to articulate
the input logical representation. According to Belnap, the input logical description Γ
is first to be closed under some non-classical logic generating a superset Γ∗ and then
Rescher’s strategy can be applied to Γ∗ in the normal way. The role of Γ∗ is to make
explicit the content of Γ so that the kind of difficulties that arise in situations similar
to example (3.1.1) can be avoided. In 1979, Belnap’s suggestion was to use Angell’s
analytic containment. In 1989 [24], Belnap’s suggestion was to use an even more re-
strictive non-classical logic based on the idea of conjunctive containment.
In this chapter, we’ll first highlight the connection between Rescher’s method of
reasoning from maximal consistent subsets and the default reasoning of Reiter [151].
This gives us the necessary background to appreciate Belnap’s criticism in relation to
more recent developments in AI. This also gives us a direct way to apply the preserva-
tion analysis from the previous chapter to various forms of default reasoning. Finally,
we’ll address Belnap’s criticism by pointing out that his suggestion of using conjunc-
tive containment seems to be open to the very objection he raised. We’ll suggest a
strategy to amend conjunctive containment.
3.2 Connection With Default Reasoning
In many ways Rescher’s method of reasoning from maximal consistent subsets has
anticipated many recent developments in AI. One in particular is the nonmonotonic
formalism developed by Reiter in [151]. In this section, we’ll recap the connection be-
tween Rescher’s method and Reiter’s original formalism for default reasoning. Since
the publication of [151], Reiter’s formalism has been revised and extended (see Schaub
[163] for a summary). Many of these new developments have been shown to be ex-
pressively equivalent to various forms of belief revision formalism. We’ll not be able
to summarise all these new developments here. But since many of these extensions
are theoretically grounded in some form of reasoning from maximal consistent sub-
sets, Belnap’s methodological criticism is still in force here. In any case, we’ll focus
on the standard default formalism of Reiter. We’ll begin by recalling some standard
definitions.
In Reiter’s formalism, a default theory is a pair 〈D,F〉, whereF is a set of formulae
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called facts and D is a set of default rules of the form:
A : B1, . . . , Bn
C
Intuitively, the meaning of the rule is that if A is provable and each Bi is consis-
tent, then we may conclude C. A is called a prerequisite of the default rule, each Bi is a
justification of the default rule and C is a consequent of the default rule. A default rule
without justification is equivalent to an inference rule in standard logics. Hence the
requirement of justification is responsible for the nonmonotonicity of default reason-
ing.
Example 3.2.1
F = {head light on} F ′ = {head light on, brake light fails}
D =
{
head light on: component 1 ok, ..., component n ok
electrical system ok
}
From the observed fact that the head light is working properly and in the absence of
evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to conclude that the electrical system is working
properly. But of course this conclusion can be defeated when we observe the failure
of some other component of the system even though the head light may still be in
operation. So in this sense a default rule is defeasible when new observation violates
some of the justifications of the rule.
The key concept in default reasoning is the notion of an extension. An extension
of a default theory is a deductive closure (under classical logic) of the facts together
with the consequents of the applicable default rules. Intuitively we can think of an
extension as a possible scenario according to the information provided by the facts
and the applicable default rules. More formally an extension for a default theory is
defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.1
(Reiter [151]) Let W = 〈D,F〉 be a default theory. For any deductively closed set
S ⊆ Φ, let γ(S) be the least set satisfying the following conditions:
1. F ⊆ γ(S)
2. Cn(γ(S)) = γ(S) (where Cn is closure under classical deduction)
3. If A:B1,...,BnC ∈ D, A ∈ γ(S), and ¬B1, . . . ,¬Bn 6∈ S , then C ∈ γ(S)
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A deductively closed set E ⊆ Φ is an extension forW (E ∈ ext(W)) iff γ(E) = E , i.e. E
is a fixed point of the operator γ.
Reiter’s definition of an extension is not recursive since it appeals to a fixed point
construction of γ. In example (3.2.1), the extensions ofW = 〈D,F〉 andW ′ = 〈D,F ′〉
are respectively:
ext(W) =
{
Cn({head light on, electrical system ok})
}
ext(W ′) =
{
Cn({head light on, brake light fails})
}
However, the existence of an extension is not guaranteed in general for every de-
fault theory. Multiple extensions for a given default theory are also possible. There
are three basic decision problems associated with default reasoning:
Extension Existence: Given a default theoryW , is ext(W) non-empty?
Intersection Membership: Given a default theoryW and a formulaA, isA a member
of
⋂
ext(W)?
Union Membership: Given a default theory W and a formula A, is A a member of⋃
ext(W)?
The first order version of default theory is clearly not semi-decidable with respect
to these decision problems. Even in the propositional case, the complexities of these
problems are generally very high – ΣP2 and Π
P
2 hard. Thus it is often desirable to
identify subclasses of default theories with either guaranteed existence of extension(s)
or with low computational complexity. A normal default theory for instance is one
whose default rules are of the form:
A : B
B
For the class N of normal propositional default theories the existence of an ex-
tension is guaranteed but the complexity of determining whether a formula is in an
extension is ΣP2 complete. Analogously, the decision problem of determining whether
a formula is in every extension is ΠP2 complete (see chapter 4 of [43] for a summary of
complexity results for default reasoning).
Another important class of default theories is the class of prerequisite free default
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theories. A prerequisite free default theory is one whose default rules are of the form:
: B1, . . . , Bn
C
Two default theories W and W ′ are said to be extension equivalent if they have the
same set of extensions, i.e. ext(W) = ext(W ′). The class of prerequisite free default
theories is representationally complete with respect to the class of all default theories in
the sense that every default theory is extension equivalent to some prerequisite free
default theory. A default theoryW is said to be inconsistent if its only extension is Φ.
In [151] Reiter shows that:
Theorem 3.2.1
(Reiter [151])
1. Let Γ be a set of formulae and W = 〈D,F〉 be a default theory. Define Γ0 = F
and for each i ≥ 0,
Γi+1 = Cn(Γi) ∪
{
C :
A : B1, . . . , Bn
C
∈ D, A ∈ Γi, ¬B1, . . . ,¬Bn 6∈ Γ
}
Then Γ is an extension forW iff
Γ =
∞⋃
i=0
Γi
2. If E and E ′ are extensions of a default theory and E ′ ⊆ E , then E ′ = E
3. A default theory W = 〈D,F〉 is inconsistent iff F is classically inconsistent iff
ext(W) = {Φ}.
4. Extensions exist for every normal default theory.
5. Extensions of a normal default theory are orthogonal in the sense that they are
pairwise inconsistent.
We note that in (1) of theorem (3.2.1), the definition of Γi+1 makes essential ref-
erence to Γ and hence it is not a recursive definition. Using Reiter’s results, we can
show that there is a close relationship between consistent prerequisite free normal de-
fault theories and reasoning from maximal consistent subsets. Note that by (3) of
theorem (3.2.1), inconsistent default theories are extension equivalent trivially. By (4)
of theorem (3.2.1), extension is guaranteed to exist for any default theory in the class
P of consistent prerequisite free normal default theories.
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Theorem 3.2.2
For everyW = 〈D,F〉 ∈ P , ext(W) is of the form
{Cn(Σ ∪ A) : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}
for some Γ and consistent Σ.
Proof:
Let W = 〈D,F〉 ∈ P be arbitrary but fixed. We set Σ = F . First we observe that by
part (3) of theorem (3.2.1), Σ is consistent and each extension ofW is also consistent.
Define
Γ =
{
A :
: A
A
∈ D
}
Let E ∈ ext(W) be an arbitrary but fixed extension, consider ∆ = Cn((E ∩ Γ) ∪ Σ). We
claim that
Claim: ∆ = E :
Proof of Claim: (∆ ⊆ E): Since E ∈ ext(W), γ(E) = E and thus by properties (1) and (2)
of definition (3.2.1) we have:
E ∩ Γ ⊆ E =⇒ (E ∩ Γ) ∪ Σ ⊆ E
=⇒ Cn((E ∩ Γ) ∪ Σ) ⊆ Cn(E)
=⇒ Cn((E ∩ Γ) ∪ Σ) ⊆ E
(∆ ⊇ E): Now we use part (1) of theorem (3.2.1). Since E ∈ ext(W), we have E =⋃∞
i=0 Ei. We prove inductively that Ei ⊆ ∆. For the basis it is trivial since E0 = Σ ⊆ ∆.
Now we assume the induction hypothesis that Ei ⊆ ∆ and prove that Ei+1 ⊆ ∆. If
A ∈ Ei+1, then A ∈ Ei or A ∈ {C : :CC ∈ D, ¬C 6∈ E}. In the former case, we have A ∈ ∆
by the induction hypothesis. In the later case, we have A ∈ Γ and A ∈ γ(E) by (3) of
definition (3.2.1) hence A ∈ E as γ(E) = E . Hence A ∈ E ∩ Γ and so A ∈ ∆ as required.
This completes the proof that E = ⋃∞i=0 Ei ⊆ ∆.
To continue with the main proof we need to show that E ∩ Γ ∈ MΣ(Γ). Clearly,
E ∩ Γ is Σ-consistent since E is Σ-consistent. To show maximal consistency, consider
any A ∈ Γ such that A 6∈ E ∩ Γ . Since γ(E) = E by part (3) of definition (3.2.1), we
have A ∈ E or ¬A ∈ E . Since A 6∈ E ∩ Γ , we have A 6∈ E . Thus, ¬A ∈ E . But ∆ = E so
(E ∩ Γ) ∪ Σ ` ¬A. Hence (E ∩ Γ) ∪ {A} is not Σ-consistent. This suffices to show that
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E ∩ Γ ∈MΣ(Γ). Since E is arbitrary, we conclude that every extension ofW must be of
the form Cn(Σ ∪ A)where A ∈MΣ(Γ). Hence, ext(W) ⊆ {Cn(Σ ∪ A) : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}.
Now to show that for everyA ∈MΣ(Γ), Cn(Σ∪A) ∈ ext(W), we make use of part
(1) of theorem (3.2.1). We consider an arbitrary A ∈ MΣ(Γ) and define S0 = Σ = F
and for each i ≥ 0
Si+1 = Cn(Si) ∪
{
A :
: A
A
∈ D,¬A 6∈ Cn(Σ ∪ A)
}
We note that for i ≥ 2, Si = Si+1. Hence we only need to verify that S2 = Cn(Σ ∪ A),
i.e. we need to verify that
Cn(Σ ∪ A) = Cn
(
Cn(Σ) ∪
{
A :
: A
A
∈ D,¬A 6∈ Cn(Σ ∪ A)
})
(3.1)
We claim that in equation (3.1),{
A :
: A
A
∈ D,¬A 6∈ Cn(Σ ∪ A)
}
= A
To verify our claim consider an arbitrary B ∈ A. Since A ⊆ Γ , we have B ∈ Γ and thus
:B
B ∈ D. By the maximal Σ-consistency of A, we have ¬B 6∈ Cn(Σ ∪ A). Conversely
consider an arbitrary B ∈ {A : :AA ∈ D,¬A 6∈ Cn(Σ ∪ A)}. It follows that B ∈ Γ
and ¬B 6∈ Cn(Σ ∪ A). Suppose to the contrary that B 6∈ A, then by the maximal Σ-
consistency of A we have ¬B ∈ Cn(Σ ∪ A) contradicting our previous claim. Hence
B ∈ A as required.
Thus equation (3.1) can be rewritten as:
Cn(Σ ∪ A) = Cn(Cn(Σ) ∪ A) (3.2)
To verify (3.2), we note that by reflexivity Σ ∪ A ⊆ Cn(Σ) ∪ A and thus by the mono-
tonicity we getCn(Σ∪A) ⊆ Cn(Cn(Σ∪A)). Conversely by reflexivity andmonotonic-
ity, Cn(Σ) ∪A ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪A) and thus Cn(Cn(Σ) ∪A)) ⊆ Cn(Cn(Σ ∪A) = Cn(Σ ∪A)
by idempotence of Cn.
We note that for any given set Γ and any given consistent set Σ, the family of clo-
sures of Σ-maximal consistent subsets of Γ is precisely the family of extensions of some
consistent prerequisite free normal default theory. The corresponding default theory
is defined in the obvious way. It is easy to see that the following is an immediate
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corollary of theorem (3.2.2).
Corollary 3.2.1
LetW and Γ be defined as in theorem (3.2.2). Then C∗UΣ(Γ) =
⋂
ext(W) and C∗EΣ(Γ) =⋃
ext(W).
More interestingly, Marek, Treur, and Truszczyn´ski [126] show that there is a close
relationship between consistent normal default theories and reasoning from maximal
consistent subsets. They also show that the class of consistent prerequisite free normal
default theories P is representationally complete with respect to the class of consistent
normal default theories N . Note that P is a proper subclass of N . Thus the results
of Marek, Treur, and Truszczyn´ski can be seen as a strengthening of theorem (3.2.2).
The results of Marek, Treur, and Truszczyn´ski can be restated in terms of representation
theory for default logic. A family of theories G is said to be trivial if Φ ∈ G, else
G is non-trivial. Furthermore G is said to be representable by a default theory W if
ext(W) = G.
Theorem 3.2.3
(Marek, Treur, and Truszczyn´ski [126])
1. If a family of non-trivial theories G is representable by a default theoryW ∈ N ,
then G is representable by a default theoryW ′ ∈ P , i.e. P is representationally
complete with respect to N .
2. A family of non-trivial theories G is representable by a default theoryW ∈ N iff
there is a set of formulae Γ such that
G = {Cn(A) : A ∈M∅(Γ)}
Theorem (3.2.3) shows that each consistent normal default theory W is expres-
sively equivalent to a family of maximal consistent subsets of some set Γ , i.e. the
family of closures of these maximal consistent subsets of Γ is precisely the family of
extensions ofW . But note that Γ need not be unique in general, i.e. it is possible that
for some Γ ′ 6= Γ , {Cn(A) : A ∈ M∅(Γ)} = {Cn(B) : B ∈ M∅(Γ ′)}. The following are
immediate corollaries of theorem (3.2.3).
Corollary 3.2.2
1. For any Γ ⊂ Φ with M∅(Γ) 6= ∅, CE∅(Γ) = C∗E∅(Γ) =
⋃
ext(W) and CU∅(Γ) =
C∗U∅(Γ) =
⋂
ext(W) for someW ∈ N .
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2. A family of non-trivial theories G is representable by a default theoryW ∈ P iff
there is a set of formulae Γ such that
G = {Cn(A) : A ∈M∅(Γ)}
Proposition 3.2.1
For everyW ∈ N , ext(W) can be expressed in two equivalent forms:
{Cn(A) : A ∈M∅(Γ ′)} = {Cn(Σ ∪ B) : B ∈MΣ(Γ)} (3.3)
for some consistent Σ and some Γ and Γ ′.
Proof:
Consider an arbitraryW ∈ N . By (2) of theorem (3.2.3), there exits Γ ′ such that ext(W)
can be expressed as the LHS of equation (3.3). By (1) of theorem (3.2.3), P is represen-
tationally complete with respect to N . Hence, there exists a W ′ ∈ P where W ′ is
extensionally equivalent to W . By theorem (3.2.2), there exits Γ such that W ′ can be
expressed as the RHS of equation (3.3).
We can give a representational completeness result similar to (1) of theorem (3.2.3).
Set S′ = {(Γ, ∅) : Γ ⊆ Φ} and S = {(Γ, Σ) : Γ, Σ ⊆ Φ, Σ 6` ⊥}. We say that a family of
theories G is representable by a (Γ, Σ) ∈ S iff G = {Cn(Σ ∪ A) : A ∈MΣ(Γ)}.
Theorem 3.2.4
If a family of theories G is representable by some (Γ, Σ) ∈ S, then G is representable by
some (Γ ′, ∅) ∈ S′
Proof:
Let G be a family of theories representable by some (Γ, Σ) ∈ S. Then G is representable
by some W ′ ∈ P . Since P is a subclass of N , we can apply proposition (3.2.1) to W ′
and thereby yielding the existence of a Γ ′ such that ext(W ′) = {Cn(A) : A ∈ M∅(Γ ′)}.
This suffices to show that G is representable by some (Γ ′, ∅) ∈ S′.
We can summarise our results with figure (3.1). P ,N , S′ and S are all expressively
equivalent in the sense that a family of theories G is representable in one of these
classes iff G is representable in all the other classes.
Of course these results show that the formalism of default reasoning is equipped
with capabilities for handling inconsistencies. Taking union (intersection) over exten-
sions of a consistent normal default theory corresponds to existential (universal) con-
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Figure 3.1: Expressive equivalence of P , N , S′ and S
sequence in Rescher’s sense. But there are also limitations to default reasoning – in-
consistencies in the set of facts in a default theory still trivialises the extension. Clearly
there is room for improvement here. One possible solution suggested by Hunter in
[91] is to replace the underlying classical logic with a weaker paraconsistent logic as
the underlying deduction mechanism. Indeed, we can keep most of definition (3.2.1)
intact. The only modification we need to make is the replacement of the closure con-
dition in clause 2 of definition (3.2.1) with the deductive closure of a weaker paracon-
sistent logic. As to which paraconsistent logic should be used, we need not decide
a priori here. In fact it would seem to be more useful to study and compare the be-
haviour of the resulting mechanisms obtained by plugging in various paraconsistent
logics. We’ll leave this analysis and study for future work.
From a preservational point of view, the upshot of theorem (3.2.2) and theo-
rem (3.2.3) is that the kind of analyses and accounts presented in the last chapter has
direct counterparts for default theories in P and N .
3.3 Belnap’s Conjunctive Containment
In [8], Belnap considered a strategy to improve the Rescher-mechanism by finding dif-
ferent articulations for a set of logical descriptions. Recall that Belnap’s main criticism
of Rescher is that reasoning with maximal consistent subsets is too syntax dependent
on the underlying logical representation. Hence a minor syntactic variant may yield
wildly different conclusions. Note that given the results from last section, Belnap’s
criticism is equally applicable to default reasoning. For the classes P andN of default
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theories, extensions are just closures of maximal consistent subsets. Hence any rea-
soning strategy involving extensions in these classes is equivalent to reasoning with
maximal consistent subsets.
Belnap’s main idea is that given a set of input premises Γ we can pre-process Γ with
certain closure operations so that the content of the input premises can be made ex-
plicit and information not involved in any inconsistency can be isolated. Once this
is done, we can then apply the Rescher-mechanism to reason with the extended set.
Indeed Belnap’s suggestion is not fundamentally different from the methodology of
knowledge compilation in AI (see [106; 107]). In knowledge compilation, the general aim
is to give a sound and complete translation of information represented in a general lan-
guage to a sub-language with lower complexity. The translation is done off-line so that
the computational cost of inference is shifted from run time query-answering to off-
line compilation. Thus in knowledge compilation, reasoning can be viewed as a two
stage process involving both data preparation and formal deduction from prepared
data. For Belnap however, the concern is not so much to reduce the computational
cost but to reduce the effect of syntactic variations on inferences from the innocent
part of the information. Clearly this can be seen as a form of data preparation. It is
instructive to recap Belnap’s reasons for rejecting the use of the first degree entailment
(FDE) of the relevant logic R, Parry’s analytic implication (AI) and Angell’s analytic
containment (AC) as candidate closures for the input premises:
Example 3.3.1
Γ = {p, ¬p, q}
In FDE and Parry’s AIwe have, respectively
`FDE A→ A∨ B `AI A∧ B→ A∨ ¬B
Hence the closure of Γ under either FDE or analytic implication yields ¬p∨¬qwhich
conspires together with p to prevent q from being derived as a U-consequence.
Example 3.3.2
Γ = {p, ¬p, q, r∨ ¬q}
In Angell’s ACwe have
`AC A∧ (B∨ C)↔ A∧ (B∨ C)∧ (A∨ C)
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Hence from Γ we get `AC ¬p ∧ (r ∨ ¬q) → ¬p ∨ ¬q. Once again ¬p ∨ ¬q conspires
together with p to prevent q from being derived as a U-consequence.
In each of these cases, the use of a certain version of disjunction introduction re-
sults in the introduction of additional inconsistencies. Indeed this is symptomatic of
the kind of difficulties involved in the use of disjunction introduction in the presence
of inconsistencies. To overcome this problem, Belnap proposes the use of conjunctive
containment. First we have the following definitions. To simplify the matter, we’ll
assume that our language is restricted to the truth functional connectives {¬,∧, ∨}.
Definition 3.3.1
A subformula B of a given formula A is said to be an even subformula if it is within
the scope of zero or an even number of negations, otherwise it is said to be odd.
Definition 3.3.2
Belnap’s replacement rules are given as follows:
[∗] . . . (B∧ C) . . .
. . . B . . . . . . C . . .
provided that (B∧ C) is an even subformula.
[#]
. . . (B∨ C) . . .
. . . B . . . . . . C . . .
provided that (B∨ C) is an odd subformula.
Clearly for any given Awe can built a finite binary tree T such that
1. the root of T is just A,
2. each branching is an application of either [#] or [∗],
3. a node is either the root of T or a formula obtained by [#] or [∗], and
4. the leaves or end points are formulae which contain no even subformulae of the
form (B∧ C) and no odd subformulae of the form (B∨ C)
For convenience we shall draw a tree with the root at the bottom and all branches
extending upward, i.e. we apply the replacement rules as if they are upside down.
Since the order in which we apply [#] and [∗] can be permuted, clearly such a tree is
not unique for a given A in general. But there can be at most finitely many such trees
for a given A. Thus we can associate with each A a finite set of trees {T A1 , . . . , T An }
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where each T Ai is a finite binary tree built in the prescribed way. We’ll call these the
Belnap trees associated with A.
Lemma 3.3.1
Let (B∧C) be a zero subformula inD = . . . (B∧C) . . ., thenD is classically equivalent
to D′ = ((. . . B . . .)∧ (. . . C . . .)).
Proof:
Since (B∧C) is a zero subformula, we can equivalently transformD into the following
form:
D0 =
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B∧ C) ∗1 A1) ∗2 A2) ∗3 . . .) ∗n An)
where ∗i is either ∧ or ∨.
Since both ∧ and∨ are commutative, we note any step in the transformation from
D to D0 is reversible and equivalence preserving. We’ll denote the transformation
from D to D0 as T and the reverse of T as T ′. We’ll show by induction on the depth
d of (B ∧ C), defined in terms of the number of ‘(’ to the left of B ∧ C, that D0 is
equivalent to
D′0 = [
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B ∗1 A1) ∗2 . . .) ∗n An)∧
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (C ∗1 A1) ∗2 . . .) ∗n An) ]
For the basis d = 1: this is trivial since (B∧C) is equivalent to itself. For the inductive
step, We’ll make the assumption that the statement holds for d = k and show that it
holds for the case when d = k+ 1. Since we assume that d = k+ 1, D0 must be of the
form:
k+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B∧ C) ∗1 A1) ∗2 A2) ∗3 . . .) ∗k Ak)
By the induction hypothesis, the following subformula of D0
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B∧ C) ∗1 A1) ∗2 A2) ∗3 . . .) ∗k−1 Ak−1)
is equivalent to
[
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B ∗1 A1) ∗2 . . .) ∗k−1 Ak−1)∧
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (C ∗1 A1) ∗2 . . .) ∗k−1 Ak−1) ]
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Hence D0 must be equivalent to
E =
(
[
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B ∗1 A1) ∗2 . . .) ∗k−1 Ak−1)∧
k−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (C ∗1 A1) ∗2 . . .) ∗k−1 Ak−1) ] ∗k Ak
)
There are two cases to consider: either ∗k is ∧ or ∨. In the first case E is equivalent to
[
k+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B ∗1 A1) . . . ∗k−1 Ak−1)∧Ak)∧
k+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (C ∗1 A1) . . . ∗k−1 Ak−1)∧Ak)]
In the later case, using distribution of ∨ over ∧, E is equivalent to
[
k+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (B ∗1 A1) . . . ∗k−1 Ak−1)∨Ak)∧
k+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(. . . (C ∗1 A1) . . . ∗k−1 Ak−1)∨Ak)]
This suffices to show that D0 and D′0 are equivalent. To complete the proof we
make use of the fact that the transformation T from D to D0 is reversible. Hence
by applying the reverse transformation T ′ to the left and right conjuncts of D′0, the
equivalence of D and D′ follows.
Proposition 3.3.1
If E and F are obtained from A by an application of either [∗] or [#], then E ∧ F is
classically equivalent to A.
Proof:
If E and F are obtained from A by an application of [∗], then E and Fmust be obtained
via an even subformula (B ∧ C) of A. Since (B ∧ C) is even, repeat applications of
pushing negations onto (B∧C)will result in an even occurrences of negation in front
of (B ∧ C). By double negation elimination we can transform A into an equivalent
formulaA′ where (B∧C) is a zero subformula. Using lemma (3.3.1) and reversing the
relevant transformation steps, the desired result follows.
If E and F are obtained via [#], then E and F must be obtained via an odd subfor-
mula (B∨ C) of A. Since (B∨ C) is odd, repeat application of pushing negation onto
(B∨C)will result in an odd occurrences of negation in front of (B∨C). Using double
negation elimination repeatedly and pushing the remaining negation into (B∨C)will
result in an even subformula (¬B ∧ ¬C). Again applying lemma 3.3.1 and reversing
all relevant transformation steps, the desired result follows.
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Corollary 3.3.1
For any Belnap tree T A associated with A, A is classically equivalent to the conjunc-
tion of all the leaves in T A.
Definition 3.3.3
Belnap’s Closure, CB, on a given A is defined as follows: D ∈ CB(A) iff D is a node
of some Belnap tree associated with A. For a given set of formulae Γ , CB(Γ) = {D ∈
CB(A) : A ∈ Γ }.
A set Γ conjunctively contains A in the strict sense iff A ∈ CB(Γ), i.e. A is a node of
some Belnap tree associated with some A ∈ Γ .
The extended Belnap’s Closure, C+B on a set Γ is defined as follows: A ∈ C+B(Γ) iff
every member of CB(A) is classically equivalent to a conjunction of some members of
CB(Γ).
Alternatively we may define CB(Γ) simply as the least superset of Γ that is closed
under [∗] and [#]. The use of Belnap’s trees gives us an easy way to visualise the un-
derlying mechanism: each piece of information A is conjunctively eliminated at each
level of a Belnap’s tree until all hidden conjunctions are eliminated; since [∗] and [#]
preserve the model of their premises, all information implicitly encoded in A is suc-
cessively passed on to the next level in its Belnap’s tree.
With respect to the extended Belnap’s closure C+B , the basic idea is to regain
some limited form of conjunction introduction with members of CB while adding all
those that are classically equivalent to these conjunctions without creating unexpected
nonequivalence.
Example 3.3.3
Let Γ = {p}. We have p ∧ p ∈ C+B(Γ) but p ∨ (p ∧ q) 6∈ C+B(Γ) even though p ∧ p is
classically equivalent to p∨ (p∧q). Note that although we have p∨q ∈ CB({p∨ (p∧
q)}), p∨ q is not classically equivalent to any conjunction of members of CB(Γ).
Fact 3.3.1
CB and C+B are closure operators in the sense of Tarski, i.e. they satisfy inclusion,
monotonicity and idempotence. C+B is an extension of CB, i.e. for any Γ ⊆ Φ, CB(Γ) ⊆
C+B(Γ). Moreover they distribute over union, i.e. CB(Γ ∪ Γ ′) = CB(Γ) ∪ CB(Γ ′)
While we may think of Belnap’s closure CB as an articulation of a set of formulae,
the extension C+B is a proper E-equivalent extension of CB in the following sense:
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Definition 3.3.4
A closure operator C is a proper E-equivalent extension of a closure operator C′ iff for
any premise set Γ ⊆ Φ,
1. C(Γ) and C′(Γ) have exactly the same set of existential-consequences, i.e.
C∗E(C(Γ)) = C
∗
E(C
′(Γ)).
2. C′(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ)
3. C(C′(Γ)) = C(Γ)
If condition (1) holds for C, then we say that C is E-equivalent to C′.
Note that in our definition, we have dropped the reference to any constraint set
Σ. By the representational completeness of theorem (3.2.4), there is no loss of general-
ity here. By modifying clause (1) of our definition, we can obtain the corresponding
notions of proper U, A, S, L-equivalent extensions of a given closure operator. More
generally for x ∈ {E, U, A, S, L}, two sets Γ and Γ ′ are x-equivalent if Γ and Γ ′ have
exactly the same set of x-consequences. The following lemma can be used to show
that C+B is a proper E and U-equivalent extension of CB:
Lemma 3.3.2
For an arbitrary but fixed Γ , letM(CB(Γ)) andM(C+B(Γ)) be the collections of maximal
consistent subsets of CB(Γ) and C+B(Γ) respectively. Then there is a bijection f with
domain M(CB(Γ)) and range M(C+B(Γ)) such that for any A ∈ M(CB(Γ)), f(A) is
classically equivalent to A.
Proof:
Let Γ be arbitrary but fixed. Let
M(CB(Γ)) = {Ai : i ∈ I}
M(C+B(Γ)) = {Bj : j ∈ J}
We observe that
1. for each i ∈ I there exists a j ∈ J such that Ai ⊆ Bj: by the consistency of Ai and
the fact that CB(Γ) ⊆ C+B(Γ).
2. for each i ∈ I there is exactly one j ∈ J such thatAi ⊆ Bj: from (1) the existence of
such a Bj is guaranteed for each arbitrary but fixed i ∈ I. Toward a contradiction
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assume that for some k ∈ J, k 6= j, Ai ⊆ Bk. Note that since Bj 6= Bk, Bj ∪ Bk is
inconsistent. Hence there exists D1, . . . , Dm ∈ Bj and E1, . . . , En ∈ Bk such that
D1 ∧ . . .∧Dm ` ¬(E1 ∧ . . .∧ En)
We claim that every member ofCB(D1)∪ . . .∪CB(Dm)must be classically equiv-
alent to a conjunction of some members of Ai. Suppose not. Then there must
be a member of CB(D1) ∪ . . . ∪ CB(Dm) classically equivalent to a conjunction
of members involving elements of (CB(Γ) \ Ai). But this is impossible since by
the maximal consistency of Ai any A ∈ CB(Γ) \ Ai is inconsistent with Ai and
this would imply that Ai is inconsistent with Bj. Similar argument also shows
that every member of CB(E1) ∪ . . . ∪ CB(En) must be classically equivalent to a
conjunction of some members of Ai. But this clearly contradicts the consistency
of A. Hence Bj cannot be distinct from Bk afterall.
3. for no i, i′ ∈ I, i 6= i′ do we have Ai ⊆ Bj and Ai′ ⊆ Bj for some j ∈ J: by the
consistency of each Bj.
4. for each j ∈ J there exists an i ∈ I such that Ai ⊆ Bj: it is straightforward to
verify that for each j ∈ J, Bj ∩ CB(Γ) is a maximal consistent subset of CB(Γ).
We now define the function f : CB(Γ) −→ C+B(Γ) as follows: for each i ∈ I
f(Ai) = Bj ⇔ Ai ⊆ Bj
for some j ∈ J. Clearly by observation (2), f is a well defined function. By observation
(4), f is surjective. By observation (3) f is injective. Hence f is a bijection.
Finally to show that for every i ∈ I, Ai and f(Ai) are classically equivalent, it
suffices to observe that the argument for observation (2) establishes that for every
A ∈ f(Ai), every member of CB(A) is classically equivalent to a conjunction of some
members of Ai.
Theorem 3.3.1
C+B is a proper E and U-equivalent extension of CB.
Proof:
By lemma (3.3.2), condition (1) of definition (3.3.4) is clearly satisfied. Moreover
CB(Γ) ⊆ C+B(Γ) clearly holds. It remains to verify that for any Γ , C+B(CB(Γ)) = C+B(Γ)
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(⊇): Since CB and C+B are both Tarskian closure operators, we have Γ ⊆ CB(Γ) and
hence C+B(Γ) ⊆ C+B(CB(Γ)).
(⊆): If A ∈ C+B(CB(Γ)), then for every B ∈ CB(A), there are C1, . . . , Cn ∈ CB(CB(Γ))
such that B is classically equivalent to C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cn. But CB(CB(Γ)) = CB(Γ), hence
A ∈ C+B(Γ) as required.
Corollary 3.3.2
For any Γ and consistent Σ ⊆ Φ, let D and D′ be default theories defined as follows:
D = 〈{ : A
A
: A ∈ CB(Γ)}, Σ〉 D′ = 〈{ : B
B
: B ∈ C+B(Γ)}, Σ〉
Then ext(D) = ext(D′)
The notion of E-equivalence is an important idea and by theorem (3.2.3) it is related
to the notion of extension equivalence between default theories. Lemma (3.3.2) clearly
gives a sufficient condition for E-equivalence – two sets of formulae (with arbitrary
cardinalities) are E-equivalent if a bijection of the suitable sort exists between the two
collections of maximal consistent subsets of the two sets. But it is unclear that this is
also necessary in cases where infinite cardinalities are considered. In [156], Rescher
and Manor give the necessary and sufficient conditions for E-equivalence for finitely
generated sets of formulae. But no general characterisation is given there. For sets with
finitely many maximal consistent subsets (though not necessarily finitely generated
in Rescher’s sense), the following proposition gives a necessary condition for their
E-equivalence:
Proposition 3.3.2
Let |M(Γ)| < ω. If Γ ′ is E-equivalent to Γ , then |M(Γ ′)| = |M(Γ)|. Equivalently, for any
Γ and Γ ′, if |M(Γ ′)| and |M(Γ)| are finite and |M(Γ ′)| 6= |M(Γ)|, then Γ and Γ ′ are not
E-equivalent.
Proof:
Without loss of generality, we may assume that Γ and Γ ′ are such that |M(Γ)| = n and
|M(Γ ′)| = m where m < n. Towards a contradiction, we assume that Γ and Γ ′ are
E-equivalent. We letM(Γ) = {A1, . . . ,An} andM(Γ ′) = {B1, . . . ,Bm}. Since members
ofM(Γ ′) are pairwise inconsistent, by the standard compactness theorem, there exist
formulae A1, . . . , An such that for every i ≤ n,
1. Ai ` Ai and
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2. Ai `
∧
i 6=j ¬Aj
By our reductio assumption Γ and Γ ′ are E-equivalent and hence by (1) above for
each i ≤ n there exists a k ≤ m such that Bk ` Ai. However by our initial assumption
m < n and thus by the pigeonhole principle, there exists a t ≤ m such that Bt `∧
i≤n ¬Ai. Clearly by the consistency of each Ai ∈ M(Γ), Ai 6`
∧
i≤n ¬Ai. But this
contradicts the assumption that Γ and Γ ′ are E-equivalent. This suffices to show that Γ
and Γ ′ are not E-equivalent on the assumption that n 6= m.
Thus for any two finite sets, we can test for their non-E-equivalence by simply
counting their number of maximal consistent subsets. In previous chapter, such a
counting function λ was introduced and studied. It was further argued that the λ
value of a set of formulae may be used as a way to measure the amount of inconsis-
tency in the set. Intuitively, if the λ values of two finite sets (with the same cardinality)
differ then the amounts of inconsistency in these two sets also differ. This intuition is
justified by the fact that if λ(Γ) = k 6= ω, then by taking the union of each distinct
pair of maximal consistent subsets there are at least k(k−1)2 many ways of generating
inconsistent subsets of Γ . As such the λ function may be useful as a tool for analyzing
inconsistent data.
3.3.1 Maximal Equivalent Extension
In [8] Belnap considered the interesting possibility of finding a strongest, i.e. maximal,
closure operator C that U-equivalently extends CB. In particular, Belnap proposed
C+B as a candidate. The following shows that C
+
B fails to be such a maximal closure
operator.
Proposition 3.3.3
C+B is not a maximal closure that U-equivalently extends CB.
Proof:
It suffices to find a closure operator that properly extends C+B and U-equivalently ex-
tends CB. For any Γ let,
C∗(Γ) = C+B(Γ) ∪ >
We claim that C+B(Γ) ∪ > = C+B(Γ ∪ >):
(⊆): trivial since C+B is a closure operator.
62 Rescher-Mechanism
(⊇): let A ∈ C+B(Γ ∪ >). Then each B ∈ CB(A) is classically equivalent to the conjunc-
tion of some C1, . . . , Cn ∈ CB(Γ ∪>). But CB(Γ ∪>) = CB(Γ)∪> by the distributivity
of CB, so we have 3 cases to consider:
1. C1, . . . , Cn ∈ CB(Γ). Then A ∈ C+B(Γ) and hence A ∈ C+B(Γ) ∪ >.
2. C1, . . . , Cn ∈ >. Then A is a tautology and hence A ∈ C+B(Γ) ∪ >.
3. C1, . . . , Ci ∈ CB(Γ) and Ci+1 . . . Cn ∈ >. Then clearly A is equivalent to C1 ∧
. . .∧ Ci. Hence A ∈ C+B(Γ).
By our claim C∗ is a closure operator. We verify that C∗(CB(Γ)) = C∗(Γ):
(⊇): since Γ ⊆ CB(Γ), C∗(Γ) ⊆ C∗(CB(Γ)) holds as required.
(⊆): by the usual closure properties of CB, we have CB(CB(Γ)∪>) = CB(Γ ∪>). Hence
A ∈ C+B(CB(Γ) ∪ >) implies that A ∈ C+B(Γ ∪ >). Hence C∗(CB(Γ)) ⊆ C∗(Γ).
It remains to show that CB(Γ) and C∗(Γ) have the same set of U-consequences. But
this is trivial since tautologies are trivial consequences of any subset. Finally to see
that C∗ properly extends C+B , we note that C
+
B(Γ) ⊂ C∗(Γ) holds for any Γ such that
CB(Γ) contains no tautology.
Though technically correct, our proposition is unremarkable since it is straightfor-
ward to show that C∗ properly extends C+B and U-equivalently extends CB. However,
we may think that we can continue the trick by adding every false sentence to Γ and
then closing the resulting set under C+B . But this is clearly not a U-equivalent exten-
sion of CB. If we begin with a consistent set, e.g. {p} and then add the false sentence
p∧ ¬p, we can no long obtain p as a U-consequence.
Another minor observation is that if there are countably many propositional
atoms, then there are at least countably many trivial U-equivalent extensions of CB
between CB and C∗: for each pi we can simply add pi ∨ ¬pi to Γ and then close it
under CB to obtain a U-equivalent extension.
3.4 An Improvement to Belnap’s Strategy
One of the main motivations for Belnap to introduce CB is to provide a standard way
to isolate the effect of the inconsistencies in a set. Recall that the rules [∗] and [#] are
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replacement rules of the form:
[∗] . . . (B∧ C) . . .
. . . B . . . . . . C . . .
[#]
. . . (B∨ C) . . .
. . . B . . . . . . C . . .
where the [∗] rule applies if (B ∧ C) is even and the [#] rule applies if (B ∨ C) is odd.
These rules are introduced by Belnap specifically to eliminate concealed conjunctions.
In [87], Horty explicitly endorsed a similar strategy for handling inconsistent instruc-
tions using modalized versions of these replacement rules:
[∗] (. . . (B∧ C) . . .)(. . . B . . .) (. . . C . . .) [#]
(. . . (B∨ C) . . .)
(. . . B . . .) (. . . C . . .)
where again the even and odd restrictions apply to the respective rule.
To appreciate the significance of these rules, we quote a remark of Belnap:
Since different ways of articulating our beliefs . . . give different results un-
der Rescher’s proposal and since we do not want this, evidently we have
to have some views about which articulations we most want to reflect
. . . Policy: try to reflect maximum articulation. . . . if we maximally artic-
ulate . . .we may be able to isolate the effect of its contradiction, . . . [o]r,
which seems just as important, we may be able to block a consequence by
freeing for use some conjunct of a conjunction which is itself not consis-
tently available . . . (page 545 [8])
In light of the [∗] and [#] rules, maximum articulation here is cashed out in terms
of conjunction elimination. In certain cases, this seems to be just the right remedy.
Consider for instance:
Example 3.4.1
Let A = (p∧ ¬p)∧ (q∨ r) and let Γ = {A, ¬r, ¬p}
Applying the [∗] rule to Awe get
p ¬p
p∧ ¬p q∨ r
(p∧ ¬p)∧ (q∨ r)
Figure 3.2: Belnap tree for (p∧ ¬p)∧ (q∨ r)
In example (3.4.1), all conjunctions are eliminated to maximally articulate the infor-
mation encoded by A. The result is that the inconsistency with respect to p would
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neither interfere with ¬r nor q∨ r. We note however that an imprudent use of [∗]may
result in duplication and thereby increase the size of the tree.
p q∨ r
p∧ (q∨ r)
¬p q∨ r
¬p∧ (q∨ r)
(p∧ ¬p)∧ (q∨ r)
Figure 3.3: Belnap tree for (p∧ ¬p)∧ (q∨ r)
However, our main concern here is not with efficiency. Our main concern is that
there are cases in which [∗] and [#] cannot eliminate conjunctions without a detour in
using the distributive properties of ∧ over ∨ and vice versa. Consider for instance a
slight variant of example (3.4.1):
Example 3.4.2
Let B = ¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬q]∨ ¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬r)] and Γ ′ = {B, ¬r, ¬p}
Assuming that we have the usual double negation elimination rule, contraction
for ∨ and ∧, and commutative and associative rules for ∨ and ∧, we can now apply
[#] to B in example (3.4.2) to obtain the Belnap tree for B (figure (3.4).
p ¬p
¬(p∨ ¬p)
¬p∨ r p∨ r
¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬¬r]
¬(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬r]
q∨ r
¬¬q∨ ¬¬r
p∨ q ¬p∨ q
¬¬q∨ ¬(p∨ ¬p)
¬¬q∨ ¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬r]
¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬q]∨ ¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬r]
Figure 3.4: Belnap tree for ¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬q]∨ ¬[(p∨ ¬p)∨ ¬r)]
This is not entirely satisfactory because in taking an unnecessary detour, we have
produced additional disjunctive information. Belnap’s initial objection against the use
of relevant implication and analytic implication is precisely that closures under these
implications are too liberal in generating disjunctive information. The point is that
disjunctive information can interact with inconsistencies in such a way that further
inconsistencies can be produced. In the presence of ¬r for instance, p∨ r and ¬p form
an inconsistent triad. Comparing this with figure (3.2) however, ¬r remains innocent.
We note further that the distributivity of ∧ over ∨ and ∨ over ∧ are built into Belnap’s
replacement rules – we cannot avoid the use of distributivity with these rules.
While our previous example demonstrates how distributivity is used in the con-
text of implicit conjunction, our next example shows that the same is true of explicit
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conjunction:
Example 3.4.3
Let C = (p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r) and Γ = {C, ¬r, ¬p}
Applying the [∗] rule to Cwe get the following Belnap tree:
p p∨ r
p∨ (p∧ r)
p∨ q q∨ r
q∨ (p∧ r)
(p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r)
Figure 3.5: Belnap tree for (p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r)
p q∨ r
p∧ (q∨ r)
(p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r)
Figure 3.6: Factoring for (p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r)
The example here is similar to the previous case: p∨r conspires with¬p in Γ to prevent
¬r from being derived as an U-consequence. Contrasting this with the case where we
use amore direct route to eliminate conjunctionwhile keeping disjunctive information
to a minimal, we get a very different result. But what can we say coherently about
these examples? There are two possible options:
1. our examples do encode different information in each instance and hence con-
junctive containment merely makes explicit the difference. This is reflected in
the production of different disjunctive information under conjunctive contain-
ment.
2. our examples do not encode substantively different information in each in-
stance. The fact that their conjunctive closures differ shows that conjunctive
containment still over generates – in particular it over generates by producing
too much disjunctive information.
Our intuition in this matter may not run very deep. Indeed there may not be
any definitive reason to settle for one over the other. While option (1) is certainly a
coherent position (andwe suspect this is the option Belnap is likely to take), we would
like to explore option (2) here and flesh out an account where examples (3.4.1), (3.4.2),
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and (3.4.3) do not yield different U-consequences while their maximal articulations
are narrower then conjunctive containment.
3.4.1 Logic Minimisation
We start with example (3.4.3) first. We note that the set of leaves ∆′ = {p, q ∨ r} in
figure (3.6) is consistent and classically equivalent to the set of leaves∆ = {p, p∨r, p∨
q, q∨ r} in figure (3.5). However, they clearly differ in the way in which they interact
with the remaining members of Γ . ∆ would generate more inconsistent subsets when
added to Γ then would ∆′. Furthermore, we note that every member of ∆′ is a prime
implicate of C. We’ll briefly recap some of the standard definitions:
Definition 3.4.1
A literal is either a propositional atom or the negation of a propositional atom. A
disjunction of literals is said to be a clause. A clause D is an implicate of A iff
A |= D. An implicate D of A is prime iff for all implicates D′ of A if D′ |= D then
D |= D′. A set of prime implicates {D1, . . . , Dn} of A is complete iff {D1, . . . , Dn} |= A.
A set of prime implicates {D1, . . . , Dn} is independent iff for no Di do we have
{D1 . . . , Di−1, Di+1 . . . Dn} |= Di
The notion of prime implicate was introduced by Quine in [142; 143; 144]. Quine
was interested in simplifying truth functions and he showed that notion of prime
implicate plays a central role in simplifying truth functions and thereby contributed
directly to the minimisation and design of digital circuits. The emphasis on minimi-
sation stems from the days when the production of logic gates was expensive and
required considerable physical space and power. With the advent of semiconductor
processes and VSLI, it is of course no longer a central concern to reduce the actual gate
count for a system. Circuit design today is more concernedwith physical space alloca-
tion, reliability and the correctness of a system. Interest in the use of prime implicates
in circuit design has decreased considerably as a result. But the notion of prime im-
plicate enjoys a renewed interest in recent years in light of works by de Kleer et al in
logic based diagnostic systems [56; 57; 58].
Returning to our example however, it is easy to see that ∆′ is a complete and in-
dependent set of prime implicates of C. It is thus natural to take ∆′ to be the maximal
articulation of C in example (3.4.3). Our choice can be justified on the grounds that
• ∆′ is a more compact representation of C,
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• ∆′ minimises redundancies and disjunctive information, and
• ∆′ minimises interference with ¬r
However, the standard notion of prime implicate would not be able to handle
example (3.4.2) since definition (3.4.1) uses a classical notion of consequence and thus
inconsistent formulae would have the same (complete equivalence class) of prime
implicates – namely the empty clause ∅. But this is exactly what we are trying to avoid
in the first place. However, there is a straightforward way to amend the situation –
we use a relevant notion of prime implicate:
Definition 3.4.2
A clause D is a relevant implicate of A iff A |=FDE D. A relevant implicate D of A is
prime iff for all relevant implicates D′ of A if D′ |=FDE D then D |=FDE D′. A set of
relevant prime implicates {D1, . . . , Dn} of A is complete iff D1 ∧ . . . ∧Dn |=FDE A. A
set of relevant prime implicates {D1, . . . , Dn} is independent iff for no Di do we have
D1 ∧ . . . ∧Di−1 ∧Di+1 ∧ . . . ∧Dn |=FDE Di. We say that two sets of formulae Γ and
∆ are FDE equivalent, written as Γ ≡FDE ∆, iff
∧
Γ |=FDE
∧
∆ and
∧
∆ |=FDE
∧
Γ .
The dual notion of relevant prime implicant of a given formula A can easily be de-
fined: a relevant implicant of a formula A is a cube C (conjunction of literals) which
FDE-entails A. In addition, C is prime if it is a minimal cube that FDE-entails A.
Since FDE is a paraconsistent logic, the empty clause is not a FDE-consequence of
any (non-empty) inconsistent formula.
Proposition 3.4.1
For no A do we have A |=FDE ∅.
Proof:
Using the standard (4-valued) ambi-valuation of Dunn in [66] (also see appendix (A)
for more details), we can verify the existence of a 4-valued assignment vwith 1 6∈ v(∅)
while 1 ∈ v(A) for any A 6= ∅
Given that resolution is not a valid form of inference in relevant logic in general,
it is easy to see that the set of classical prime implicates (PI) and the set of relevant
prime implicates (RPI) may be distinct for a given formula:
Example 3.4.4
A = (q∨ r)∧ ((p∨ q)∧ (¬p∨ q))
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RPI PI
q∨ r
√ ×
q × √
Figure 3.7: RPI and PI of A
Although not every RPI of a given A is a PI of A, it is easy to see that:
Proposition 3.4.2
Every RPI of a given A is a classical implicate of A.
Proof:
It suffices to observe that |=FDE ⊂ |=.
Since any two complete independent sets of relevant prime implicates of a given
formula must be FDE equivalent, we can treat them as unique up to equivalence.
We’ll use the notation RPI(A) to denote any such complete independent set of rel-
evant prime implicates of A. Similarly we use PI(A) for the complete independent
set of classical prime implicates of A. We note that RPI(A) is a minimal set (ordered
under ⊆) that is both complete and independent. In classical logic, two formulae are
equivalent iff their prime implicates are equivalent. This is also true with respect to
FDE formulae:
Proposition 3.4.3
For any A and B, A |=FDE B and B |=FDE A iff RPI(A) ≡FDE RPI(B).
Proof:
(⇒): Suppose A and B are FDE equivalent. Let RPI(A) = {D1, . . . , Dm} and RPI(B) =
{E1, . . . , En}. By the transitivity of |=FDE we have,
∧
i≤mDi |=FDE Ej for each j ≤ n.
Hence
∧
i≤mDi |=FDE
∧
j≤n Ej. Similarly we can show that
∧
j≤n Ej |=FDE
∧
i≤mDi
(⇐): Suppose RPI(A) ≡FDE RPI(B). Then we have
A |=FDE
∧
i≤m
Di |=FDE
∧
j≤n
Ej |=FDE B
Similarly we have
B |=FDE
∧
j≤n
Ej |=FDE
∧
i≤m
Di |=FDE A
By the transitivity of these entailments, it follows that A and B are FDE equivalent.
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An immediate corollary is that standard reduction rules for CNF (DNF) conversion
are RPI preserving:
Corollary 3.4.1
The following equivalences holds:
1. RPI(¬¬A) ≡FDE RPI(A)
2. RPI(¬(A∨ B)) ≡FDE RPI(¬A∧ ¬B)
3. RPI(¬(A∧ B)) ≡FDE RPI(¬A∨ ¬B)
4. RPI(A∨ (B∧ C)) ≡FDE RPI((A∨ B)∧ (A∨ C))
The minimality of an RPI ensures that a certain transitivity property of RPI holds:
Proposition 3.4.4
For any formulae A, B and C, if C ∈ RPI(B) and B ∈ RPI(A), then C ∈ RPI(A)
Proof:
Given that B ∈ RPI(A), B must be a clause and thus B ∈ RPI(B) holds trivially. So if
C ∈ RPI(B), B ≡FDE C follows immediately from definition (3.4.2). HenceC ∈ RPI(A).
Just as Belnap’s replacement rules can be used as a basis for defining the closure
operators CB and C+B , RPIs too can be used as a basis for defining certain Tarskian
closure operators:
Definition 3.4.3
For any A and Γ , define
CRPI(A) = RPI(A) ∪ {A}
CRPI(Γ) = {B ∈ CRPI(A)| A ∈ Γ }
C+RPI(Γ) =
⋃
∆⊆finCRPI(Γ)
{B | B ≡FDE
∧
∆}
Proposition 3.4.5
CRPI and C+RPI are both Tarskian closure operators. Moreover, C
+
RPI is an E-equivalent
(U-equivalent) extension of CRPI.
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Proof:
Reflexivity: trivial since A ∈ CRPI(A) for every A ∈ Γ .
Monotonicity: Assume Γ ⊆ ∆, then if B ∈ CRPI(Γ), there must exist some A ∈ Γ such
that B ∈ CRPI(A). But A ∈ ∆ holds, so B ∈ CRPI(∆) as required.
Idempotence: CRPI(Γ) ⊆ CRPI(CRPI(Γ)) is implied by the monotonicity of CRPI above.
For CRPI(CRPI(Γ)) ⊆ CRPI(Γ), we note that proposition (3.4.4) gives us the transitivity
property of RPI:
D ∈ CRPI(CRPI(Γ)) =⇒ ∃A ∈ CRPI(Γ) : D ∈ CRPI(A)
=⇒ ∃B ∈ Γ : A ∈ CRPI(B)
=⇒ D ∈ CRPI(B)
=⇒ D ∈ CRPI(Γ)
Reflexivity and monotonicity for C+RPI are straightforward. For idempotence, we ver-
ify that C+RPI(C
+
RPI(Γ)) ⊆ C+RPI(Γ):
A ∈ C+RPI(C+RPI(Γ)) =⇒ ∃C1, . . . , Ci ∈ CRPI(C+RPI(Γ)) :
A ≡FDE C1 ∧ . . .∧ Ci
=⇒ ∃D1, . . . , Di ∈ C+RPI(Γ) :
∀j ≤ i, Cj ∈ CRPI(Dj)
=⇒ ∀j ≤ i, ∃E1j , . . . , Emj ∈ CRPI(Γ) :
Dj ≡FDE E1j ∧ . . .∧ Emj
=⇒ ∀j ≤ i, ∃F1j , . . . , Fmj ∈ Γ :
E1j ∈ CRPI(F1j ), . . . , Emj ∈ CRPI(Fmj )
=⇒ ∀j ≤ i, Cj ∈ CRPI(E1j ∧ . . .∧ Emj )
=⇒ ∀j ≤ i, ∃k : Cj ≡FDE Ekj
=⇒ ∀j ≤ i, ∃Fkj ∈ Γ : Cj ∈ CRPI(Fkj )
=⇒ C1, . . . , Ci ∈ CRPI(Γ)
=⇒ A ∈ C+RPI(Γ)
To show that C+RPI is an E-equivalent extension of CRPI, we need to show that
1. CRPI and C+RPI have the same E-consequences.
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2. For any Γ , CRPI(Γ) ⊆ C+RPI(Γ)
3. For any Γ , C+RPI(CRPI(Γ)) = C
+
RPI(Γ)
(2) is trivial. For (1) we note that any FDE equivalent formula are also classically
equivalent, so an argument similar to lemma (3.3.2) suffices to show that C+RPI is an
E-equivalent (U-equivalent) extension of CRPI. Finally we verify that C+RPI(CRPI(Γ)) =
C+RPI(Γ):
(⊇): Trivial since CRPI and C+RPI are both Tarskian closure operators.
(⊆): We note that CRPI is idempotent.
A ∈ C+RPI(CRPI(Γ)) =⇒ ∃B1, . . . , Bi ∈ CRPI(CRPI(Γ)) :
A ≡FDE (B1 ∧ . . .∧ Bi)
=⇒ ∃B1, . . . , Bi ∈ CRPI(Γ) :
A ≡FDE (B1 ∧ . . .∧ Bi)
=⇒ A ∈ C+RPI(Γ)
We note that definition (3.4.3) makes use of RPI(A) for each A in a given set Γ ,
but
⋃
A∈Γ RPI(A) need not be an independent set of RPIs. In particular redundant
information can be spread across an entire set of formula. Thismotivates the following
alternative definition:
Definition 3.4.4
For any Γ and any clause C, we define C ∈ RPI∗(Γ) iff
1. for some A ∈ Γ , A |=FDE C and
2. for any B ∈ Γ and clause D, if B |=FDE D and D |=FDE C, then C |=FDE D
For any Γ ,
C∗RPI(Γ) = RPI
∗(Γ) ∪ Γ
Membership for C∗RPI is clearly more stringent then CRPI – a clause C is in RPI
∗(Γ)
only if C is entailed by some member of Γ and no other member of Γ entails a stronger
clause. This definition is similar to definition (3.4.2) for the RPI’s of an individual
formula. However, C∗RPI is not a closure operator in Tarski’s sense. Although both
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reflexivity and idempotence remain intact, C∗RPI does not have the usual monotonicity
property.
Example 3.4.5
Γ = {p ∧ (q ∨ r)}, p ∈ C∗RPI(Γ) and q ∨ r ∈ C∗RPI(Γ). But q ∨ r 6∈ C∗RPI(Γ ′) where
Γ ′ = {p∧ (q∨ r), q}
The failure of monotonicity should not be regarded as a defect of C∗RPI. Arguably,
implicit information need not always increase monotonically with respect to supersets;
C∗RPI is a possible candidate for specifying the content of a given set of logical ex-
pressions. To illustrate the difference between C∗RPI and CRPI consider the following
example:
Example 3.4.6
Γ = {p, (r∧ ¬r)∧ (p∨ q),¬p}
Since p ∈ C∗RPI(Γ) we have p ∨ q 6∈ C∗RPI(Γ). However p ∨ q ∈ CRPI(Γ) given that
p∨ q ∈ RPI((r∧¬r)∧ (p∨ q)). Note that in example (3.4.6) q is an E-consequence of
CRPI(Γ) but not an E-consequence of C∗RPI(Γ). In general, C
∗
RPI does not yield the same
E-consequence (U-consequence) as CRPI.
Proposition 3.4.6
For any Γ ,
1. C∗RPI(Γ) ⊆ CRPI(Γ)
2. CPRI(C∗RPI(Γ)) = CRPI(Γ)
3. C∗RPI(CRPI(Γ)) = CRPI(Γ)
Proof:
For (1) it suffices to observe that RPI∗(Γ) ⊆ ⋃A∈Γ RPI(A).
(2⊇): Since Γ ⊆ C∗RPI(Γ), we have CRPI(Γ) ⊆ CRPI(C∗RPI(Γ)) by the monotonicity of
CRPI.
(2⊆): From (1) we have C∗RPI(Γ) ⊆ CRPI(Γ) so by the monotonicity of CRPI it fol-
lows that CRPI(C∗RPI(Γ)) ⊆ CRPI(CRPI(Γ)). By the idempotence of CRPI we have
CRPI(C
∗
RPI(Γ)) ⊆ CRPI((Γ)
(3): Trivial from (1).
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Returning to examples (3.4.1) and (3.4.2), Belnap’s replacement rules are complete
with respect to the given A and B in these examples, i.e. CRPI(A) ⊂ CB(A) and
CRPI(B) ⊂ CB(B), but the generated implicates are not all prime. So Belnap’s re-
placement rules are unsound with respect to relevant prime implicates. In the general
case, Belnap’s replacement rules are not complete since they are insufficient to trans-
form formulae into clausal form. Clearly for clause reduction we need the additional
rule, ` ¬(B ∧ C) ↔ (¬B ∨ ¬C), to distribute negation over conjunction. However
C+B is complete with respect to RPI’s, i.e. for any Γ , we have CRPI(Γ) ⊆ C+B(Γ). We
summarise the relationships of these closure operators in figure (3.8).
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Figure 3.8: Relationships between Closure Operators
To illustrate consider Γ = {(p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r),¬(p ∧ q) ∧ s}. Clearly, p ∨ r ∈ CB(Γ)
but p ∨ r is not an RPI, so p ∨ r 6∈ C+RPI(Γ). Region (1) is non-empty. Moreover
¬(p∧ q) ∈ CB(Γ) but ¬p∨ ¬q ∈ C+RPI(Γ), so region (2) is non-empty. Example (3.4.6)
shows that region (3) is non-empty and with minor modification it can show that
region (4) is also non-empty. To see that C+RPI ⊆ C+B , it suffices to note that
Proposition 3.4.7
For any clause D and formula A, if D ∈ RPI(A), then E ≡FDE D for some E ∈ CB(A).
Proof:
We note that using arguments similar to the proofs of lemma (3.3.1) and proposi-
tion (3.3.1), we can show that anyA is FDE-equivalent to the conjunction of the leaves
of the Belnap’s tree T A, i.e. le(T A) ≡FDE RPI(A). Moreover, each leaf of a Belnap’s
tree is conjunction free in the sense that each leaf is FDE-equivalent to a clause. Hence
if D ∈ RPI(A), there must be a leaf E of T A such that D ≡FDE E.
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We should point out that in adopting the use of either CRPI or C+RPI for capturing
the informational content of a formula, there is no guarantee that conjunction elimina-
tion is a sound strategy for generating RPIs. In general RPI(A)∪RPI(B) 6= RPI(A∧B).
Example 3.4.7
A = p∧ (p∨ q)
In example (3.4.7), it is clear that RPI(p ∧ (p ∨ q)) ⊂ RPI(p) ∪ RPI(p ∨ q). The
containment here is proper. However, we do have the containment RPI(A ∧ B) ⊆
RPI(A) ∪ RPI(B) in the general case.
Lemma 3.4.1
For any clause C and any formula A and B, if A |=FDE C, then A∧ B |=FDE C.
Proof:
Again we use the ambi-valuation of Dunn ([66]) to prove our claim. Assume that
A |=FDE C. Then we have the implication 1 ∈ v(A) ⇒ 1 ∈ v(C) for any standard
4-valued valuation v of FDE. Consider an arbitrary v′ such that 1 ∈ v′(A ∧ B). Then
it follows that 1 ∈ v′(A) and 1 ∈ v′(B). So on v′ in particular, 1 ∈ v′(C). Since v′ was
arbitrary, we have A∧ B |=FDE D as required.
Proposition 3.4.8
For any A and B, RPI(A∧ B) ⊆ RPI(A) ∪ RPI(B).
Proof:
Assume that for an arbitrary clause D we have D ∈ RPI(A ∧ B) but D 6∈ RPI(A) ∪
RPI(B). Then we have A∧B |=FDE D butD 6∈ RPI(A) andD 6∈ RPI(B). Then there are
4 cases to consider:
(case 1)A 6|=FDE D and B |=FDE D butD is not prime for B: it follows that there exists a
D0 ∈ RPI(B) such that B |=FDE D0 and D0 |=FDE D but D 6|=FDE D0. By lemma (3.4.1),
we have A∧ B |=FDE D0. But given thatD ∈ RPI(A∧ B) andD0 |=FDE D,D |=FDE D0
holds. This is a contradiction.
(case 2) B 6|=FDE D and A |=FDE D butD is not prime for A: the proof is similar to case
1 with B replaced with A throughout.
(case 3) Both A |=FDE D and B |=FDE D, but D is prime for neither A nor B: the
argument in case (1) suffices to show that case 3 is impossible.
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(case 4) A 6|=FDE D and B 6|=FDE D: we make use of the equivalence between FDE
and tautological entailment as described in Anderson and Belnap ([7]). Since A 6|=FDE D
and B 6|=FDE D, for any arbitrary but fixed DNF = CA1 ∨ . . . ∨ CAm of A and DNF =
CB1 ∨ . . . ∨ C
B
n of B, there exist some i ≤ m, and some j ≤ n such that CAi 6|=FDE D
and CBj 6|=FDE D. Denote the set of literals occurring in CAi as lit(CAi ). We have
lit(CAi )∩ lit(D) = ∅ and lit(CBj )∩ lit(D) = ∅. Hence (lit(CAi )∪ lit(CBj ))∩ lit(D) = ∅.
Now consider the formula
E =
∨
1≤k≤m, 1≤l≤n
(CAk ∧ C
B
l )
Clearly, E is a DNF of A ∧ B. Since lit(CAi ∧ C
B
j ) = (lit(C
A
i ) ∪ lit(CBj )), we note
that lit(CAi ∧ C
B
j ) ∩ lit(D) = ∅. We define a 4-valued assignment v on the set of
propositional atoms as follows:

0 ∈ v(p) and 1 6∈ v(p) if ¬p ∈ lit(CAi ∧ CBj ) and
p 6∈ lit(CAi ∧ CBj )
1 ∈ v(p) and 0 6∈ v(p) if p ∈ lit(CAi ∧ CBj ) and
¬p 6∈ lit(CAi ∧ CBj )
1 ∈ v(p) and 0 ∈ v(p) if p ∈ lit(CAi ∧ CBj ) and
¬p ∈ lit(CAi ∧ CBj )
1 6∈ v(p) and 0 6∈ v(p) otherwise
Clearly 1 ∈ v(CAi ∧CBj ) and hence 1 ∈ v(E) but by the disjointness of lit(CAi ∧CBj )
and lit(D), 1 6∈ v(D). HenceA∧B 6|=FDE D. But this contradicts the initial assumption
that D ∈ RPI(A∧ B).
3.4.2 Algorithmic Considerations
Proposition (3.4.8) shows that in terms of using replacement rules in the style of [∗] or
[#] for eliminating conjunctions, the RPIs of a child node need not be the RPIs of the
root node. So although corollary (3.4.1) shows that the standard reduction method for
CNF conversion is indeed complete for generating RPIs, there is no guarantee that the
clauses obtained are indeed independent. Checking for clause subsumption seems
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unavoidable and indeed critical when redundant information is presented. However
when combined with a clause subsumption check, the standard CNF conversion al-
gorithm can provide a sound and complete algorithm for generating RPIs.
Algorithm 3.4.1 RPI Generation
Require: input A ∈ Φ
Ensure: output S = RPI(A)
1: convert A into CNF(A) using the standard reduction method
2: for each C ∈ CNF(A), S := S ∪ {C} if C is relevant prime, else S := S.
3: return S
Algorithm (3.4.1) is a naive method for generating RPIs. It first generates a set of
relevant implicates of A and then prunes the set by removing all non-prime impli-
cates. Clearly we have CNF(A) ≡FDE RPI(A) given corollary (3.4.1). So completeness
is ensured in step (1) provided that step (2) does not remove implicates that are also
prime (and clearly it doesn’t). Although the clause subsumption check may be de-
ployed earlier while CNF(A) is generated, in the worst case the size of CNF(A) can
be exponentially related to the size of A, e.g. if A = (p1 ∧ p2) ∨ . . . ∨ (p2n−1 ∧ p2n),
there are 2n clauses in the corresponding CNF. Our problem is inherently difficult
computationally.
3.4.2.1 PRI via Classical PI Generation
In what follows, we’ll present an alternative algorithm for generating RPI(A) based on
ideas from Ramesh et al [147; 145; 146] and Arieli and Denecker [13; 14]. Themain idea
here is to avoid the expensive CNF conversion by using negated normal form (NNF)
instead. Once a formula A is converted into NNF(A), we’ll make use of Arieli and
Denecker’s splitting transform to convert NNF(A) into a positive (i.e. negation free)
formula N̂NF(A).1 The conversion will preserve our problem in the sense that for any
clause D, D ∈ RPI(A) iff D̂ ∈ PI(N̂NF(A)). So in effect our problem is transformed
into the classical problem of prime implicate generation for a positive NNF formula.
The algorithm of [146; 145] can thus be invoked to generate the required PI’s via the
use of the corresponding semantic graph. Before we present the algorithm, we need to
present some of the main definitions.
1We note that Besnard and Schaub [38] employed the same transform for defining signed systems of
paraconsistent reasoning.
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Definition 3.4.5
1. A formula A is in negated normal form (NNF) iff no complex subformula of A
is in the scope of a negation, i.e. only atomic formulae are within the scope of a
negation operator.
2. LetNNF(A) denotes the negated normal form ofA. Then the splitting transform
of NNF(A), denoted by N̂NF(A), is the formula obtained by uniformly substi-
tuting every unnegated atom pi occurring inNNF(A)with a new (signed) atom
p+i and every negated atom ¬pi in NNF(A) with a new (signed) atom p
−
i [13;
14]. If B = Â for some A, then we define the inverse of splitting transform B
as the formula obtained by uniformly substituting every signed atom p+i with
literal pi and every signed atom p−i with literal ¬pi, i.e. Â = A
3. Let v be an arbitrary 4-valued assignment and NNF(A) an arbitrary NNF for-
mula. Then v̂ is the 2-valued (classical) assignment defined as follows:
• For all p+i and p−i occurring in N̂NF(A), v̂(p+i ) = 1 iff 1 ∈ v(pi) and v̂(p−i ) =
1 iff 0 ∈ v(pi).
We note that both the splitting transform and v̂ are well defined and do not depend
on A. The following are consequences of definition (3.4.5):
Proposition 3.4.9
1. Let v be an arbitrary 4-valued assignment and NNF(A) be an arbitrary NNF
formula. Let v̂ be a 2-valued assignment as defined in (3) of definition (3.4.5).
Then 1 ∈ v(NNF(A)) iff v̂(N̂NF(A)) = 1 (cf. Lemma (3.1) of [13])
2. For any A and B, A |=FDE B iff N̂NF(A) |= N̂NF(B) (cf. Theorem (3.1) of [13]).
3. For any clause D, D ∈ RPI(A) iff D̂ ∈ PI(N̂NF(A)).
4. The problem of relevant prime implicate generation is polynomially reducible
to classical prime implicate generation.
Proof:
We note that (2) is a simple corollary of (1). For (1), we use an induction on the struc-
ture ofNNF(A). There are two base cases with eitherNNF(A) = pi orNNF(A) = ¬pi.
In the former case we have 1 ∈ v(pi) ⇔ v̂(p+i ) = 1 given by the definition of v̂. In the
later case we have 1 ∈ v(¬pi)⇔ 0 ∈ v(pi)⇔ v̂(p−i ) = 1.
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For the induction case we have either NNF(A) = B ∧ C or NNF(A) = B ∨ C.
We note that both B and C must be in NNF form and hence the induction hypothesis
applies. Thus we have 1 ∈ v(B) ⇔ v̂(B̂) = 1 and 1 ∈ v(C) ⇔ v̂(Ĉ) = 1. So 1 ∈
v(B ∧ C) ⇔ [1 ∈ v(B) and1 ∈ v(C)] ⇔ [v̂(B̂) = 1 and v̂(Ĉ) = 1] ⇔ v̂(B̂∧ C) = 1. The
case for B∨ C is similar.
(3 ⇒): Since NNF(A) ≡FDE A it suffices for us to consider an arbitrary D ∈
RPI(NNF(A)). Then by (2) above we have N̂NF(A) |= D̂. This shows that D̂ is an
implicate of N̂NF(A). Toward a contradiction, suppose D̂ is not prime. Then there
exists a clause C such that N̂NF(A) |= C and C |= D̂ but D̂ 6|= C. But N̂NF(A) is
negation free and thus neither C nor D̂ are the empty clause, nor are they tautolo-
gies. Hence there must be a C′ such that NNF(A) |=FDE C′ where Ĉ′ = C. But then
we have C′ |=FDE D but D 6|=FDE C′. This contradicts the primeness of D. Hence
D̂ ∈ PI(N̂NF(A)) as required.
(3 ⇐): Suppose that D 6∈ RPI(NNF(A)). Then either NNF(A) 6|=FDE D or D is not
prime. In the former case, N̂NF(A) 6|= D̂ follows immediately from (2). So suppose
D is relevant implicate of NNF(A) but is not prime. Then there exists a C such that
NNF(A) |=FDE C and C |=FDE D but D 6|=FDE C. By (3⇒) and (2) above it follows that
Ĉ is prime implicate of N̂NF(A) but D̂ 6|= Ĉ. Hence D̂ 6∈ PI(N̂NF(A)) as required.
(4): We note that bothNNF conversion and the splitting transform are linearly related
to the input formula. Hence by (3) above, the claim follows.
3.4.2.2 Semantic Graphs
In [147], a non-clausal approach is developed to compute classical prime impli-
cates (implicants). Their basic motivation is to avoid the computational overhead
of CNF/DNF based approaches to prime implicate (implicant) generation that are
known to be exponential. Their general strategy is to use an alternative graph the-
oretic representation of NNF formulae and to reduce the search for prime implicates
(implicants) to a search of un-subsumed d-paths (c-paths) in the graph. Although
the associated decision problems are known to be NP-hard and NP-complete (theo-
rem 8 and theorem 9 of [146]), their theoretical framework is both sound and elegant.
Their experimental results also show that for a certain class of formulae that are hard
for CNF −DNF based methods, their algorithms show significant improvement. We
present some of their central definitions and results here.
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Definition 3.4.6
Given an arbitrary formula A in NNF, the semantic graph associated with A, GA =
(N , C,D), is a triple where the nodesN are the literals ofNNF(A), C is the set of c-arcs
andD is the set of d-arcs. A c-arc (d-arc) is a conjunction (disjunction) of two semantic
subgraphs of GA. The notion of a subgraph is defined recursively in the standard way
where all elements of N are subgraphs of GA and all complex subgraphs are built up
using c-arcs and d-arcs.
Essentially a semantic graph is an alternative two dimensional representation of
an NNF formula. Following the standard convention, we display c-arcs vertically
and d-arcs horizontally and continue to overload our symbols ‘∧’ for c-arc and ‘∨’
for d-arc. Both c-arcs and d-arcs are obviously associative and commutative. We’ll
use the convention that a d-arc is displayed horizontally in the same order as the
corresponding disjunction from left to right, whereas a c-arc is displayed vertically
with the right conjunct below the left conjunct (see figure (3.9)). To increase readability
we may display a semantic graph with boxes around certain subgraphs. Like many
other graph based representations, the notion of a path plays a central role in graph
based computation.
Example 3.4.8
A = [(¬p∧ q)∨ (r∨ s)]∧ [¬q∨ (t∧ p)]
GA =
¬p
∧
q
∨ r∨ s
∧
t
∧
p
∨¬q
Figure 3.9: Semantic Graph of A
Definition 3.4.7
Let GA be a semantic graph. Let X and Y be subgraphs of GA and let a and b be nodes
in X and Y respectively. Then a and b are said to be α-connected iff (X, Y) is an α-arc
(α = c, d). An α-link is a complementary (e.g. p and ¬p) pair of α-connected nodes.
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A partial α-path through GA is a multi-set of pairwise α-connected nodes of GA. An
α-path through GA is a partial α-path that is maximal, i.e. it has no proper extension
that is also a partial α-path through GA.
In example (3.4.8), {¬p, q, t, p}, {¬p, q,¬q}, {r,¬q}, {s,¬q}, {r, t, p}, and {s, t, p} are
all c-paths. On the other hand, {¬p, r, s}, {q, r, s}, {¬q, t} and {¬q, p} are all d-paths.
Although our definition of an α-path is strictly stated in terms of multisets, it would
be convenient to continue to use set theoretic representation for paths. We say that
one α-path is subsumed by another α-path with the understanding that the set of
nodes of one path is contained in the set of nodes of the other. We write lit(P) to
denote the set of literals (nodes) of the path P . Intuitively, a linkless c-path through
GA corresponds to a model ofA, whereas the set formed by complementing all literals
occurring in a linkless d-path through GA corresponds to a counter-model of A, i.e. a
truth assignment which falsifies A.
Some of the most important equivalence preserving operations on semantic graph
are path dissolution operations. Strictly speaking there are two types of path disso-
lution operations corresponding to c-path and d-path dissolution. Full details and
definitions are in [146], but roughly the idea of path dissolution is to select a link and
then restructure a semantic graph so that any α-path with the link is removed. A spe-
cial case of c-path dissolution is just the standard resolution rule. A semantic graph
is said to be a full dissolvent if all of its α-paths are linkless. Dissolution for c-paths
is strongly complete in the sense that any sequence of dissolution steps will termi-
nate in a c-linkless semantic graph. In the event that a semantic graph corresponds to
an unsatisfiable formula, repeat application of c-path dissolution will terminate with
the empty graph (∅, ∅, ∅). Similarly dissolution for d-paths will also terminate in a
d-linkless semantic graph. And in the event that the semantic graph corresponds to a
tautology, repeat application of d-path dissolution will also terminate with the empty
semantic graph. In this context the empty graph is ambiguous – it represents both >
and ⊥ in classical logic. In figure (3.9) for instance, GA is d-linkless but not c-linkless.
The interest in linkless graphs lies in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.4.1
([146] theorem 3) In any nonempty semantic graph in which no c-path (d-path) con-
tains a link, every implicate (implicant) of the corresponding formula is subsumed by
some d-path (c-path).
§3.4 An Improvement to Belnap’s Strategy 81
Given the fact that any N̂NF(A) is negation free, any semantic graph G
N̂NF(A)
must
be linkless (i.e. neither c-paths nor d-paths contain any links). Hence by (3) of propo-
sition (3.4.9) and theorem (3.4.1) above, we have the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 3.4.2
Let A be any formula and D be a clause, then D ∈ RPI(A) iff lit(D̂) is subsumed by
some d-path through the semantic graph G
N̂NF(A)
Corollary (3.4.2) provides us with the basis to incorporate the PI algorithm de-
scribed in [145] to generate RPIs. Moreover given (4) of proposition (3.4.9), the com-
putational overhead of the splitting transform will not adversely affect the PI algo-
rithm. However corollary (3.4.2) only warrants completeness but not soundness of
the method. In order to capture the exact RPI’s of a given A we need to define the
largest subset of d-paths of GA that is minimal:
Definition 3.4.8
Let GA be a non-empty semantic graph without c-links, then pi(GA) is defined as fol-
lows: P ∈ pi(GA) iff
1. P is a d-path through GA,
2. P is linkless (i.e. P 6= >) and
3. For all d-paths Q through GA, lit(Q) 6⊂ lit(P), i.e. P is not subsumed by any
other d-path through GA.
In definition (3.4.8), pi(GA) captures exactly the set of prime implicates of A (theo-
rem 6 [145]). Thus for any Awe have
RPI(A) = {
∨
lit(P) : P ∈ pi(G
N̂NF(A)
)}
where
∨
lit(P) is a disjunction formed with the literals of the path P and ∨ lit(P)
is the inverse of the splitting transform of
∨
lit(P). In short we have the following
alternative algorithm for generating the RPIs for any given A:
In the original PI algorithm for computing classical prime implicates (implicants)
of an arbitraryNNF formula, additional steps are required to first dissolve a semantic
graph into a full dissolvent (with respect to c-paths). But this is clearly not required for
us since any G
N̂NF(A)
is linkless. Similarly PI is not required to check whether a d-path
contains links ((2) of definition (3.4.8)). The only real work to be done is to check for
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Algorithm 3.4.2 RPI Generation via splitting transform and semantic graph
Require: input A ∈ Φ
Ensure: output S = RPI(A)
1: convert A into NNF(A) using the standard reduction method
2: convert NNF(A) to N̂NF(A)
3: call PI to compute pi(G
N̂NF(A)
)
4: S := {
∨
lit(P) : P ∈ pi(G
N̂NF(A)
)}
5: return S
path subsumption ((3) of definition (3.4.8)). But unfortunately the path subsumption
check is the most computationally intensive task of the algorithm.
The basic idea of PI is to recursively traverse GA from a left-to-right, bottom-up
manner while partial paths are computed along the way. Both tautologies and sub-
sumed paths are eliminated as they are encountered. Each recursive call to PI takes a
collection of (possibly empty) sets of d-paths {Pi| i ∈ I} and a full dissolvent semantic
(sub)graph GB as inputs and correctly computes the maximal set of minimal d-paths,
pi(GB) (theorem 8 [145]). The first call to PIwill take ({∅},GA) as input and then subse-
quent recursive calls will move PI progressively towards the left bottom-most node of
GA. If a subgraph GB is of the form (X, Y)c then PI will first attempt to find solutions
for Y and then solutions for X while making sure that any subsumed d-path in X is
removed. If GB is of the form (X, Y)d, then PI will attempt to find solution for X first
and then extend all d-paths through X into Y. The set of d-paths {P : i ∈ I} at each
recursive call is the set of non-tautological and unsubsumed d-paths that have been
traversed by PI. Initially {P : i ∈ I} is empty until PImeets the left bottom-most node
of GA. Whenever PI is called for a node, it will attempt to extend all current d-paths
with the new node unless the complement of the node is already in a path (thereby
avoiding tautologous paths). This is done repeatedly until all nodes in the graph are
visited by PI at least once.
To illustrate consider GA in figure (3.10). After the initial recursive calls, PI will
meet the left bottom most node of GA. In this case it is n1. PI will update its current
set of d-paths to {{n1}} then go right to n2 and see if the single d-path {n1} can be
extended. Then PI will continue upward to see if n3 can be added to {n1}. At the
end of each move upward along a c-path, PImust check for path subsumption in the
current set of d-paths and remove any subsumed path. In this case if n2 and n3 are
neither complementary literals nor identical literals, then the current set of d-paths
would be {{n1, n2}, {n1, n3}}. After traversing through n1, n2 and n3, PI will again
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Algorithm 3.4.3 PI for computing pi(GA)
Require: input (paths,GA)
Ensure: output paths′′ = pi(GA)
1: PI(paths, GA)
2: if paths = ∅ then
3: return ∅
4: end if
5: if GA is a literal then
6: paths′ := ∅;
7: paths′′ := ∅
8: for all P ∈ paths do
9: if GA ∈ P then
10: paths′ = paths′ ∪ P
11: else if ¬GA 6∈ P then
12: paths′′ := paths′′ ∪ P ∪ GA
13: end if
14: end for
15: paths′′ := paths′ ∪ (paths′ \ {P ∈ paths′ : ∃Q ∈ paths′ ∧Q ⊂ P})
16: return paths′′
17: else if GA = (X, Y)c then
18: paths′ := PI(paths, Y)
19: paths′′ := PI((paths \ paths′), X)
20: paths′′ := (paths′ ∪ paths′′)
21: \{P ∈ paths′| ∃Q ∈ paths′′ ∧Q ⊂ P}
22: \{P ∈ paths′′| ∃Q ∈ paths′ ∧Q ⊂ P}
23: return paths′′
24: else if GA = (X, Y)d then
25: paths′ := PI(paths, X)
26: paths′′ := PI(paths′, Y)
27: return paths′′
28: end if
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GA =
n7
∧
n4
∨ n5 ∨ n6
∧
n3
∧
n2
∨n1
Figure 3.10: Construction of pi(GA) using PI
move to the left bottom most node of the upper subgraph, meeting n4. PI will then
attempt to extend {n4}with n5 and continuing with n6. After meeting n6, PIwill once
again check for subsumption, if there is no subsumption then once again the current
set of d-paths is updated to {{n1, n2}, {n1, n3}, {n4, n5, n6}}. PI then continues with a
new d-path starting with n7 moving right toward n5 and then n6. Finally PI will
complete the last subsumption check before updating the current set of d-paths one
last time.
As we pointed out earlier, path subsumption checking is computationally expen-
sive. Thus in [146], various optimisation techniques based on anti-link operations are
introduced to restructure a semantic graph before PI is invoked. The restructuring
involves early removal of subsumed d-paths. In some cases the improvement is dra-
matic – without anti-link operations PI will take exponential time to find the solution
whereas with anti-link operations PI will only take polynomial time. Anti-links are
essentially multiple occurrences of the same literal. If (X, Y)α is an α-arc in a seman-
tic graph and AX and AY are nodes of the same literal A in X and Y respectively, then
{AX, AY} is said to be an (α-) anti-link. The presence of an anti-link in a semantic graph
is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the existence of a non-tautologous
subsumed d-paths in a semantic graph (theorem 15 [146]), i.e. the occurrence of a
non-tautologous subsumed d-paths implies the existence of either a c-anti-link or a
d-anti-link in a semantic graph. The amount of subsumption checking required can
be reduced by removing anti-links preemptively. In some cases, anti-links can be com-
pletely eliminated in a semantic graph, thereby eliminating the need for any subsump-
tion checking. But in the general case, complete elimination of anti-links in a semantic
graph is not always possible.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that reasoning with inconsistent information can be di-
vided into two distinct stages. In the first stage inconsistent information encoded in a
full language can be rewritten in such a way as to facilitate the isolation of the incon-
sistent part of the information. In the second stage various deduction strategies based
on either classical or nonclassical logics can then be applied to the rewrite. We note
that Belnap’s strategy of dividing reasoning into a preprocessing stage and a deduction
stage is akin to a recent approach to knowledge compilation. In knowledge compila-
tion a knowledge base encoded in a logical language is first complied into a target
language. The complied knowledge base is then deployed during run-time query
answering. The main objective of the compilation is to make on-line reasoning easier.
The hope is that the time required for compilation will have an eventual payoff during
run-time query answering.
With respect to preprocessing inconsistent information however, we find Belnap’s
suggestion of using conjunctive containment wanting. In particular, inconsistent infor-
mation tends to interact badly with disjunctive and redundant information. Although
conjunctive containment generally reduces disjunctive consequences, it is however in-
sufficient. Our remedy is to use a relevant notion of prime implicates as the basis to
both preserve information and minimise the potentially harmful disjunctive content
of inconsistent information.
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Chapter 4
Uncertainties and Inconsistencies
4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we have introduced a preservation theoretic analysis of infer-
ence. We have done so both in terms of a measurement based on coverings of a set
as well as an information theoretic measurement. We have also argued that, at least
with respect to the method of reasoning from maximal consistent subsets, we gener-
ally need to pay attention to the syntactic form of the premises since these measure-
ments are essentially syntax sensitive notions. In this chapter, we approach the issue
of preservation from a slightly different angle; we’ll look at the problem of uncertain-
ties that are transmitted from an inconsistent set of premises to the conclusion in a
given inference. The problem can be stated as follows: suppose we are given an in-
ference with an inconsistent set of premises {A1, . . . , Am} together with the conclusion
B derivable in some logic L. Suppose further that we have a particular method for
assigning uncertainties to each premise and to the conclusion in terms of probabili-
ties. Furthermore let’s suppose that for each i ≤ m, the uncertainty of each premise is
pii ∈ [0, 1], i.e. U(Ai) = pii. What then is the maximum value of the uncertainty of the
conclusion?
Our question is important for several reasons. Firstly, even if we have a classi-
cally valid inference with consistent premises it is not always the case that we can be
completely certain about each one of the premises. The validity of an inference only
guarantees that if there is no uncertainty in the premises, i.e. they are all true, then
there can be no uncertainty in the conclusion. In an extreme case we may have a valid
inference with a billion consistent premises and the conclusion is the conjunction of
all the premises. The uncertainty of each premise may be less then one in a billion but
the cumulative uncertainty of the conclusion may turn out to be prohibitively high.
To determine the uncertainty maxima of the conclusion of an inference is one way to
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provide probabilistic assurance in uncertain reasoning – a kind of assurance that goes
beyond mere deductive validity. Secondly, in the case of inferences with inconsistent
premises we have a general problem of assessing the general quality of the conclusion.
This problem cannot be solved by simply switching to a nonclassical logic. Indeed
with a few notable exceptions, most proponents of paraconsistent logics have not re-
ally addressed the issue of quality control at all. Even with a seemingly innocent
inference like the conjoining of premises, the resulting conclusion may turn out to be
unacceptable due to high uncertainty. Finally, our problem is important in light of the
remarks of Adams and Levine in [5] that
inconsistent premise sets introduce some surprising uncertainty phenom-
ena whose interpretations involve problems (p.432)
In this respect, the current chapter can be seen as a continuation of the unfinished
work of Adams and Levine in [5]. But the theoretical foundation can be traced back
to the work of Boole a century ago in [42] and has been revived, a century later, by
Hailperin in [81] and more recently by Nilsson in [134] and Knight in [109; 110; 111].
We do not proclaim that the theoretical work here is particularly new; but we do hope
to show that the general framework of probabilistic analysis of inferences fits well
with the preservational approach to paraconsistent reasoning.
4.2 Probabilities over Possible Worlds
An obvious way to generate an uncertainty function for a finite set of premises is
to assign probabilities to the set of interpretations of the premises and then sum the
probabilities over all interpretations that fail to support a given premise. There is
both a decision and an optimisation version of the problem. Since we are primarily
interested in the analysis of inference from inconsistent premises, for our purpose the
optimisation version is of more interest.
Before we formally define our problem, we’ll first fix some notations. Given a set
Γ = {A1, . . . , Am}with n distinct variables, the set of interpretations over Γ , written as
WΓ , is the set of truth assignments over Γ restricted to variables occurring in Γ . Since
Γ is assumed to have n distinct variables, |WΓ | is exactly 2n. We call each vi ∈ WΓ
a possible world for Γ and assume that there is an arbitrary but fixed enumeration
of these possible worlds. For each i ≤ 2n, we assign a probability Pi ∈ [0, 1] to vi.
Furthermore we require that
∑2n
i=1 Pi = 1. Intuitively, Pi is the probability that vi
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is the actual world or the actual outcome. Next we define a m × 2n binary matrix
A = (aij) by setting
aij =

0 if vj |= Ai
1 otherwise
(4.1)
We’ll call the matrix A an uncertainty matrix for Γ . We note that in the standard lit-
erature, aij is set to 1 if vj |= Ai and 0 otherwise. But since we take uncertainty to be
probability of Ai to fail, it is convenient for us to use (4.1) to define U(Ai) instead.
We note that different enumerations of Γ andWΓ would generate different uncer-
tainty matrices A = (aij) with different orderings on their rows and columns. But
we’ll treat these matrices as belonging to the same equivalence class invariant under
the usual row and column rotation. We define the uncertainty of Ai by setting
U(Ai) =
2n∑
j=1
aijPj = pii (4.2)
The set of equalities and inequalities can be written concisely in the matrix notation:
1 P = 1
A P = pi (4.3)
P ≥ 0
where 1 is a 2n unit row vector, P and pi are the column vectors [P1, . . . , P2n ]T and
[pi1, . . . , pim]
T respectively. As usual we use [. . .]T to denote the transpose of [. . .]. We
call each distinct column vector P a probability distribution for Γ and each distinct
column vector pi an uncertainty vector for Γ . We note that the uncertainty of Ai ex-
pressed in (4.2) is defined relative to a given probability distribution P. Where it is
necessary, we’ll use ‘UP(Ai)’ to denote the uncertainty of Ai relative to P. We note
that relative to any finite Γ and probability distribution P, the function UP( ) satisfies
the usual Kolmogorov’s Axioms.
The decision version of our problem (uncertainty satisfiability problem, USAT)
can now be stated as follows: given an uncertainty vector pi for Γ , is there a probability
distribution P for Γ such that the set of equalities and inequalities in (4.3) holds with
respect to P and pi? We note that although there are uncountably many probability
distributions for Γ and thus the search space is infinite, our problem is effectively de-
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cidable. Any of the standard algorithms (e.g. various versions of the simplex method
or the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure [82] p. 36–39) for solving linear systems
can be used as a decision procedure. If the answer to our decision problem is ‘yes’,
then we say that pi is an uncertainty assignment for Γ .
Now consider the addition of one more sentence B with unknown uncertainty
pim+1. In the optimisation version, wewish tominimise (or maximise) the valueU(B) =
pim+1 subject to the constraints imposed by (4.3). Again in matrix notion, we have:
min (max) pim+1 =
2n∑
j=1
am+1,jPj
subject to
1 P = 1
A P = pi (4.4)
P ≥ 0
We note that in (4.4), A is now a (m+ 1)×2n matrix where n is now the number of
variables occurring in both Γ and B. Clearly, the optimisation version of USAT is just
a linear programming problem and thus can be effectively solved using the simplex
method. In general, linear programs of interest are those in which the number of
unknowns exceeds the number of equations. So for our purpose, we’ll assume that in
(4.4)m+ 1 ≤ 2n. Since a set of premises {A1, . . . , Am}may not be logically independent
in the sense that some premise may be provable from the remaining premises, we
make no assumption about the rank of the matrix A in (4.4).
4.3 Bounded USAT and Inconsistencies
The decision and optimisation versions of USAT expressed in (4.3) and (4.4) should
be distinguished from a further version of USAT. In the bounded version of USAT,
(4.4) is replaced with the inequalities:
A P ≤ pi (4.5)
We call any such pi in (4.5) which has a solution a bound vector. A vector with
identical entries in all of its coordinate is a uniform vector. In the more general version
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of bounded USAT, A P is bounded from both above and below:
pi ≤ A P ≤ pi (4.6)
The decision version of bounded USAT is of particular interest since it captures
the classical notion of logical consistency and inconsistency. In particular we have the
follow equivalences:
Theorem 4.3.1
Let Γ = {A1, . . . , Am} and let A be a uncertainty matrix of Γ . The following statements
are equivalent:
1. Every vector pi ∈ [0, 1]m is a bound vector for Γ , i.e. for every vector pi ∈ [0, 1]m,
A P ≤ pi hold for some P.
2. Every uniform vector pi ∈ [0, 1]m is a bound vector for Γ , i.e. for every uniform
vector pi ∈ [0, 1]m, A P ≤ pi hold for some P.
3. Γ is classically consistent.
Proof:
(1.⇒ 2.): Trivial.
(2. ⇒ 3.): If Γ is inconsistent, then every column of A must contain at least one entry
of 1. Thus for every probability distribution P of Γ , there must be an i ≤ m such that
U(Ai) = pii > 0. Hence A P 6≤ [0, · · · · · · , 0]T for every P.
(3. ⇒ 1.): If Γ is consistent, then there must be a j such that the j-th column of A is
the vector [0, · · · · · · , 0]T . Let P be the probability distribution where Pj = 1. Clearly,
A P = [0, · · · · · · , 0]T and so A P ≤ pi for every uncertainty vector pi.
The implication of the equivalence of (2) and (3) is that for any inconsistent set Γ ,
there would be uniform vectors that are not bound vectors for Γ . Of those uniform
vectors that are bound vectors for an inconsistent Γ , the most interesting one is of
course the minimal one, i.e. one that satisfies inequality (4.5), but no (co-ordinate
wise) smaller vector also satisfies (4.5). For minimally inconsistent sets, there is a
straightforward way to determine a minimal uniform bound. But first we note that
for an inconsistent set, the sum of the uncertainties of its members is bounded below
by 1:
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Theorem 4.3.2
If Γ is inconsistent then, for any probability distribution P,
∑
A∈Γ U(A) ≥ 1.
Proof:
Let n be the number of variables occurring in Γ . Let A be an uncertainty matrix for Γ .
Consider an arbitrary probability distribution P = [P1, . . . P2n ]T and equalities:
A [P1, . . . , P2n ]
T = [pi1, . . . , pi|Γ |]
T (4.7)
Clearly it follows from (4.7) that
pi1 + . . .+ pi|Γ | =
|Γ |∑
i=1
2n∑
j=1
aijPj (4.8)
Since Γ is inconsistent, each column of Amust contain at least one entry of 1. Thus for
each Pj ∈ P, there must be an i ≤ |Γ | such that aij = 1 and thus 1 × Pj must occur at
least once in the RHS of (4.8). But P is a probability distribution and thus
∑2n
j=1 Pj = 1.
This implies in particular that RHS of (4.8) ≥ 1. We conclude that∑A∈Γ U(A) ≥ 1.
The converse of theorem (4.3.2) is obviously also true since the consistency of Γ
must be witnessed by a zero column in A so distributing maximum probability into
such a column yields
∑
A∈Γ U(A) = 0 immediately.
Theorem 4.3.3
Let Γ be a minimally inconsistent set of formulae such that |Γ | = m. Then the minimal
uniform bound vector for Γ is exactlym−1 (= [m−1 . . .m−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
]T ).
Proof:
Suppose Γ is minimally inconsistent and |Γ | = m. Let n be the number of variables
occuring in Γ . Let A be an uncertainty matrix for Γ . By the minimal inconsistency
of Γ , A must contain the identity matrix of order m as a sub-matrix. Without loss of
generality we may assume that the identity sub-matrix occupies the left most position
of A, otherwise we may perform the usual row and column operations to put A into
such a configuration. Let the probability distribution
D = [
2n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
m−1, . . . ,m−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, 0, . . . , 0]T
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Clearly we have AD = m−1, som−1 is a uniform bound vector for Γ . It’s minimal-
ity follows from theorem (4.3.2) since we have
∑
m−1 = m(m−1) = 1.
In addition, the size of the largest minimal inconsistent subset of Γ gives an abso-
lute lower bound on the number of variables in Γ :
Theorem 4.3.4
If Γ = {A1, . . . , Am} is minimally inconsistent, then there are at least dlog2me many
distinct variables occurring in Γ .
Proof:
We assume that |Γ | = m and Γ is minimally inconsistent. Towards a contradiction
suppose that there are k variables occurring in Γ where k < log2m. Since there are k
variables occurring in Γ , there are exactly 2k distinct valuations for Γ . By the minimal
inconsistency of Γ however, for each i ≤ m, there must be a distinct valuation vi
satisfying Γ \{Ai}. Hence there must be at leastm distinct valuations. But by the initial
assumption k < log2m and so 2
k < m. This contradicts the minimal inconsistency of
Γ . Hence k ≥ log2m. But k ∈ Z+, hence k ≥ dlog2me.
Corollary 4.3.1
Ifm is the cardinality of the largest minimal inconsistent subset of Γ , then there are at
least dlog2memany distinct variables occurring in Γ .
4.4 Geometric Rendering of Inconsistencies
According to theorem (4.3.3), the minimal uniform uncertainty bound of a minimal
inconsistent set is inversely proportional to the size of the set. Thus the larger the set,
the smaller the bound. The geometric relationship between the uniform bound vectors
and the uncertainty vectors (of a minimally inconsistent Γ ) can be displayed easily in
the 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional cases. The dimension here simply corresponds
to the cardinality of the set Γ .
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Figure 4.1: Uniform Bounds and Uncertainties in 2D
Figure 4.2: Uniform Bounds and Uncertainties in 3D
In the 2-dimensional case (figure (4.1)), the set of all possible uncertainty assign-
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ment of Γ are contained within the area of the unit square on or above the diagonal
x + y = 1. Recall that in the proof of theorem (4.3.3), the sum of all the co-ordinates
of an uncertainty assignment is ≥ 1. The set of uniform vectors form the other main
diagonal of the unit square. The minimal bound vector is simply the intersection of
the two diagonals.
In the 3-dimensional case (figure (4.2)), the set of all possible uncertainty assign-
ments for Γ is contained within the unit cube on or above the plane x + y + z = 1.
The set of uniform vectors again forms the main diagonal joining the origin and its
opposing vertex. The minimal bound vector in this case is simply the intersection of
the diagonal and the plane.
The generalisation is obvious. For any minimal inconsistent set of size m, the
set of uncertainty assignments is contained within the unit hyper-cube on or above
the hyper-plane
∑m
i=1 xi = 1. The set of uniform vectors forms the diagonal from
the origin to the opposing vertex (1, . . . , 1). The minimal bound vector is again the
intersection of the diagonal and the hyper-plane.
Theorem 4.4.1
For any minimal inconsistent set Γ , the minimal bound vector for Γ is the minimal
uniform bound vector for Γ .
Proof:
Recall that the euclidean distance between x, y ∈ Rm is defined by
e(x, y) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (4.9)
Thus the euclidean distance between any x = 〈x1, . . . xm〉 ∈ [0, 1]m and the ori-
gin is
∣∣∣∣√∑mi=1 x2i ∣∣∣∣. From theorem (4.3.2), we know that for any inconsistent Γ =
{A1, . . . , Am}, any uncertainty assignment x ∈ [0, 1]m for Γ is such that
∑m
i=1 xi ≥ 1.
There are two cases to consider:
(case 1)
∑m
i=1 xi = 1: We want to find value x ∈ [0, 1]m with minimal distance to the
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origin subject to the constraint that
∑m
i=1 xi = 1, i.e.
minimise e(x, 0) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√√√√ m∑
i=1
x2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (4.10)
subject to
m∑
i=1
xi = 1 (4.11)
Without loss of generality we may consider minimising the square of (4.10) instead,
i.e.
f(x) =
m∑
i=1
x2i (4.12)
We note that the constraint (4.11) is a closed and bounded subset of the hyper-cube
on which f is continuous, thus an absolute minimum value must occur. To find the
minima we let g(x) =
∑m
i=1 xi and use Lagrange multipliers on all partial derivatives
of f and g:
∇f(x) =
(
∂f
∂x1
, . . . , ∂f∂xm
)
= (2x1, . . . , 2xm)
whereas
∇g(x) =
(
∂g
∂x1
, . . . , ∂g∂xm
)
= (1, . . . , 1)
Solving for the Lagrange multiplier λ in ∇f(x) = λ∇g(x) yields:
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 2xi = λ
=⇒ x1 = x2 = . . . = xm
But (x1, . . . , xm) is on the hyper-plane
∑m
i=1 xi = 1. Hence for each i, xi = m
−1. The
other remaining possible locations for extrema to occur are the endpoints or the point
x where ∇g(x) = 0. We note however that for no x ∈ [0, 1]m do we have ∇g(x) = 0.
Hence the latter case is impossible after all. Now each of the endpoints of g is of the
form xe = (. . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .). Hence for each endpoint xe, f(xe) > f(m−1). Hence we
conclude that them−1 must be the absolute minimum.
(case 2)
∑m
i=1 xi > 1: since [0, 1]
m is a euclidean space, if x = (x1, . . . , xm) is such that
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∑m
i=1 xi > 1, then there must be a y = (y1, . . . , ym) such that
∑m
i=1 yi = 1 and
e(x, 0) = e(y, 0) + e(x, y) (4.13)
where e(x, y) > 0. From the previous case however, we know that the absolute
minima of f on the hyper-plane
∑m
i=1 xi = 1 occurs at m−1 . It follows then that
e(y, 0) ≥
√
m−1. Hence e(x, 0) >
√
m−1. Since x was arbitrary, we conclude that
any such x would have e(x, 0) >
√
m−1. This suffices to show that m−1 is the closest
uncertainty assignment to the origin.
4.5 Multiple Inconsistencies
The general situation for finding uniform bound vectors for an inconsistent set is con-
siderably more difficult. Although the set of uncertainty assignments is on or above
the hyper-plane
∑m
i=1 xi = 1, we have no information on where the uniform vector
may intersect with the set of uncertainty assignments (if they intersect at all). Even
if the two do intersect, we have no guarantee that result analogous to theorem (4.4.1)
should hold.
In the general case, an inconsistent set may have multiple minimally inconsistent
subsets. We say that a set of formulae is contradiction free if it contains no singleton
inconsistency. We can obtain some bounds, though not necessarily minimal ones, by
looking at the smallest minimal inconsistent subset(s).
Theorem 4.5.1
Let Γ be inconsistent but contradiction free. Letn be the number of variables occurring
in Γ andm be the size of the smallest minimal inconsistent subset of Γ . Then there exist
a probability distribution P such that for all A ∈ Γ , U(A) ≤ 2n−(m−1)2n .
Proof:
We let ∆ = {A1, . . . , Am} ⊆ Γ be a smallest minimal inconsistent subset. Consider the
uncertainty matrix A for Γ where the firstm row of A correspond to members of ∆. We
note that by the minimal inconsistency of ∆, A must be configurable with an identity
submatrix of orderm in the top left most position, i.e.
A =
[
Im B
C D
]
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In the worst case B may contain only 1’s and thus the maximum possible number of
1’s in any given row of the submatrix [Im B] is 2n−(m−1). We let {Am+1, . . . , A|Γ |} ⊆ Γ
be the set of formulae corresponding to the rows of the submatrix [C D]. Let Aj be an
arbitrary but fixed element of {Am+1, . . . , A|Γ |} and consider
Π =
{
Σ ∪ {Aj} : Σ ⊂ ∆ and |Σ| = (m− 2)
}
We note that given |∆| = m, we have |Π| =
(
m
m−2
)
. Since every Σ ∪ {Aj} ∈ Π is of size
(m− 1), there must be a vΣ ∈ WΓ which witnesses the consistency of Σ ∪ {Aj}.
Claim 1: For no v ∈ WΓ do we have v witnesses the consistency of more than 2 mem-
bers of Π.
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose to the contrary that there is some v ∈ WΓ which witnesses
the consistency of some distinct Σ1 ∪ {Aj}, Σ2 ∪ {Aj}, Σ3 ∪ {Aj} ∈ Π. It follows that v
must witness the consistency of Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ Σ3 ∪ {Aj}. But note that for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
|Σi| = m − 2 and Σi ⊂ ∆. So given that Σ1, Σ2 and Σ3 are all distinct it follows that
Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ Σ3 = ∆ and thus ∆ ⊆ Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ Σ3 ∪ {Aj}. Given that ∆ is inconsistent,
Σ1 ∪Σ2 ∪Σ3 ∪ {Aj}must be inconsistent. This contradicts the initial assumption that v
witnesses the consistency of Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ Σ3 ∪ {Aj} and hence for no v ∈ WΓ do we have
v being the witness of more then 2members of Π.
Claim 2: There are at least (m− 1) entries of zero’s in each row of the submatrix [C D].
Proof of Claim 2: We consider 3 cases:
Case 1: m = 2. We note that since Γ contains no contradictions, each row of A must
contain at least one entry of 0.
Case 2: m = 3. Then |Π| =
(
m
m−2
)
=
(
3
1
)
= 3. But by claim (1) no single v ∈ WΓ can
witness the consistency of all three members ofΠ. Hence to witness each member ofΠ
requires at least two distinct u, v ∈ W It follows that every row of [C D] must contain
at least two entries of 0.
Case 3: m ≥ 4. Clearly given claim (1), at least ⌈ |Π|2 ⌉many distinct v ∈ WΓ are required
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to witness the consistency of each member of Π. But note that form ≥ 4we have
⌈( m
m−2
)
2
⌉
≥ 1
2
(
m
m− 2
)
=
1
2
× m× (m− 1)
2
≥ (m− 1)
Hence there are at least (m− 1) entries of 0 in each row of [C D] as required.
Given claim (2) the maximum possible number of 1’s in each row of [C D] must be
2n − (m− 1). Hence,
A[2−n, . . . , 2−n]T ≤ [2
n − (m− 1)
2n
, . . . ,
2n − (m− 1)
2n
]T
We note that the bound given in theorem (4.5.1) is an absolute bound. However
it is not an attractive bound since 2n grows exponentially with n and thus the bound
approaches 1 very quickly as n grows. One obvious way to obtain a lower bound is
to consider the size of Γ instead.
Theorem 4.5.2
Let Γ be inconsistent but contradiction free. Letn be the number of variables occurring
in Γ and m be the size of the smallest minimal inconsistent subset of Γ . Then there
exists a probability distribution P such that for all A ∈ Γ , U(A) ≤ |Γ |−(m−1)|Γ | .
Proof:
Let |Γ | = k. Since m is the size of the smallest inconsistent subset of Γ , every subset
∆ ⊆ Γ of sizem−1must be consistent. The number of such subsets is ( km−1). Let these
subsets be enumerated as ∆1, . . . , ∆( km−1)
.
For each subset ∆i, 1 ≤ i ≤
(
k
m−1
)
, there must be a v ∈ WΓ that witnesses the consis-
tency of ∆i. For each ∆i choose one such witness v∆i and set
ti(v) =

(
k
m−1
)−1
if v = v∆i
0 otherwise
(4.14)
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We note that the v∆i ’s are not necessarily unique, i.e. for i 6= j, v∆i = v∆j but ∆i may
be distinct from ∆j.
For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, we define the probability:
Pj = t1(vj) + . . .+ t( km−1)
(vj)
We let the probability distribution P = [P1, . . . P2n ]T , i.e.
P =

t1(v1) + . . .+ t( km−1)
(v1)
t1(v2) + . . .+ t( km−1)
(v2)
...
t1(v2n) + . . .+ t( km−1)
(v2n)
 (4.15)
Claim 1: P is a probability distribution overWΓ , i.e.
∑2n
j=1 Pj = 1.
Proof of claim 1: We note that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ( km−1),
2n∑
j=1
ti(vj) =
(
k
m− 1
)−1
Hence
( km−1)∑
i=1
2n∑
j=1
ti(vj) =
(
k
m− 1
)
×
(
k
m− 1
)−1
= 1
This completes the proof of our claim. We note that in (4.15) there are exactly
(
k
m−1
)
many non-zero terms.
Let A be an arbitrary but fixed member of Γ , we note that there are exactly
(
k−1
m−2
)
many subsets ∆i containing A. Without loss of generality we may assume that A is
contained in the first
(
k−1
m−2
)
subsets ∆i. We let [a1, . . . , a2n ] be the row vector in the
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uncertainty matrix A for the corresponding A ∈ Γ . Clearly we have
U(A) = a1 ×
[
t1(v1) + . . .+ t( km−1)
(v1)
]
+ . . .
+ a2n ×
[
t1(v2n) + . . .+ t( km−1)
(v2n)
]
= a1 × t1(v1) + . . .+ a1 × t( km−1)(v1)
+ . . .
+ a2n × t1(v2n) + . . .+ a2n × t( km−1)(v2n)
=

a1 × t1(v1)
+
...
+
a2n × t1(v2n)

+ . . .+

a1 × t( km−1)(v1)
+
...
+
a2n × t( km−1)(v2n)

(4.16)
Claim 2: For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ( k−1m−2), and each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, if ti(vj) 6= 0, then
aj × ti(vj) = 0.
Proof of claim 2:
ti(vj) 6= 0 =⇒ vj |=∧∆i
=⇒ vj |= A
=⇒ aj = 0
=⇒ aj × ti(vj) = 0
It follows from claim (2) and the definition of ti that there are at least
(
k−1
m−2
)
many
zero terms in (4.16). Thus the maximum number of non-zero terms in (4.16) is
(
k
m−1
)
−
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(
k−1
m−2
)
. But since each non-zero term in (4.16) is equal to
(
k
m−1
)−1
, we have
U(A) ≤
(
k
m−1
)
−
(
k−1
m−2
)(
k
m−1
) = 1− ( k−1m−2)(
k
m−1
)
= 1−
[
(k− 1)!
[(k− 1) − (m− 2)]!(m− 2)!
× [(k− (m− 1)]!(m− 1)!
k!
]
= 1−
[
1
[(k− 1) − (m− 2)]!
× [(k− (m− 1)]!(m− 1)
k
]
= 1−
[
1
[(k−m+ 1)]!
× (k−m+ 1)!(m− 1)
k
]
=
k− (m− 1)
k
Since Awas arbitrary, we conclude that A P ≤ k−(m−1)k .
Since k−(m−1)k approaches 1 at a rate that is only linearly related to increases in k,
theorem (4.5.2) is an improvement over theorem (4.5.1). We note that in obtaining the
bound in theorem (4.5.2) we make no assumption about whether members of Γ are
independent. Further improvement can be made if we consider only certain subsets
of Γ that are independent in a certain sense.
Definition 4.5.1
We say that a set of formulae Γ is pairwise independent iff for any A,B ∈ Γ , neither
A ` B, nor B ` A. A subset Π ⊆ Γ is said to be a cover of Γ iff
⋃
B∈Π
Cn(B) =
⋃
A∈Γ
Cn(A)
where Cn is the usual closure under classical deduction.
The notion of a pairwise independent set is an obvious generalisation of the usual
notion of independence – a set of formulae is independent if no member of the set is a
consequence of the remaining members of the set. Note that if a set Γ is independent
in the ordinary sense, then no proper subset of Γ can be inconsistent (though Γ may be
minimally inconsistent). Generalising this, sets that are pairwise independent must be
§4.5 Multiple Inconsistencies 103
contradiction free, whereas sets that are n-independent in the sense that no member
of the set is a consequence of any subset of size n− 1must be free of any inconsistent
subset of size≤ n−1. Thus ann-independent inconsistent set must only haveminimal
inconsistent subsets of size ≥ n. It is straightforward to verify from definition (4.5.1)
that every set of (contradiction free) formulae Γ must contain a pairwise independent
cover of Γ .
Theorem 4.5.3
Let Γ be inconsistent but contradiction free. Letm be the size of the smallest minimal
inconsistent subset of Γ and Π be any pairwise independent cover of Γ . Then there
exists a probability distribution P such that for all A ∈ Γ , U(A) ≤ |Π|−(m−1)|Π| .
Proof:
Let Γ and Π fulfil the hypotheses.
Claim 1: m is the size of the smallest minimal inconsistent subset of Π.
Proof of Claim 1: Clearly given that Π ⊆ Γ , the size of the smallest minimal inconsistent
subset of Π cannot be less thanm. We now show that there is a minimal inconsistent
subset of Π of size m. Let ∆ be a minimal inconsistent subset of Γ with |∆| = m. By
the covering property of Π, for each Ai ∈ ∆ there must be a Bk ∈ Π such that Bk ` Ai.
We note that for no two distinct Ai, Aj ∈ ∆ do we have Bk ` Ai and Bk ` Aj for some
Bk ∈ Π. For otherwise, (∆ \ {Ai, Aj}) ∪ {Bk} is a minimal inconsistent subset of size
< m. Let ∆′ ⊆ Π be a set with the property that each Ai ∈ ∆ is implied by exactly one
Bj ∈ ∆′. Clearly, ∆′ must be minimally inconsistent and of sizem. This completes the
proof of our claim.
Claim 2: For any formulaeA,B ifA ` B then for all probability distributions P,U(B) ≤
U(A).
Proof of Claim 2: Suppose thatA ` B. Consider an arbitrary but fixed l×2n uncertainty
matrix A with row ri = [ai1, . . . , ai2n ] corresponding to A and row rj = [bj1, . . . , bj2n ]
corresponding to B. Clearly for any k ≤ 2n, if aik = 0 then the corresponding bjk = 0.
So for any arbitrary probability distribution Q = [Q1, . . .Q2n ]T , we have
2n∑
k=1
bjk ×Qk ≤
2n∑
k=1
aik ×Qk
But since A and Q were completely arbitrary, we conclude that U(B) ≤ U(A) on any
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probability distribution.
By the covering property of Π every A ∈ Γ \Π is implied by some B ∈ Π, so it follows
from claim (2) that for any probability distribution, for each A ∈ Γ \ Π there exists
some B ∈ Π such that U(A) ≤ U(B). By theorem (4.5.2) and claim (1) however, there
must be a probability distribution P such that for all B ∈ Π, U(B) ≤ |Π|−(m−1)|Π| . If
P is not defined for all of Γ , it is trivial to extend P′ for all of Γ such that for any
B ∈ Π, U(B) ≤ |Π|−(m−1)|Π| still holds with respect to P
′. But then claim (2) confirms
that on P′, U(A) ≤ |Π|−(m−1)|Π| holds for any A ∈ Γ \ Π. Hence we conclude that on P
′,
U(A) ≤ |Π|−(m−1)|Π| holds for any A ∈ Γ .
The bound obtained in theorem (4.5.3) clearly improves as the value of m ap-
proaches |Π|. This shows that in a large data set, the uncertainty bound of any single
datum is better for dispersed inconsistencies than for concentrated inconsistencies.
We also note that in the event that Γ is minimally inconsistent, Γ must be a pairwise
independent cover of itself. Thus applying theorem (4.5.3) to Γ we get the uncertainty
bound |Γ |−1which is in accordancewith theorem (4.3.3). In light of this, theorem (4.5.3)
can be taken to be a generalisation of theorem (4.3.3).
4.6 Uncertain Inference
As we have already noted, premises that are inconsistent (but contradiction free) have
non-trivial uncertainties. In this section we would like to continue the investigation
initiated by Adams and Levine in [5] and examine how uncertainties may be trans-
mitted from premises to conclusions. In [1; 2; 3], Adams extended the result of [5] to
cover a language with a conditional connective. However the issue of uncertainties
transmitted from inconsistent premises to conclusions has not been addressed in any
of their subsequent works. We start by identifying several candidate (uncertainty) en-
tailment relations – all of which can be said to preserve the uncertainty bound of the
premises under some sense:
Definition 4.6.1
For any set of formulae Γ and formula B we define the following entailment between
Γ and B
Certainty Entailment: For any probability distribution P such that UP(A) = 0 for all
A ∈ Γ , we have UP(B) = 0. We denote this by Γ |=0 B.
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Uncertainty Entailment: For any probability distribution P such that UP(A) < 1 for
all A ∈ Γ , we have UP(B) < 1. We denote this by Γ |=<1 B.
-Entailment: For any  ∈ [0, 1], for any probability distribution P such that UP(A) ≤
 for all A ∈ Γ we have UP(B) ≤ . We denote this by Γ |=≤ B.
We note that an inconsistent set of formulae cannot all be certain together. Thus
certainty entailment is an explosive entailment for any inconsistent premises. In fact
it is just classical entailment:
Proposition 4.6.1
Certainty entailment is equivalent to classical entailment.
Proof:
We note that any v ∈ WΓ which verifies all of Γ but falsifies B would also confirm the
existence of a P with all A ∈ Γ having U(A) = 0 but U(B) 6= 0.
Conversely if Γ |= B, then for the uncertainty matrix A of Γ ∪ {B}, every column
[a1j, . . . a|Γ |+1j]
T with all 0’s in the first |Γ | entries (corresponding to members of Γ ) will
have a|Γ |+1j = 0 (corresponding to B). Let P = [P1 . . . P2n ]T be an arbitrary but fixed
probability distribution such that for all Ak ∈ Γ , UP(Ak) = 0. Clearly for each Ak ∈ Γ
UP(Ak) =
2n∑
j=1
akjPj
is zero if either akj = 0 or Pj = 0 for each i ≤ 2n. If Pj = 0 then obviously a|Γ |=1j×Pj =
0. But if Pj 6= 0 then akj = 0 for each k ≤ |Γ |. But then a|Γ |=1j = 0 as well and thus
a|Γ |=1j × Pj = 0. Hence
∑2n
j=1 a|Γ |+1jPj = 0, i.e. UP(B) = 0.
Turning now to uncertainty entailment, it is clearly an improvement over certainty
entailment for handling inconsistencies. The basic idea of uncertainty entailment is
that if each of the Ai ∈ Γ is free from complete uncertainty, then the conclusion B is
also free of complete uncertainty. Since contradiction free inconsistent premises have
non-trivial uncertainties, the antecedent of the conditional in our definition is never
falsified in such a case. Thus we do not have A,¬A |=<1 B in general. But note
that in the presence of contradictions, we do have A ∧ ¬A |=<1 B. Moreover for any
classical tautology > we have |=<1 > trivially. In fact the logic which captures |=<1
completely is the discursive logic(s) developed by Jas´kowski in [97]. For a complete
sequent formulation of discursive logic, the reader can consult the system S of Knight
in [111]. But the basic idea of a discursive logic is to take the union of all the theorems
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of an underlying logic `L together with the deductive closures (under `L) of each
singleton of the premises, i.e. for any Γ and B we have
Γ `D B iff `L B or A `L B for some A ∈ Γ
For a different choice of the underlying Lwe get a different discursive logic.
Proposition 4.6.2
For any Γ and B, Γ |=<1 B iff either ` B or A ` B for some A ∈ Γ where ` is the usual
classical propositional logic.
Proof:
As noted before it is trivially true that if B is a classical tautology, then for any proba-
bility distribution Pwe haveUP(B) ≤ UP(A) for anyA. So we’ll consider any B that is
not a tautology. For the only if direction we assume that A ` B for some A ∈ Γ . Then
from claim (2) of theorem (4.5.3), for every probability distribution P over Γ ∪ {B},
we have UP(B) ≤ UP(A). So in particular for any probability distribution Q with
UQ(C) < 1 for every C ∈ Γ we have UQ(B) < 1. This shows that Γ |=<1 B.
For the if direction, we assume that for no A ∈ Γ do we have A ` B. Now consider
the uncertainty matrix A = (aij) for Γ ∪ {B}. As usual we’ll assume that A is a (m +
1) × 2n matrix, where the first m rows correspond to members of Γ and the (m + 1)-
th row corresponds to B. Moreover we assume that t is the number of 1’s occurring
in the (m + 1)-th row of A. We note that t ≥ 1 since B is not a tautology by the
initial assumption. We define the probability distribution P as follows: for every j,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2n,
Pj =

t−1 if am+1,j = 1
0 otherwise
Clearly given how P is defined, UP(B) = [
∑2n
j=1(am+1,j × Pj)] = 1. But note that since
for each A ∈ Γ , A 6` B so we have, for each i ≤ m there must be a ji ≤ 2n such that
aiji = 0 but am+1,ji = 1. This implies that for each A ∈ Γ we have UP(A) ≤ t−1t < 1.
Thus P witnesses the failure of Γ |=<1 B.
Turning now to -entailment, the basic requirement is that the uncertainty of a
conclusion B should never exceed the maximum value of the uncertainty of any given
A ∈ Γ , i.e. for any probability distribution P, U(B) ≤ max{U(A) : A ∈ Γ }. As it turns
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out -entailment is in fact equivalent to uncertainty entailment:
Proposition 4.6.3
For any Γ and B, Γ |=≤ B iff Γ |=<1 B.
Proof:
The only if direction is trivial since |=<1 is a special case of |=≤ when  < 1.
For the if direction, consider B where B is a tautology. Then for any Γ we have
Γ |=≤ B since U(B) = 0 for any probability distribution. Suppose then that B is not
a tautology but for some A ∈ Γ , A ` B holds. Then from claim (2) of theorem (4.5.3)
again, for every probability distribution P over Γ ∪ {B}, we have U(B) ≤ U(A). Thus
we have U(B) ≤ max{U(A) : A ∈ Γ } as required.
To put the matter in terms of preservation, discursive logic is exactly the logic
which preserves the uncertainty bounds of premises. Note however that discursive
logic does not allow for full aggregation of premises. In general we have U(
∧m
i=1Ai) ≤∑m
i=1U(Ai), but not U(
∧m
i=1Ai) ≤ max{U(Ai)| 1 ≤ i ≤ m}. In light of this, discur-
sive logic is a very extreme approach to bounding the uncertainty of the conclusion.
When the value of max{U(A) : A ∈ Γ } is close to 1, it is of course desirable to ensure
that the conclusion’s uncertainty should not exceed this bound. But when the value
of max{U(A) : A ∈ Γ } is small, a slightly riskier inference with a higher conclusion
uncertainty may be acceptable. More importantly, aggregation is particularly useful
for fusing information from multiple sources. We’ll introduce a kind of entailment
relation which permits a limited form of aggregation by bounding the size of the ag-
gregating set. Our entailment relation also provides a partial solution to a problem
stated in Knight [111] (page 360). But first we need to fix some terminologies and
definitions.
Definition 4.6.2
Let k ∈ Z+ be arbitrary but fixed. Let Γ be a finite set of formulae in n variables. The
set of all subsets of Γ of size ≤ k is denoted by ℘k(Γ).
If P = [P1, . . . , P2n ]T is a probability distribution over Γ , we say that P is i-positive if
Pi > 0.
If ∆ ⊆ Γ , we say that P verifies ∆ if there exists an i ≤ 2n such that P is i-positive and
the ith term of UP(A) is 0 for each A ∈ ∆, i.e. where A is the uncertainty matrix for Γ
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and j(1), . . . , j(t) are the respective enumeration of members of∆, we have aj(1)i×Pi =
. . . = aj(t)i × Pi = 0 under P.
Note that if ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ) is inconsistent, then no P will verify ∆. Intuitively, P verifies
a ∆ only if P distributes non-zero probability into at least one model of ∆. We now
introduce a generalised version of -entailment with an additional parameter k as a
bound on the size of the aggregating set.
Definition 4.6.3
Let k ∈ Z+ be arbitrary but fixed. Let Γ be any finite set of formulae in n variables.
For any formula B, we say that Γ k-entails B, Γ |=k B, iffU(B) < 1 on every probability
distribution P which verifies every ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ).
Now for different choices of k we can regain different degrees of aggregation. So
for instance if k ≥ 2 and A1, A2 ∈ Γ then Γ |=k A1 ∧A2. Again k is the absolute upper
bound on the number of (independent) members of Γ that can be conjoined. Note
also that any tautology > is k-entailed by any Γ since U(>) = 0 < 1 holds trivially.
Moreover if the size of the smallest minimal inconsistent subset of Γ ism andm < k,
then no P will verify every ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ) and thus Γ |=k B for any B holds trivially, i.e.
|=k explodes when m < k. We summarise the properties of |=k in theorem (4.6.1).
The content of our theorem is self-explanatory. Part (1) shows that |=k is an extension
of |=≤. Part (2) shows that |=k is a kind of substructural logic. Part (3) shows that
|=k is monotonically increasing with respect to k. Part (4) is a generalised version of
proposition (4.6.2) and therein shows that |=k can be viewed as a kind of generalised
discursive logic (and thus is decidable). Part (5) shows that |=k, like |=≤, preserves
the uncertainty bound of the premises in a certain sense.
Theorem 4.6.1
1. For any k ∈ Z+, |=≤ ⊆ |=k.
2. |=k is reflexive and monotonic but transitivity fails.
3. If k′, k ∈ Z+ and k′ < k, then |=k′ ⊆ |=k.
4. Let k ∈ Z+ be fixed. For any Γ and B, Γ |=k B iff B ∈
⋃
{Cn(∆)| ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ)}.
5. Let  ∈ [0, 1] such that  < 1. Let Γ |=k B. Then for any probability distribution
P, if
∑
A∈∆UP(A) ≤  holds for each ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ) then UP(B) ≤ .
Proof:
(1): As noted before for any tautology B, Γ |=k B holds trivially. So we’ll assume that B
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is not a tautology and for an arbitrary Γ , we have Γ |=≤ B. From propositions (4.6.2)
and (4.6.3), it follows that for some A ∈ Γ , A ` B. Again from claim (2) of theo-
rem (4.5.3) it follows that for any probability distributionQ, we haveUQ(B) ≤ UQ(A).
Clearly {A} ∈ ℘k(Γ) for any k ∈ Z+. So if P verifies every ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ), it must also verify
{A}. This implies the existence of some i such that Pi > 0 and the ith-term ofUP(A) is 0.
SinceA ` B, the ith term ofUP(B)must be 0 as well. ThusUP(B) ≤ [(
∑2n
j Pj)−Pi] < 1.
(2): For reflexivity, clearly if A ∈ Γ then {A} ∈ ℘k(Γ) for any k ∈ Z+. So if P verifies
every ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ), it must also verify {A} as well. This implies that for some i, U(A) ≤
[(
∑2n
j Pj) − Pi] < 1 as required.
For monotonicity, we note that ℘k(Γ) ⊆ ℘k(Γ, Σ) so if P verifies every member ℘k(Γ, Σ),
it must also verify every member of ℘k(Γ). So on the assumption that Γ |=k A holds
Γ, Σ |=k Amust hold as well.
To see the failure of transitivity, consider Γ = {p, ¬p∨ r, ¬r}. We have
Γ |=2 p∧ (¬p∨ r) and Γ, p∧ (¬p∨ r) |=2 q
But note that Γ 6|=2 q.
(3) We note if k′ < k then ℘k′(Γ) ⊆ ℘k(Γ) for any Γ . Thus if P verifies every member of
℘k(Γ) it must also verify every member of ℘k′(Γ). So on the assumption that Γ |=k′ A,
Γ |=k Amust hold as well.
(4) For the if direction let P be any probability distribution which verifies every ∆ ∈
℘k(Γ). We want to show that UP(B) < 1 on the assumption that B ∈
⋃
{Cn(∆)| ∆ ∈
℘k(Γ)}. So we assume that for some ∆0 ∈ ℘k(Γ), ∆0 ` B. By the initial assumption
however P must verify ∆0, so there exists some i such that Pi > 0 and the ith term of
UP(A) is 0 for every A ∈ ∆0. But ∆0 ` B so the ith term of UP(B) is 0 as well. As in (1)
and (2), this suffices to show that UP(B) ≤ [(
∑2n
j=1 Pj) − Pi] < 1.
For the only if direction, we assume that B 6∈ ⋃{Cn(∆)| ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ)}, i.e. for every
∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ), ∆ 6` B. We’ll show the existence of a P which verifies every ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ) but
on P we have UP(B) = 1.
Consider the uncertainty matrix A = (aij) for Γ ∪ {B}. As usual we’ll assume that
A is am + 1× 2n matrix, where the firstm rows correspond to members of Γ and the
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(m + 1)-th row corresponds to B. Moreover we assume that t is the number of 1’s
occurring in the (m+ 1)-th row of A. We note that t ≥ 1 since B cannot be a tautology
by the initial assumption. We define the probability distribution P as follows: for
every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n,
Pj =

t−1 if am+1,j = 1
0 otherwise
Clearly given how P is defined, UP(B) = [
∑2n
j=1(am+1,j × Pj)] = 1.
Claim: P verifies every ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ).
Proof of claim: Let∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ) be arbitrary. By the initial assumption∆ 6` B so there must
be a column in A which witnesses this. Let the witnessing column be the sth column
in A. We note that P must be s-positive since Ps = t−1 > 0. Moreover the sth term
of U(A) must be 0 for every A ∈ ∆. Hence P verifies ∆. Since ∆ was arbitrary, this
suffices to show that P verifies every member of ℘k(Γ).
(5) We assume that Γ |=k B and that P = [P1 . . . P2n ]T is an arbitrary probability distri-
bution such that
∑
A∈∆UP(A) ≤  < 1 holds for each ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ). From (4) above it
follows that B ∈ ⋃{Cn(∆)| ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ)}. This implies that for some ∆0 ∈ ℘k(Γ) we have
∆0 ` B. But by the initial assumption
∑
A∈∆0 UP(A) ≤  < 1. By theorem (4.3.2)), it
follows that ∆0 must be consistent. Let |Γ | = mwith n variables and let |∆0| = t. With-
out loss of generality we may assume that the first t rows of the uncertainty matrix A
correspond to members of ∆0 and the (m+1)-th row of A corresponds to B. Using the
usual column rotation, A can be reconfigured into the following sub-matrices:
A =
[
B C
D E
]
B is a t × s submatrix with each column containing at least one entry of 1; C is a
t× (2n− s) zero submatrix. By the consistency of ∆0, C cannot be empty. We note that
since ∆0 ` B, the last row of E must be 0’s. This gives the following absolute upper
bound on UP(B):
UP(B) ≤ P1 + . . .+ Pt
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However we note that since each column of B contains at least one entry of 1, we have
the following absolute lower bound on
∑
A∈∆0 UP(A):
P1 + . . .+ Pt ≤
∑
A∈∆0
UP(A)
Hence UP(B) ≤
∑
A∈∆0 UP(A) ≤  < 1 as required.
4.7 Bounded Reasoning in Natural Deduction
Although our motivation for |=k has been stated solely in probabilistic terms so far,
we should point out that |=k can also be regarded as a kind of resource bounded rea-
soning. If we take the suggestion of the linear logician seriously and treat premises as
resources to be consumed, it is natural to be concerned with how premises are used
and propagated in a proof. In certain natural deduction systems for classical logics,
formulae can be labelled with numerals to facilitate bookkeeping of premise depen-
dence as well as to keep track of the subproof structure of a given proof. Lemmon’s
classic text [118] for instance uses such a labelling device. Anderson and Belnap also
introduce labels to a Fitch style natural deduction formulation of relevant logics in
their seminal work [7].1 The basic function of the labels is to serve as names for the
premises and the process of deduction involves propagating the labels from premises
to the conclusion in a systematic and controlled way. Of course in classical logics, a
premise can be reused as often as required in a proof. In linear logics however, this is
no longer the case – we may have A `L B but not A,A `L B. Hence in linear logics,
the fundamental data structure of premises is multisets instead of the usual sets. Of
course k-entailment is not a linear logic and does not require any accounting for how
many times a given premise is used in a proof. But |=k does require a mechanism
to keep track of how many distinct premises (from Γ ) are used in a given proof. But
we must be careful to distinguish between different ways of introducing assumptions
into a proof. Using Lemmon’s system in [118] as a point of reference, there are at least
4 distinct ways to introduce assumptions into a proof:
1. the rule of assumption introduction (AI)
1The use of labels was first introduced by Jas´kowski in [96] and subsequently refined by Quine [141]
and Suppes [175]. For a history and discussion of various versions of natural deduction systems, see
Pelletier [137]. For a completely general approach to logics via the use of Labelled Deductive Systems,
see Gabbay [73].
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2. →-introduction (CP for conditional proof),
3. ∨-elimination rule, (∨− E), and
4. the reductio ad absurdum rule (RAA)
The rule that is of immediate interest to us is the rule of AI:
...
{α} (i) A Assumption
...
Figure 4.3: Assumption Introduction
The notation is slightly modified here with the label α enclosed in set brackets. The
usual convention is that the label α is just a numeral indicating that the introduced
assumption A depends on itself. We’ll continue to use our convention from now on.
The rule of AI allows us to introduce an assumption at any stage in a proof and the
rule can be used for any number of assumptions in a given proof. The basic idea
is that given a set of premises Γ , we can introduce finitely many members of Γ into
a proof via the use of AI. Clearly AI cannot be a valid rule for |=k. Nonetheless,
it is possible to port AI into |=k by using double labelling – both keeping track of the
assumption dependence and keeping count of the number of assumptions introduced
from the given set Γ . For an arbitrary but fixed k, we let the set of labels for the rule of
assumption introduction be N× {1, . . . , k}:
The modified AI rule allows us to introduce an assumption into a proof at line (i)
provided that for no j < i do we have 〈j, β〉 (β ∈ {1, . . . k}) occurring as a label for a
distinct assumption introduced by AI.
...
{〈i, β〉} (i) A Assumption Intro
...
Figure 4.4: Modified Assumption Introduction
The net effect of our modification is that no more than k assumptions from a given
Γ can be introduced into a proof. What about other rules which also require the in-
troduction of assumptions? The simplest approach to take is to deploy a distinct set
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of labels for these rules. We take the set of labels for assumptions introduced via CP,
∨-E and RAA to be N× {0}. CP can be redefined using our labelling system as follows:
...
{〈i, 0〉} (i) A Assumption CP
...
J (j) B . . .
J \ {〈i, 0〉} (j+ 1) A→ B i− j CP
...
Figure 4.5: Modified rule of→-Introduction
...
I (i) A∨ B
...
{〈j, 0〉} (j) A Assumption ∨− E
...
L \ {〈j, 0〉} (l) C . . .
...
{〈m, 0〉} (m) B Assumption ∨− E
...
N \ {〈m, 0〉} (n) C . . .
(I ∪ L ∪ N ) \ {〈j, 0〉, 〈m, 0〉} (n+1) C i, j− l,m− n ∨− E
...
Figure 4.6: Modified ∨− E
Note that at line (j+1) (figure (4.5), the label 〈i, 0〉 is removed from the set of labels
J and thereby discharging (an occurrence of) the assumption A at line (i). The occur-
rences of formulae corresponding to labels in J \ {〈i, 0〉} are said to be undischarged
at line (j + 1). Note that the notion of a discharged and undischarged assumption is
defined over occurences of an assumption. An occurence of an assumption Amay be
discharged at line k while a distinct occurrence of A may be undischarged at k. The
dotted line at line (j) represents some rule in the system which is being applied at line
(j) of the proof. The block beginning with the line with the assumption A and ending
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with the line with A being discharged is a subproof of the overall proof. Note also
that although A is discharged at line (j + 1), the label 〈i, 0〉 may not be a member of
J at all. The→ introduced by the CP rule is the material implication – it allows us to
obtain A→ B trivially if we can obtain B without actually using the assumption A.
In figure (4.6), the inferred statement C at line (n + 1) inherits all undischarged
assumptions ofA∨B at line (i), as well as those from line (l) and line (n). BothA and
B (at line (j) and line (m) respectively) are discharged at line (n + 1). Also note that
there are two subproof structures involved here – blocks (j− l) and (m−n). For RAA
the assumption A is discharged at line (j+ 1) as usual.
...
{〈i, 0〉} (i) A Assumption RAA
...
J (j) B∧ ¬B . . .
J \ {〈i, 0〉} (j+ 1) ¬A i− j RAA
...
Figure 4.7: Modified RAA
I A
...
J A→ B
MP
I ∪ J B
I ¬B
...
J A→ B
MT
I ∪ J ¬A
I A
...
J B
∧− I
I ∪ J A∧ B
I A∧ B
∧− E
I B
I A
∨− I
I A∨ B
I A
DN
I ¬¬A
Figure 4.8: Modified Lemmon’s Rules
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All remaining rules of Lemmon’s system involve no introduction of assumptions
and can be redefined in our double labelling system. We’ll simplify the graphical
representations of these rules by omitting some details here. We note that DN is an
invertible rule. ∨− I, ∧− I and ∧− E are all commutative with respect to ∨ and ∧.
Note that each application of our rules involves no discharging of assumptions;
thus all undischarged assumptions prior to the application of a rule will remain undis-
charged at the line in which the rule is applied. We’ll call all the above rules non-
discharging rules and call CP, ∨ − E and RAA discharging rules. We’ll identify Lem-
mon’s original system as L′ and our modified system as L. The notion of provability
in L is defined in the usual way.
Definition 4.7.1
We say that a sentence B is L-provable from a set of sentences Γ , written as Γ `L B, iff
there is a finite sequence 〈〈I1, A1〉, . . . , 〈Is, As〉〉 such that
1. As = B,
2. Is is either empty or contains only labels introduced by AI in the sequence. In
the second case, all undischarged occurrences of assumptions are members of Γ .
3. For each t ≤ s, At is either an assumption introduced from the set Γ via AI or
introduced by CP, ∨ − E or RAA, or obtained from previous line(s) via either a
non-discharging or a discharging rule, and the set of labels It is obtained by the
application of the corresponding rule.
Before we show that `L is indeed adequate for |=k, we need a number of interme-
diate results. As usual for any Γ , we set CL(Γ) = {B| Γ `L B}.
Theorem 4.7.1
(see [118]) Lemmon’s system L′ is (strongly) sound and complete with respect to clas-
sical semantics.
An immediate corollary of theorem (4.7.1) is that all tautologies (theorems) of clas-
sical logic are L′ provable from ∅, i.e. the last line of any such L′ proof is 〈∅,>〉 where
> is a tautology.
Lemma 4.7.1
For any tautology >, every L′ proof of > can be converted into an L proof of > and
vice versa.
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Proof:
By theorem (4.7.1), there must be a L′ proof of > from ∅. We note that since CP,
∨ − E and RAA are the only discharging rules in L′, any L′ proof of > which contains
applications of AI can be converted into a L′ proof of > without AI. This holds since
any assumption introduced by AI will remain undischarged in the last line of a L′
proof if the assumption is actually used in the proof. To see that such a L′ proof can be
converted into a L proof of >, we observe that the only difference between L and L′ is
the labelling used. Since AI is not used in such a L′ proof of >, each line of the proof
can be rewritten with labels from N× {0}. This suffices to show that all tautologies are
provable in L from ∅. To see that the converse also holds, again observe that any L
proof of> can be converted into aAI free L proof of>. Each line of such a L proof can
be rewritten with the corresponding label in L′.
Lemma 4.7.2
L has the deduction theorem, i.e. for any A, B and Γ , Γ,A `L B only if Γ `L A→ B.
Proof:
We assume that Γ,A `L B and the proof of B from Γ,A to be
D = 〈〈I1, C1〉, . . . , 〈Is, B〉〉
There are two cases to consider:
(case 1): There is no occurrence of A as an assumption introduced via AI in D. Then
D can be extended to a L proof of A→ B from Γ as follows:
...
Is (s) B . . .
{〈s+ 1, 0〉} (s+ 1) A Assumption CP
Is ∪ {〈s+ 1, 0〉} (s+ 2) A∧ B s, s+ 1, ∧− I
Is ∪ {〈s+ 1, 0〉} (s+ 3) B s+ 2, ∧− E
Is (s+ 4) A→ B (s+ 1) – (s+ 3), CP
We note that by the initial assumption, Is contains no label corresponding to any
occurrence ofA. Hence at line (s+4) the only undischarged assumptions are members
of Γ .
(case 2): There is an occurrence of A in D via the rule of AI. Suppose that A occurs
at line (i) with label 〈i, j〉, with j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We’ll construct an L proof, D′ from D
§4.7 Bounded Reasoning in Natural Deduction 117
as follows: line (i) of D is replaced with the assumption A for CP with the label 〈i, 0〉.
Each subsequent line ofDwhich usesAwith label 〈i, j〉will be replaced with the label
〈i, 0〉. At line (s + 1), A → B is obtained via the use of CP and thereby discharges the
occurrence of A at line (i):
...
{〈i, 0〉} (i) A Assumption CP
...
I ′s (s) B . . .
I ′s \ {〈i, 0〉} (s+ 1) A→ B (i− s) CP
We note that the set of labels I ′s is the same as Is except that any occurrence of
〈i, j〉 in Is is replaced by 〈i, 0〉. Thus at line (s + 1) all undischarged assumptions are
members of Γ . We conclude that in either case we have Γ `L A→ B.
Lemma 4.7.3
Let k ∈ Z+ be arbitrary but fixed. For any Γ ,
⋃
∆∈℘k(Γ)
Cn(∆) ⊆ CL(Γ)
Proof:
We let k ∈ Z+ be fixed and Γ be any arbitrary set of formulae. Wemake the assumption
that for some arbitrary ∆ ∈ ℘k(Γ) and some arbitrary formula B, we have ∆ ` B. We
let∆ = {A1, . . . , An}. By theorem (4.7.1) we have∆ `L′ B. Since the deduction theorem
also holds with respect to L′, we have
∅ `L′ [A1 → (A2 → (. . . (An → B) . . .))]
Hence by lemma (4.7.1) we have
∅ `L [A1 → (A2 → (. . . (An → B) . . .))
We let D = 〈〈I1, C1〉, . . . , 〈Is, Cs〉〉 be the L proof of Cs = [A1 → (A2 → (. . . (An →
B) . . .))We note that since ∆ = {A1, . . . , An} ∈ ℘k(Γ), D can be extended to a proof D′
by repeated application of AI andMP:
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...
∅ (s) [A1 → (. . . (An → B) . . .] . . .
{〈s + 1, 1〉} (s + 1) A1 Assumption AI
{〈s + 2, 2〉} (s + 2) A2 Assumption AI
...
...
...
...
{〈s + n,n〉} (s + n) An Assumption AI
{〈s + 1, 1〉} (s + n + 1) (A2 → (. . . (An → B) . . .) (s), (s + 1)MP
{〈s + 1, 1〉, 〈s + 2, 2〉} (s + n + 2) (A3 → (. . . (An → B) . . .) (s + n + 1),
(s + 2),MP
...
...
...
...
{〈s + 1, 1〉, . . . , 〈s + n − 1, n − 1〉} (s + 2n − 1) An → B (s + n − 1),
(s + 2n − 2),MP
{〈s + 1, 1〉, . . . , 〈s + n,n〉} (s + 2n) B (s + n),
(s + 2n − 1),MP
Note that the undischarged assumptions at line (s + 2n) are exactly the members of
∆. It follows that Γ `L B as required.
Lemma 4.7.4
Let k ∈ Z+ be arbitrary but fixed. For any Γ ,
CL(Γ) ⊆
⋃
∆∈℘k(Γ)
Cn(∆)
Proof:
We let k ∈ Z+ be arbitrary but fixed. For arbitrary Γ and B we let Γ `L B. By
lemma( 4.7.2), there must be some ∆ = {A1, . . . , An} ∈ ℘k(Γ) such that
∅ `L [A1 → (A2 → (. . . (An → B) . . .))]
By lemma (4.7.1) we get
∅ `L′ [A1 → (A2 → (. . . (An → B) . . .))]
It follows that ∆ `L′ B. But ∆ ∈ ℘K(Γ), hence by theorem (4.7.1) B ∈
⋃
∆∈℘k(Γ)Cn(∆)
as required.
Theorem 4.7.2
For any arbitrary but fixed k ∈ Z+ we have |=k = `L.
Proof:
From part (4) of theorem (4.6.1) we get Γ |=k B iff B ∈
⋃
∆∈℘k(Γ)Cn(∆) for arbitrary Γ
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and B. So by lemmas (4.7.3) and (4.7.4), we get Γ |=k B iff Γ `L B for arbitrary Γ and B.
4.8 Conclusion
We note that although our uncertainty analyses of inconsistencies and inferences do
not seem to provide adequate provisions to deal with contradiction infested premises,
we can nonetheless adopt the approach from the previous chapter by rewriting each
premise as a set of relevant prime implicates. The result of such a rewrite will un-
doubtedly affect the uncertainty (bound) of the premises. We have not undertaken
any systematic study of the effect on the uncertainty function U( ) of either restricting
or rewriting the syntax of the premises. In the case in which all premises are restricted
to clauses, we conjecture that the uncertainty bound can be improved further. More
specifically we put forth the following conjecture:
Conjecture 4.8.1
If Γ = {C1, . . . , Cs} is a set of clauses and m is the size of the smallest inconsistent
subset of Γ , then there is a probability distribution P such that for all i ≤ n, U(Ci) ≤
m−1. Moreover this is the best possible bound.
We end this chapter by noting that given our modification of Lemmon’s system in
section (4.7), we agree with Slaney [171] that nonclassical logics, relevant logics and
many of their rivals, are far from being contrived and esoteric. Simple modifications
of the labelling procedure can produce logics that are both intuitive and intrinsically
interesting.
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Chapter 5
QC Logic
5.1 Introduction
Logic has long been recognized as the study of reasoning – reasoning not in the psy-
chological sense of how people actually reason or what inferences people tend to draw
given some initial assumptions, but reasoning in the sense of providing some stan-
dards for evaluating reasoning patterns and distinguishing good ones from bad ones.
The development of logic in the past has concentrated on both the proof theoretic and
model theoretic aspects of logic. Yet the pragmatics aspect of logic seems not to have
received the same attention. In this chapter we would like to demonstrate that a logic
can be practical in the sense that it can assist us in evaluating andmeasuring the amount
of information in an inconsistent set of data. Though we envision that any intelligent
practical reasoning system must have some mechanism for handling inconsistencies,
our goal here is not to address the issue of what is reasonable to conclude given some
inconsistent data. Indeed there seems to be no a priori reason to favor any one particu-
lar inconsistency tolerant system. Rather we would like to illustrate how a particular
paraconsistent logic can be used as a tool for analysing inconsistent information. In
particular, we would like to be able to quantitatively compare the relative information
value of different sets of inconsistent data.
5.2 Paraconsistent Logics
A recalcitrant problem in the development of practical reasoning systems is the issue
of uncertainty. One sort of uncertainty is the result of underdetermination of data. An-
other sort is the result of overdetermination. All this is well known and is documented
in Belnap’s [21; 22]. When information gathered from different sources is either in-
complete or inconsistent, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions to guide further
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action. More importantly, when inconsistencies arise a reasoner must take measures
to guard against drawing trivial conclusions. Revising one’s data to restore consis-
tency may be an available option, but on occasions it is more important to maintain
the integrity of the original data – perhaps the inconsistent data is irrelevant to one’s
overall project. On other occasions it may even be ‘desirable’ to have inconsistencies
in one’s database; for instance, inconsistencies may be deployed as directives to guide
learning, and inconsistencies in a taxpayer’s records can be used as a reason to prompt
further investigation (see [74] for more discussion). The important point is that many
ordinary circumstances require us to reason in the presence of inconsistencies. The
main motivation for paraconsistent logics is precisely to develop reasoning systems
that can tolerate inconsistencies. In classical logic, the rule ex contradictione quodlibet is
derivable:
A ¬A
B
The practical implication of this is that classical logic is unsuitable as a practical rea-
soning system – it provides no guidance on what can be concluded when inconsistent
information is presented, any formula can be derived from an inconsistent set of as-
sumptions. In paraconsistent logics however ex contradictione quodlibet is no longer
derivable. But as a result paraconsistent logics are also weaker than classical logic. In
C. I. Lewis’s original proof of ex contradictione quodlibet [120], various classical rules
are deployed and thus various strategies are open for weakening classical logic:
(1) A∧ ¬A Assumption
(2) A 1, ∧− E
(3) ¬A 1, ∧− E
(4) A∨ B 2, ∨− I
(5) B 3,4 ∨− E
Figure 5.1: Lewis’s Proof of Ex Falso Quodlibet
Ignoring for now the difference between {A ∧ ¬A} and {A,¬A}, it is clear that we
can block the derivation by blocking any one of the rules in line (2), (3), (4) or (5).
Relevant logicians, for instance, opt for a solution by blocking the use of ∨-E, also
known as disjunctive syllogism (see [7; 8]).1 Logicians favoring analytic implication
1We qualify with the warning that relevant logicians do not all agree on this point. See exchanges
between Burgess [45; 46; 47], Read [150], Mortensen [130] and Lavers [117].
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opt for blocking the use of ∨-I, also known as the rule of addition (see [64; 178]). 2
Yet another novel approach is to restrict the order in which the rules are applied.
Clearly Lewis’s derivation requires that ∨-I be used before the use of ∨-E. So we can
impose restrictions on both ∨-I and ∨-E so that they cannot be used in that specific
combination. The resulting logic is called Quasi-classical logic (QC logic) by Besnard
and Hunter in [34] and Hunter in [91]. Indeed a very simple way to characterize QC
logic is this: rules in classical logic are divided into composition rules and decomposition
rules; a derivation in QC logic proceeds by first applying decomposition rules and
then applying composition rules, but not vice versa.
One of the main advantages ofQC logic is that all connectives are interpreted clas-
sically as boolean connectives. The composition and decomposition rules are divided
roughly along the lines of introduction and elimination rules associated with these
connectives.3 Thus we have not changed any of the meanings of ¬, ∧ or ∨. To sim-
plify matters we take ¬, ∧ and ∨ to be the primitive connectives and assume that ∧
and ∨ are both commutative and associative and satisfy the contraction rules: A∨AA
A∧A
A . We take the rules governing the commutativity, associativity and the contraction
property of ∧ and ∨ to be both decomposition and composition rules, i.e. they can
be used at any stage of a QC-proof. The remaining decomposition and composition
rules of QC are given in figure (5.2).
A few comments about the rules are in order. The composition rules are, for the
most part, the reversal of the decomposition rules. ¬¬-Introduction, C-Distribution
and C-de Morgan are the reversal of ¬¬-Elimination, D-Distribution and D-de Mor-
gan respectively. Obviously all our rules are classically valid. But more importantly,
all the rules except ∧-Elimination and ∨-Introduction preserve exactly the classical
models of their premises. By this we mean that any two-valued interpretation is a
model of the premises if and only if it is also a model of the conclusion. In the case
of ∧-Elimination and ∨-Introduction however, the set of models for the premises is
properly contained in the set of models for the conclusion, i.e. the conclusions of these
rules are strictly weaker then their assumptions. Amongst all the decomposition and
composition rules, ∨-Introduction is the only rule which allows the introduction of
new propositional variables not contained in the premises.
Also note that the set of decomposition rules is sufficient to reduce any formula to
its CNF and thus to an equivalent set of clauses. We can further obtain the resolvants
2See [158] for a detailed discussion of these positions.
3We qualify here that strictly speaking disjunctive syllogism is not an elimination rule associated with
the connective ∨. Note that in stating DS we are required to invoke both ¬ and ∨.
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Decomposition Rules
∧-Elimination
A∧ B
A
¬¬-Elimination
¬¬A∨ B
A∨ B
¬¬A
A
Resolution
A∨ B ¬A∨ C
A∨ C
A∨ B ¬A
B
A ¬A∨ B
B
D-Distribution
A∨ (B∧ C)
(A∨ B)∧ (A∨ C)
(A∧ B)∨ (A∧ C)
A∧ (B∨ C)
D-de Morgan
¬(A∧ B)∨ C
(¬A∨¬B)∨ C
¬(A∨ B)∨ C
(¬A∧¬B)∨ C
¬(A∧ B)
¬A∨¬B
¬(A∨ B)
¬A∧¬B
Composition Rules
∧-Introduction
A B
A∧ B
∨-Introduction
A
A∨ B
¬¬-Introduction
A∨ B
¬¬A∨ B
A
¬¬A
C-Distribution
(A∨ B)∧ (A∨ C)
A∨ (B∧ C)
A∧ (B∨ C)
(A∧ B)∨ (A∧ C)
C-de Morgan
(¬A∨¬B)∨ C
¬(A∧ B)∨ C
(¬A∧¬B)∨ C
¬(A∨ B)∨ C
¬A∨¬B
¬(A∧ B)
¬A∧¬B
¬(A∨ B)
Figure 5.2: Composition and Decomposition Rules
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from these clauses via the use of the resolution rule. Normally the use of the resolution
rule in automated theorem proving aims at deriving the empty clause. But in our case,
the role of resolution is to decompose clauses into literals so that we can identify and
isolate all the inconsistencies in the assumptions.
Unlike a natural deduction systemwith a linear representation for proofs, a deriva-
tion in QC is best represented as a tree-like structure.4 Officially a derivation in QC
logic takes a (finite) set of formulae Γ = {A1, . . . , Ai} as assumptions and a formula B
as a conclusion. We write Γ `QC B to denote that there is aQC derivation of B from Γ .
The derivation proceeds first by the construction of a series of decomposition trees via
the decomposition rules. The leaves of these decomposition trees are simply members
of Γ ; nodes are formulae obtained via the application of the decomposition rules, and
finally their roots are either clauses or resolvants of clauses obtained by application of
the resolution rule. The roots of the decomposition trees are then used, as leaves, to
construct a composition tree via the composition rules. The composition tree termi-
nates when it reaches the conclusion B. The overall structure of a QC proof is given
in figure (5.3).
Decomposition Trees
A1, A2, . . . . . .
J
J
J
J
JJ











...
clause/resovlant
J
J
J
J
JJ











...
clause/resovlant
· · · · · ·
J
J
J
J
JJ











...
Composition Tree
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J






















...
B
Figure 5.3: The Structure of a QC Proof.
4Given the use of double labeling introduced in section (4.7),QC can be ported to a Lemmon style or
a Fitch style proof system. Once again we need two disjoint sets of labels – one for the decomposition
rules and one for the composition rules.
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We should point out that the definition of a QC proof given here is one presented
in Hunter [91]. A different (and non-equivalent) definition is given in [34; 35]. In the
alternative version, all decomposition and composition rules can be applied in any
order except ∨ − I can only be used as the last step in a proof. We shall refer to this
alternative system as QC′.
The underlying proof theory of QC is reminiscent of the dual tableau systems
developed by Rasiowa and Sikorski in [149]. RS systems turn out to be a very flexible
framework for a variety of logics and have been further developed by Konikowska
and Avron [15; 114; 115] in recent years. In standard tableau systems for classical
logics, the validity of a formula B is proven by showing that ¬B has a closed tableau,
i.e. every branch contains a contradictory pair of formulae. But to determine whether
a branch in a tableau is closed, we need to keep a history of the nodes in the branch.
In RS systems however, there is no need to keep such a history. The termination
condition for a branch is always determined by the current node on the branch. In
RS systems the validity of B is proven by showing that B has a correct decomposition
tree. The key components of a RS system are
• decomposition rules
• expansion rules
• fundamental nodes (or sequences)
In RS systems, a decomposition rule is of the form:
Ω
Ω1| . . . |Ωi
An expansion rule is of the form:
Π1| . . . |Πi
Π
where all theΩ’s and Π’s are finite sequences of formulae and ‘. . . | . . .’ is branch split-
ting. Unlike a standard tableau rule, branch splitting is to be interpreted conjunctively
in RS systems.
A proof of the validity of B in a RS system begins with the application of decom-
position rules to B until each branch reaches a node that is either indecomposable or
fundamental. Depending on the particular logic in question, the fundamental nodes
or sequences are then extended by the expansion rules. Thus by modifying the com-
ponents of a RS system, we can achieve different controls over deduction and hence
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obtain different logics. For standard classical logic, the key feature of the decomposi-
tion rules is that they are validity preserving in both directions. To prove the validity
of Bwe require that every branch in the finite decomposition tree of B terminates in a
node that is a tautology.
Returning to QC however, `QC is not designed as a system for proving theorems.
In fact, QC logic has no theorems, i.e. no formula is derivable from the empty set
of assumptions. Moreover, like `L from section (4.7), `QC does not satisfy the usual
transitivity or cut rule. However, `QC is both reflexive and monotonic, and like clas-
sical logic QC is decidable (see Hunter [91] for details). For our purpose here, the
most interesting aspect of QC is its decomposition rules. Recall that in section (3.4.1)
we have introduced the notions of prime implicate and relevant prime implicate. As is
well known, the resolution proof procedure is complete with respect to prime impli-
cate generation in the sense that if B is a prime implicate of a formula A, then B is
a resolvant of CNF(A). Similarly any set of rules that is sufficient to reduce any for-
mula into its equivalent CNF form is complete with respect to RPI generation. Hence
the decomposition rules of QC are both PI and RPI complete. Garson [77] and Priest
[140] both observe that certain formulations of resolution theorem provers are implic-
itly paraconsistent in the way they handle inconsistencies. This is true for the case in
which the resolution rule is used for PI generation – arbitrary clauses are not derivable
from an inconsistent set of clauses in general.
Definition 5.2.1
The decomposition closure of a set Γ , denoted by CD(Γ) is the least superset of Γ that
is closed under the decomposition rules of QC (including the contraction rules for ∧
and ∨).
We note two important facts about CD: for any Γ the set of propositional variables
occurring in Γ is exactly the set of propositional variables occurring in CD(Γ). More-
over, if Γ is finite, then CD(Γ) is also finite. We may say that CD is a variable and
finiteness preserving closure operator.
As usual we say that a CNF of a formula A is reduced if it is a minimal CNF
such that all of its propositional variables are variables occurring in A. We say that
a reduced CNF of a formula A respects CD(Γ) if all of its clauses can be composed
from members of CD(Γ) via the composition rules. Now to determine whether A is
QC derivable from a finite Γ is simply a matter of finding a reduced CNF of A that
respects CD(Γ). Though there is no unique reduced CNF for a formula A, it is easy
to see that one of them would respect CD(Γ) iff all of them would. Since CD(Γ) is
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finiteness preserving, ℘(CD(Γ)) must be finite given that Γ is finite. Hence there are
only finitelymanyways to generate composition trees fromCD(Γ). The checkingmust
terminate eventually.
A key feature of CD is its ability to identify literals that are involved in an incon-
sistency. Other paraconsistent logics such as FDE [21] or da Costa’s Cω [53] lack this
feature since they lack the resolution rule. Consider for instance,
Example 5.2.1
For Γ = {p∨ q, p∨ ¬q, ¬p∧ r}
Γ `QC p Γ `QC ¬p
Γ `QC q Γ `QC ¬q
Γ `QC r Γ 6`QC ¬r
In our example there is a clear sense in which the variable r is not involved in any
inconsistency though it is conjoined with ¬p which is a culprit. However, we should
point out that given the consideration in section (3.4), CD is subjected to the same crit-
icism raised in example (3.4.3) – applications of the D-Distribution rules will result in
disjunctive consequences which may be deemed unacceptable. Once again the under-
lying issue is how much disjunctively redundant information should be tolerated in
the presence of inconsistencies.
Example 5.2.2
Let Γ = {p,¬p, q∨ r,¬r} and ∆ = Γ ∪ {p∨ r}. We have
r 6∈ CD(Γ) ¬r ∈ CD(Γ)
r ∈ CD(∆) ¬r ∈ CD(∆)
We note that in fullQC, we have both Γ `QC p∨r and ∆ `QC r but Γ 6`QC r. Exam-
ple (5.2.2) indeed demonstrates the failure of the transitivity of deduction in QC. But
more importantly, it reinforces a key point for section (3.4) – disjunctively redundant
information such as p∨ r, when combined with the resolution rules, allows inconsis-
tencies to be propagated amongst premises. Thus in section (3.4.1) we propose to min-
imise disjunctive redundancies by considering only the relevant prime implicates of a
given formula. Indeed, given the procedural nature of aQC proof we can explicitly in-
troduce an additional minimisation step in aQC proof by requiring that only relevant
prime implicates of premises or resolvants of relevant prime implicates of premises
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can be used to construct a composition tree. Instead of using QC’s decomposition
rules to convert each premise into CNF and then prune each CNF formula into RPI’s,
we could employ the semantic graph method of algorithm (3.4.2) from chapter 3 to
generate RPI’s. The collection of RPI’s can then be given to a conventional resolution
prover to generate resolvants. Once again, in consonance with the general method-
ology of knowledge compilation, RPI generation can be viewed as off-line processing
while resolution and composition can be viewed as run time query-answering.
5.3 Information Measurement
An old idea about information is that there is an inverse relationship between in-
formation and possibility. In Shannon-Weaver communication theory [169; 170] this
relationship is expressed by the following equation,5
I(A) = − logP(A) (5.1)
In equation (5.1), I(A) is the amount of information or information value conveyed by the
message A and P(A) is the probability of A occurring. Not surprisingly, the thrust of
the idea is that information eliminates possibilities – the more unlikely that A occurs
the more informative it is to assert A. In [17] Barwise called this the inverse relation
principle and gave an illuminating account of the interdependence of information
and possibility. To illustrate, consider our example from section (1.1). Recall that O is
located in one out of nine possible locations represented by a 3× 3 grid:
q1 q2 q3
p1
p2
p3
Figure 5.4: A simple logical representation of an object’s location.
The set of all possible locations of O can be regarded as a probability space. Fur-
thermore, we may assume that each possible location has an equal probability weight.
Using (5.1), we can calculate the information of values A = p1 and A′ = p1 ∧ ¬q2:
I(p1) = − log
3
9
= 0.48 I(p1 ∧ ¬q2) = − log
2
9
= 0.65
5 See [105] chapter 2-3 for an overview. For a related approach to semantic information theory see
Hintikka [84; 85; 86].
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Not surprisingly, we have I(A) < I(A′). Even at an intuitive level it is clear that A′ is
more informative since A′ provides the additional information ¬q2.
Shannon’s information measure expressed by equation (5.1) has a number of im-
portant properties, in particular:
I(A) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1 (5.2)
lim
P(A)→1 I(A) = 0 (5.3)
I(A) > I(B) for P(A) < P(B) (5.4)
Thus equations (5.2) and (5.3) say that I(A) is a non-negative quantity that ap-
proaches 0 as P(A) approaches 1. Equation (5.4) says that information increases with
uncertainty. Furthermore ifA1, . . . , Ak are successive and independent messages with
the joint probability P(A1, . . . , Ak) = P(A1)× . . .× P(Ak) then
I(A1, . . . , Ak) = − log[P(A1)× . . .× P(Ak)] = −
k∑
i=1
logP(Ai) (5.5)
=
k∑
i=1
I(Ai)
In [169], Shannon showed the following remarkable theorem:
Theorem 5.3.1
The information measure defined by equation (5.1) is the only function that satisfies
all of the properties from (5.2) to (5.5).
5.3.1 Inconsistent Information
Data, encoded as formulae in a logical language, are representations of the state of
the world. For a consistent set of data each classical interpretation of the data can be
regarded as a possible state of the world. Since a consistent set of formulae in finitely
many propositional variables has only finitely many non-equivalent interpretations,
we can treat the collection of all possible non-equivalent interpretations as a proba-
bility space and assign equal probability weight to each interpretation. Naturally this
leads to a definition of information analogous to equation (5.1).
Definition 5.3.1
(Lozinskii [122]) Let Γ be a consistent set of formulae in n variables and let M(Γ)
denotes the collection of (equivalence classes of) models for Γ . The information value
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of Γ is defined by the following equation:
I(Γ) = log
2n
|M(Γ)|
(5.6)
Replacing equation (5.6) in base 2 we have:
I(Γ) = n− log2 |M(Γ)| (5.7)
The intuitive justification of our definition is that the amount of information in
a data set should be based on the logarithmic ratio between the number of non-
equivalent interpretations and the number of equivalent models of the data. This
is generally in agreement with the underlying idea of equation (5.1). If a data set al-
lows us to exclude all interpretations except one as its model, then the data set has
maximum information value. We also note that the definition applies only to data
sets with finitely many variables. For sets with infinitely many variables we need to
modify our definition since it is not meaningful to talk about the ratio between two
infinite cardinals. For simplicity, we’ll focus on sets in finitely many variables. We
should mention that Lozinskii’s definition of information value is very similar to the
κ function defined by Gent, Prosser andWalsh [78] in their study of the constrainedness
of search problems. Gent’s κ function is intended to provide a quantitative measure-
ment for an ensemble of search problems (e.g. SAT or graph colouring problems), to
determine how hard or easy it is to find a solution for these problems.
In the context of inconsistent data it is natural to ask for a measurement of in-
formation analogous to our definition. However, unlike the approach of Aisbett and
Gibbon in [6], we do not agree that inconsistent data provides no information at all.
We equally reject the suggestion that inconsistent data provides themaximum amount
of information since all all possibilities are eliminated. Instead we should take a more
pragmatic approach here. What is and what isn’t informative seems to depend, at
least partly, on the goal of the agent in possession of the data. For a tax auditor, incon-
sistencies in a taxpayer’s records are useful information for detecting possible fraud.
Inconsistencies may also be useful in cases where they are deployed as directives to
guide learning or as indicators for faulty components in a complex system. Worse
still, by assigning null information value to all inconsistent data we may incur infor-
mation loss. As wementioned earlier, an important aspect of handling inconsistencies
is the ability to compare and evaluate the relative merit of different inconsistent data
sets. We need to have some quantitative criteria to determine whether one data set is
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more inconsistent or informative than another. Thus it is desirable to have a general
theoretical framework for measuring both consistent and inconsistent information. In
[123] Lozinskii provides such a framework.
Definition 5.3.2
(Lozinskii [123]) Let Γ be a set of formulae in n variables andM(Γ) be the set of max-
imal consistent subsets of Γ . For each ∆ ∈ M(Γ), if M(∆) is the collection of (equiva-
lence classes of) models of ∆ then the collection of quasi-models is defined by:
U(Γ) =
⋃
{M(∆) : ∆ ∈M(Γ)} (5.8)
The information value of Γ is defined by the following equation:
I(Γ) = n− log2 |U(Γ)| (5.9)
Again, the main idea behind definition (5.3.2) is that the information value of a
set of formulae is determined by the logarithmic ratio between the number of non-
equivalent interpretations and the number of quasi-models. Clearly definition (5.3.2)
agrees with definition (5.3.1) when Γ is consistent and yields a defined value for I(Γ)
when M(Γ) is non-empty. We note that according to the new definition the informa-
tion value of a data set is monotonically increasing with respect to consistent super-
sets, i.e. for any consistent Γ ′ ⊇ Γ , I(Γ) ≤ I(Γ ′). For inconsistent sets however, the
information value is nonmonotonic when there is an increase in inconsistencies. For
instance,
Example 5.3.1
For ∆ = {p∨ q, p∨ ¬q, ¬p∧ r}, Γ = ∆ ∪ {¬r} and Γ ′ = ∆ ∪ {s}
I(Γ) < I(∆) I(Γ ′) > I(∆)
5.4 QC Logic and Information Measure
Lozinskii’s new definition is problematic in two respects. The first is that the pres-
ence of tautologies will affect the value of I(Γ). Since we are primarily interested in
the amount of empirical information about the world, it seems reasonable to disregard
tautological statements in a data set. In a more general setting, of course, we may rel-
ativise the information value of a data set by nominating a particular set of formulae
to be disregarded. This is a useful generalisation since, as we have already pointed
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out, the information value of a data set is at least partly dependent on the agent in
possession of the data. Perhaps an agent has already independently confirmed A and
thus it is not informative to be told A again. The second problem is that I(Γ) is too
sensitive to the syntax of the formulae in Γ and thus may produce counter-intuitive
consequences. Indeed this is a general problemwith any inconsistency tolerant mech-
anism based on maximal consistent subsets. The syntactic features of the formulae
in the set determine how the set can be fragmented into consistent subsets. In [182],
Wong considers the following example:
Γ1 = {p∧ q, ¬p∧ r} Γ2 = {p∧ q∧ r, ¬p∧ q∧ r, p∧ ¬q∧ r}
|M(Γ)| 2 3
|U(Γ)| 4 3
I(Γ) 1.00 1.42
Table 5.1: Information and Inconsistencies
In this example, Γ2 is in some sense more inconsistent than Γ1; yet we have I(Γ2) >
I(Γ1). Intuitively, the information value of a set should vary inversely to the amount
of inconsistency in the set. The information value of a highly inconsistent data set
should be lower than that of a set with fewer inconsistencies. A natural solution is
to relativise the information value of a set using the decomposition closure defined in
the previous section; that is, we let
I∗(Γ) = n− log2 |U(CD(Γ))| (5.10)
Since CD is a variable and finiteness preserving closure operator, replacing Γ with
CD(Γ) in (5.9) has no effect on the value of n. Indeed the advantage of (5.10) over (5.9)
is that it provides a more discriminating way of evaluating the information value of
a data set. This gives us a more realistic appraisal of the usefulness of our data. The
information value of a set no longer depends on how the formulae are syntactically
presented.
Example 5.4.1
Γ = {p∨ q, p∨ ¬q, ¬p∧ r} and Γ ′ = {p∨ q, p∨ ¬q, ¬p, r}
Using equation (5.9) we have I(Γ) 6= I(Γ ′). According to equation (5.10) however
we have I∗(Γ) = I∗(Γ ′). In the extreme case when pi ∈ CD(Γ) and ¬pi ∈ CD(Γ) for
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every variable pi occurring in Γ , we have I∗(Γ) = 0 since the number of quasi-models
for Γ is exactly 2n where n is the number of distinct variables in Γ . In one sense
CD gives us a syntactic normal form for a set of formulae. Looking at our previous
example, it is easy to see that I∗ provides a more appropriate information value for Γ1
and Γ2.
CD(Γ1) CD(Γ2)
|M(CD(Γ))| 2 4
|U(CD(Γ))| 2 4
I∗(Γ) 2.00 1.00
Table 5.2: Comparison of Γ1 and Γ2
We note that we have not made full use of QC logic here. Indeed this is unnec-
essary and undesirable since the composition rule ∨–I allows the introduction of ar-
bitrary new propositional variables. Clearly the introduction of new variables would
interfere with the information value of a data set. In addition, we can also consider
usingCD in conjunctionwith inferencemechanisms based onmaximal consistent sub-
sets (chapters 2 and 3). The idea is similar in that we can first apply CD to obtain a
normal form for an inconsistent set and then use further inference mechanisms to
extract conclusions from the set.
5.5 The Number of Q-Models
In this section, we’ll address the question of how to compute the number of quasi-
models of an inconsistent set. We can represent all possible quasi-models of Γ using
the following scheme:
F =
∨
A∈M(Γ)
∧
C∈A
C
= (C11 ∧ . . .∧ C
1
r)∨ . . .∨ (C
|M(Γ)|
1 ∧ . . .∧ C
|M(Γ |
s ) (5.11)
where each Cxy is a reduced clause and |M(Γ)| is the number of maximal consistent
subsets of Γ . It is easy to see that the number of assignments verifying F is precisely
|U(Γ)| since an assignment v is model of F iff it is a quasi-model of Γ . Thus we can
compute the number of quasi-models for Γ by counting the number of assignments
verifying F. To do this however we need to observe the following:
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Proposition 5.5.1
1. If Γ is a set of clauses in n variables, then any maximal consistent subset of Γ has
exactly n variables.
2. There are exactly n distinct variables in each disjunct of F.
3. The number of models for F is exactly the sum of the number of models for each
disjunct of F.
Proof:
(1) Since each A ∈ M(Γ) is a subset of Γ , the number of variables occurring in any
A ∈M(Γ) cannot be greater then n. Suppose to the contrary that some A ∈M(Γ) has
less than n variables. Let li be a literal whose variable does not occur in A but occurs
in Γ . Then either li ∈ Γ or li occurs as a disjunct of a clause C ∈ Γ . In both cases,
we can find an assignment that satisfies A ∪ {li} and A ∪ {C}, but this contradicts the
maximal consistency of A.
(2) Since each disjunct of F is a conjunction of all formulae of a maximal consistent
subset of Γ , it follows from (1) that there must be n distinct variables occurring in each
disjunct of F.
(3) This follows from the fact that the disjuncts of F are pairwise inconsistent and that
each disjunct of F is consistent.
From (3) of the above proposition, it suffices to calculate the number of models for
each disjunct of F and then sum them. Now consider the k-th disjunct of F. Suppose
it is of the form,
Dk = Ck1 ∧ . . .∧ C
k
m
We can calculate the number of assignments which verifyDk by counting the number
of assignments which verify ¬Dk. From (2) of the above proposition, there must be n
variables in Dk (respectively ¬Dk). So there must be 2n distinct assignments over Dk
(respectively ¬Dk). Where |Cki | is the number of distinct variables in the i-th clause of
Dk, the number distinct assignments which verify ¬Cki is then given by the equation
|{v| v |= ¬Cki }| = 2
n−|Cki | (5.12)
In general, the size of the union of a given family of sets S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sm is given by
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the Inclusion-Exclusion formula ([40; 121]):
|
m⋃
h=1
Sh| =
∑
1≤h≤m
|Sh| −
∑
1≤h<i≤m
|Sh ∩ Si| +
∑
1≤h<i<j≤m
|Sh ∩ Si ∩ Sj| − · · ·
+(−1)m|S1 ∩ . . . ∩ Sm| (5.13)
So on the basis of (5.13), the total number of assignments which verify ¬Dk is
|{v| v |= ¬Dk}| =
∑
1≤i≤m
|{v| v |= ¬Cki }| −
∑
1≤i<j≤m
|{v| v |= ¬Cki ∧ ¬C
k
j }| + · · ·
+(−1)m|{v| v |= ¬Ck1 ∧ . . .∧ ¬C
k
m}| (5.14)
So the number of assignments which verify Dk is
|{v| v |= Dk}| = 2n − |{v| v |= ¬Dk}|
= 2n −
( ∑
1≤i≤m
|{v| v |= ¬Cki }| −
∑
1≤i<j≤m
|{v| v |= ¬Cki ∧ ¬C
k
j }| + · · ·
+(−1)m|{v| v |= ¬Ck1 ∧ . . .∧ ¬C
k
m}|
)
(5.15)
The number of assignments which verify F is simply the sum of assignments which
verify some disjunct of F,
|{v| v |= F}| =
(
2n − |{v| v |= ¬D1}|
)
+ · · ·+
(
2n − |{v| v |= ¬D|M(Γ)|}|
)
= |M(Γ)| · 2n −
∑
1≤i≤|M(Γ)|
|{v| v |= ¬Di}| (5.16)
We note that in equation (5.14), ifCki andC
k
j are clauses which contain complemen-
tary literals p and¬p, then¬Cki∧¬C
k
j is unsatisfiable and thus |{v| v |= ¬C
k
i∧¬C
k
j }| = 0.
Moreover any conjunctive extension of ¬Cki ∧¬C
k
j would clearly also be unsatisfiable.
Thus one or more terms of the RHS of (5.14) may turn out to be zero. On the other
hand if Ck1 . . . C
k
m are pairwise free from complementary literals, then ¬Ck1∧ . . .∧¬C
k
m
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is clearly satisfiable. As usual if we represent a clause C as a set of literals, the number
of models for ¬Ck1 ∧ . . .∧ ¬C
k
m can be given by
|{v| v |= (¬Ck1 ∧ . . .∧ ¬C
k
m)}| = 2
n−(|Ck1∪...∪Ckm|) (5.17)
These observations provide the basis of an algorithm developed by Lozinskii in
[121] for computing the number of models of a CNF formula.
Algorithm 5.5.1 Lozinskii’s algorithm
Require: input CNF(E)
Ensure: output µCNF(E) = |{v| v |= CNF(E)}|
1: s := 1;
2: G1 := {{C}|C ∈ CNF(E)};
3: t1 :=
∑
{Ci∈G1} 2
n−|Ci|;
4: acc := t1;
5: while Gs 6= ∅ do
6: s := s+ 1;
7: Gs := ∅;
8: ts := 0;
9: for all gs−1 ∈ Gs−1 do
10: for all C ∈ CNF(E) and C 6∈ gs−1 do
11: gs := gs−1 ∪ {C};
12: if gs is pairwise free from complementary literals then
13: Gs := Gs ∪ {gs};
14: ts := ts + 2
n−|∪gs|;
15: end if
16: end for
17: acc := acc+ (−1)s−1ts;
18: end for
19: end while
20: µCNF(E) := 2n − acc
The basic idea of algorithm (5.5.1) is to incrementally sum the terms of equa-
tion (5.14) from left to right. At the end of line (4), algorithm (5.5.1) computes the
first term of equation (5.14), giving the value for
∑
1≤i≤m |{v| v |= ¬C
k
i }|. The outer
loop at line (5) is then executed (at mostm times). Each run of the loop adds the value
of the next term of the equation. The first execution of the outer loop computes the
value of the second term
∑
1≤i<j≤m |{v| v |= ¬C
k
i ∧¬C
k
j }|. If this value is non-zero, then
acc is updated to provide the sum of the first two terms of (5.14). The loop is executed
repeatedly until either control reaches the last term of (5.14) or when every possible
way to extend every gs−1 at line (11) results in complementary literals appearing in
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some pair of clauses in the extension. At the first inner loop at line (9), Gs−1 is the set
of all subsets of CNF(E) that are of size (s − 1) i.e. each gs−1 ∈ Gs−1 contains exactly
s − 1 clauses of CNF(E). At line (10) the second inner loop extends gs−1 with a single
clause from CNF(E) and the resulting extension is tested for complementary literals.
If the extension is pairwise free from complementary literals, then Gs is extended to
include gs and ts is recalculated to reflect the change. Once all possible ways to extend
a given gs−1 have been examined, control exits from the inner most loop and acc is
updated to reflect the new value. Control then returns to the top of the loop at line (9)
and selects another member ofGs−1 and continues the process of the inner-most loop.
For a set of clauses Γ with a known number of maximal consistent subsets k, count-
ing quasi-models of Γ can be done by calling Lozinskii’s algorithm k times. But other
propositional model counting algorithms can also be deployed to achieve the task.
Indeed, experimental and theoretical results show that Lozinskii’s algorithm is super-
seded by the Counting Davis-Putnum algorithm (CDP) of Birnbaum and Lozinskii
[40] and by the Decomposing Davis-Putnum algorithm (DDP) of Bayardo and Pe-
houshek [18]. But we should point out that the general problem of counting proposi-
tional models (#SAT) is #P-complete. So according to the present state-of-the-art, the
problem is computationally intractable in the worst case. Counting quasi-models is
no easier.
5.6 Application
In previous works Hunter and Nuseibeh [93; 94] have illustrated the usefulness of
QC logic in the analysis of inconsistent specifications in software engineering. Hunter
and Nuseibeh have pointed out that inconsistent specifications are often unavoidable
during software development. They argued persuasively that during the software
development cycle it is often more important to manage inconsistencies intelligently,
i.e., we need to analyse and to keep track of inconsistencies rather then resolving them
immediately. In the same spirit we advocate using QC logic and the definition given
by equation (6) as a basis to analyse over-constrained problems.
5.6.1 Constraint Satisfaction Problems
A constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) involves,
1. a set of variables, X1, . . . , Xn
§5.6 Application 139
2. associated with each variable, Xi, is a domain, Di of values
3. a set of constraints, C1, . . . , Cm, each is defined on subset of variables over a
subset of the Cartesian product of the associated domains, i.e. Ci(Xi1 , . . . , Xik) ⊆
(Di1 × . . .×Dik)
A solution to a CSP is simply an assignment of values to variables such that all
constraints are satisfied. A CSP is a Finite Constraint Satisfaction Problem (FCSP)
if its constraint domains are finite. Many real world problems such as optimization
problems or job scheduling problems can be viewed as CSPs.
As is well known, there is a close relationship between FCSPs and logic (see [39;
125]). Any FCSP can be stated as an equivalent logic problem in a variety of settings.
In the model checking approach for instance, a FCSP is taken to have a solution iff
a certain propositional theory Γ is satisfiable. In fact, the solutions are just the set
of models of Γ . In this scheme, the theory Γ is constructed as a set of propositional
formulae in CNF such that
1. Each possible combination of values for the variables is represented by a set of
propositional variables, px1d1 , . . . , p
xm
dn
, . . ., where intuitively, pxidj is the proposi-
tion which says that the variable xi is instantiated by the value dj. For instance,
the sentence (pxidj ∨ p
xi
dk
) says that the variable xi is instantiated by at least one
of values dj and dk.
2. A constraint is stated negatively in terms of values that are forbidden, e.g. the
sentence ¬pxidj says that xi is never instantiated by value di, the sentence ¬p
xi
dk
∨
¬p
xj
dk
says that xi and xj are never instantiated by the same value dk. The set of
all constraints is represented by a set of propositional formulae in the variables,
p
x1
d1
, . . . , pxmdn , . . ..
5.6.2 Over-constrained Problems
As it is with many real world problems, a CSP can be without a solution. A solu-
tionless CSP is an over-constrained problem (OCP) – every assignment of values to
variables fails to satisfy at least one constraint. Consider for instance,
Example 5.6.1
Let X, Y, Z be variables whose domain is {1, 2, 3}. Let the constraints be: X < Y, Y < Z
and Z < X.
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Clearly, this is an OCP since no natural numbers can satisfy all three constraints.
This example illustrates that there are two main factors which contribute to a prob-
lem being over-constrained – and thus provides two different approaches to resolving
OCPs. The first is the domain of possible values and the second is the constraints
themselves. In our example if we were to add a value w to the domain such that for
somem and n,m < n, n < w, and w < m, then all constraints would be satisfied (w
need not be a natural number), in which case we no longer have an over-constrained
problem. Alternatively, we may accept a certain partial assignment that satisfies some
but not all of the constraints as a solution. Typically, we may accept those assign-
ments that satisfy a maximal number of constraints or variables. Given that any FCSP
is equivalent to a model checking problem in propositional logic, the second approach
to solving a finite OCP is equivalent to finding models for a certain subset of an in-
consistent set of propositions.
Regardless of how we may resolve an OCP, it is sometime desirable to analyse
the problem first before any further action is taken. In this respect, it is clear that QC
logic is well suited to the task. According to our previous scheme, we can encode
a finite OCP as a propositional theory Γ ; Γ must be unsatisfiable and thus inconsis-
tent. We can then apply QC logic to analyse the information value of Γ . In particular
in an OCP not all variables may be involved in an inconsistency (i.e. being overly
constrained). Thus it is desirable to identify those variables that are involved in an
inconsistency. The strategy, as before, is to take the decomposition closure of Γ and
then measure the value I∗(Γ). In a highly over-constrained problem we should expect
to see a lower value for I∗(Γ) and vice versa. This gives us a relative measurement of
the constrainedness of OCPs.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that there are general advantages in developing practi-
cal reasoning systems that can tolerate inconsistencies. In this respect we have consid-
ered a paraconsistent logic that can avoid drawing trivial conclusions in the presence
of inconsistencies. But more importantly we advocate the use of paraconsistent logic
in assisting us in analysing inconsistent data. In this light, the role of logic goes be-
yond capturing valid forms of inference. Logic can be seen as a tool for analysis.
Chapter 6
Modalized Inconsistencies
6.1 Introduction
In the standard Kripkean binary relational semantics, the truth condition for modal
formulae is defined by
|=Mx A ⇔ ∀y, Rxy ⇒ |=My A
where the notions of frame, model, and satisfaction are defined in the usual way (see
[48; 88; 89; 90]).
The minimal modal logic determined by the Kripkean binary relational frame is
the logic K, most economically axiomatised by adding to propositional logic PL the
single rule called Scott Rule:
[SR]
Γ ` A
[Γ ] ` A
where [Γ ] = {B : B ∈ Γ }. Alternatively, K can be axiomatised by adding to PL the
axiom schemata
[K] A∧B→ (A∧ B)
[N] >
and the rule of monotonicity
[RM]
A→ B
A→ B
In [164; 165; 100; 101], Jennings and Schotch generalise the Kripkean binary relational
semantics for modal logics by replacing the Kripkean binary relation with an (n+ 1)-
ary relation for each n > 1. The truth condition for modal formulae is then redefined
as
|=Mx A ⇔ ∀y1, . . . , yn, Rxy1, . . . , yn ⇒ ∃i(1≤i≤n) : |=Myi A
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Just as K is the minimal logic associated with the class of Kripkean binary relational
frames, associated with each class of (n+1)-ary frames is a minimal weak aggregative
modal logic Kn. For each n > 1, the logic Kn is obtained by replacing [K] with the
weaker aggregation schema
[Kn] A1 ∧ . . .∧An+1 → ( ∨
1≤i<j≤n+1
Ai ∧Aj)
We have, in fact, a descending sequence of modal logics ordered by inclusion:
K ⊇ K2 ⊇ K3 ⊇ . . .
The limit of such a sequence turns out to be
⋂
n<ω Kn = N, which is finitely axiomatis-
able by PL, [N] and [RM] alone. As is well known, there are modal logics even weaker
than N, for instance Ewhich has the single rule
[RE]
A↔ B
A↔ B
In [11], Apostoli and Brown deploy a general strategy to show that for each n > 1, Kn
is determined by its respective class of (n+1)-ary relational frames, and thereby verify
a claim made in [164]. Their strategy hinges on showing that Kn can be alternatively
axiomatised by the single rule
[RTn]
Γ `n A
[Γ ] ` A
where Γ `n A just iff every n-partition of Γ contains a cell which classically entails A.
The inclusion ordering of various weak modal logics is summarised in figure (6.1).
The logic M adopts the rule [RM]; C adopts [RM] and [K]; and N∗ adopts the rule of
necessitation: [RN] ` A =⇒ ` A. N∗∗ adopts a weakened version of [RN] without
the restriction that A is a theorem, i.e. necessitation applies to any formula. The logic
N∗∗ turns out to have some surprisingly deep connections with default logic (see [70]).
The initial motivation to study Kn logics comes partly from the interest in finding
a suitable medium to express deontic, doxastic and epistemic dilemmas ([101; 166]).
In the presence of the strong aggregation principle [K], no distinction can be made
between having several incompatible obligations (moral, legal etc.) and having an
obligation to inconsistency. In doxastic and epistemic contexts where we may take
‘A’ to mean ‘It is warranted that A’ or ‘It is justified that A’, it is equally unreasonable
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Figure 6.1: Inclusion ordering of weak modal logics.
to suppose that having incompatible but individually warranted claims amounts to
an inconsistency being warranted. In each of these cases, the problem is the failure to
observe the distinction between
[I] A∧¬A and [I∗] (A∧ ¬A)
In the standard Kripkean binary relational semantics, points at which [I] is true are
exactly the same points where [I∗] is true - namely points from which other points are
not accessible. The collapse of the distinction between [I] and [I∗] leads immediately
to the collapse of the further distinction between the consistency principles:
[D] A→ ¬¬A and [Con] ¬⊥
Arguably, in the deontic or epistemic reading of ‘’, [Con] is a plausible principle
which requires that no inconsistency be obligatory or warranted. [D] however makes
the stronger demand that incompatible obligations or claims are ruled out at the out-
set. Worst still, in the presence of [K] and [RM], [I] implies B for any B. 1 Thus
in any extension of the logic K, having several incompatible obligations or having
1Since A∧¬A→ B is a tautology, we have (A∧¬A)→ B, and by [K] we get A∧¬A→ B.
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incompatible but individually warranted claims tantamounts to everything is oblig-
atory or warranted. Of course, we may just bite the bullet and insist that dilemma,
moral and the like never arise in deontically and doxastically ideal worlds. But from a
design stance, if we are to make our robots reason more like us and less like God, un-
restricted aggregation of deontic or epistemic modalities is not always desirable. Our
robots, like us, live in a world in which dilemmas and conflicts lie abound. Thus it
seems desirable to endow our robots with some capacity to reason with incompatible
information or obligations.
So much for philosophical motivations. On a technical level, from both a proof
theoretic and a semantic standpoint, the generalisation from binary to (n + 1)-ary re-
lational frames is an interesting strategy with which to study modal logics weaker
than K while still remaining within some sort of relational semantics. But the de-
ployment of multi-ary relational semantics also stages another strategy to generalise
modal logics - in particular, from logics with unary modal operators to logics with
multi-ary modal operators. 2
Several examples of such generalisation are readily available. Routley and Meyer
[129; 157], Gabbay [72], Johnston [102], Goldblatt [79], and Bell [19] have all indepen-
dently introduced logics with multi-ary modal operators and shown their complete-
ness with respect to several multi-ary relational frames. If ‘’ is now taken to be an
n-ary modal operator, and
C = (B1, . . . , Bi−1, B, Bi+1, . . . , Bn)
then we may write ‘CB[A]’ to denote, the formula obtained by replacing B with A in
C, i. e.
CB[A] = (B1, . . . , Bi−1, A, Bi+1, . . . , Bn)
Having this notation available at hand, in [79] Goldblatt shows that the logic Kn, 3
axiomatised by adding to PL the axiom schemata
[Kn] CB[A]∧ CB[D]→ CB[A∧D]
2 Of course this is not surprising since the algebraic foundations of relational semantics were articu-
lated by Jo´nsson and Tarski in their seminal papers [103; 104]. According to Copland [49], Kripke had
remarked that Jo´nsson and Tarski’s paper [103] was the ‘most surprising anticipation’ of his own work.
Routley and Meyer [157] also deserve credit for generalising binary relational semantics for modal logic
to ternary relational semantics for relevant implications.
3 Although Goldblatt’s axiomatisation differs from ours, his logic is equivalent to ours.
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[Nn] CB[>]
and the rule of inference
[RMn]
Ai → Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(A1, . . . , An)→ (B1, . . . , Bn)
is determined by the class of (n + 1)-ary relational frames whose truth condition for
modal formulae is defined by
|=Mx (A1, . . . , An)⇔ ∀y1, . . . , yn, Rxy1, . . . , yn ⇒ ∃j(1≤j≤n) : |=Myj Aj
We note that Goldblatt’s truth condition is almost but not quite the same as Jennings-
Schotch’s. In Jennings-Schotch’s semantics, A is true at a point just in case A is true
somewhere in every related n-tuple of points. In Goldblatt’s semantics,(A1, . . . , An)
is true at a point just in case each related n-tuple of points has some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
where Aj is true in the j-th coordinate of the n-tuple. In each case, the Kripkean truth
condition is uniquely recovered when we set n = 1.
To no one’s surprise, just as K can be axiomatised by [SR], Goldblatt’s Kn can be
axiomatised by the rule
[GR]
Γ ` A
CB[Γ ] ` CB[A]
where CB[Γ ] = {CB[D] : D ∈ Γ }. There is clearly a symmetry between unary modal
logics and n-ary modal logics. [Kn], [Nn], and [RMn] are just n-ary counterparts of
the familiar [K], [N], and [RM]. Similarly, the rule [RE] can be restated as an n-ary
counterpart:
[REn]
Ai ↔ Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(A1, . . . , An)↔ (B1, . . . , Bn)
Our main purpose here is to study a generalisation of Jennings-Schotch’s logics. In
particular, we’ll show that just as normal unary modal logic K can be weakened to
Kn by progressively relaxing the aggregation principle, multi-ary modal logic Kn can
also be weakened to the logics Kmn . Such logics can in fact be axiomatised by a rule
analogous to [RTn]. We’ll generalise the Apostoli-Brown strategy to show that Kmn is
determined by a class of m + n-ary relational frames. In section (6.2), we’ll intro-
duce our logics and their semantics. In section (6.3), we’ll introduce a species of para-
consistent consequence relations, called n-forcing, based on our logics and prove the
compactness property for such consequence relations. In section (6.4), we’ll present
Apostoli-Brown’s axiomatisation of n-forcing and its completeness. In section (6.5),
146 Modalized Inconsistencies
we’ll give completeness a proof for our logics. We’ll conclude with a conjecture.
6.2 Logical Preliminaries
6.2.1 Syntax
A set of formulae,Φ, is constructed in the usual way from a set of propositional atoms,
At = {p1, p2, . . .}, and a set of connectives, ¬,∧,∨,where  is anm-ary connective.
As usual we’ll omit outermost parenthesis. We’ll use A → B and A ↔ B, ⊥ and >
as shorthand for ¬A ∨ B, (¬A ∨ B) ∧ (¬B ∨ A), A ∧ ¬A, A ∨ ¬A, respectively. For
each n ≥ 1 and eachm ≥ 1, the modal logic Kmn (Λ ⊆ Φ) is the least set satisfying the
following conditions:
• PL ⊆ Λ and Λ is closed under the rules of PL
• where C = (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B), [Kmn ] ∈ Λ, i. e.
CB[A1]∧ . . .∧ CB[An+1]→ CB[ ∨
1≤i<j≤n+1
Ai ∧Aj] ∈ Λ
• [Nmn ] ∈ Λ i. e.
CB[>] ∈ Λ
• Λ is closed under [RMmn ], i. e. for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1,
Ai ↔ Bi ∈ Λ and Am → Bm ∈ Λ =⇒ (A1, . . . , Am)→ (B1, . . . , Bm) ∈ Λ
If A is a theorem of Λ, we write, `Λ A. And for any Γ ⊆ Φ, Γ `Λ A iff there is an
n ∈ N such that B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Γ and `Λ B1∧ . . .∧Bn → A. A set Γ is Λ-inconsistent iff
Γ `Λ ⊥. Where the context is clear, we’ll use ‘consistent’ instead of Λ-consistent.
6.2.2 Models
A model M = 〈U ,R,V〉 where U 6= ∅, R ⊆ (℘(U))m−1 × Un+1 and V : At −→ ℘(U).
The satisfaction relation |= is defined inductively by
• |=Mx pi ⇔ x ∈ V(pi)
• |=Mx ¬A ⇔ 6|=Mx A
• |=Mx (A∨ B) ⇔ |=Mx A or |=Mx B
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• |=Mx (A∧ B) ⇔ |=Mx A and |=Mx B
• |=Mx (A1, . . . , Am−1, B) ⇔ ∀y1, . . . , yn ∈ U ,
R‖A1‖M, . . . , ‖Am−1‖M, xy1, . . . , yn ⇒ ∃i(1≤i≤n) : |=Myi B
where for any C ∈ Φ, ‖C‖M = {x ∈ U : |=Mx C}. We note that the Jennings-Schotch’s
semantics is recovered when m = 1, one of Gabbay’s semantics as defined in [72] (p.
180) is recovered when n = 1. And when m = n = 1, then we have the standard
Kripkean semantics.
Theorem 6.2.1
Kmn is sound with respect to our models.
The soundness proof is standard. We leave it to the reader to verify.
6.3 n-Forcing and Coherence Level
Before we tackle the completeness problem of Kmn , we’ll need some additional defini-
tions and lemmata. In this section, we’ll introduce the n-forcing inference relation - a
species of paraconsistent inference relation, and the notion of coherence level of a set.
From now on, we’ll assume thatm is fixed. Relative to Λ, the notion of n-forcing and
coherence level are defined as follows:
Definition 6.3.1
A non-empty Λ-inconsistent set Γ n-forces A, Γ `n A iff for every n-partition, pi, of Γ ,
there is a cell, C ∈ pi, such that C `Λ A. If Γ = ∅ or is Λ-consistent, then Γ `n A iff
Γ `Λ A.
The collection of all n-partitions of Γ will be denoted by
∏
n(Γ). We’ll say that a
partition of Γ is a Λ-consistent partition iff each cell of the partition is Λ-consistent.
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Definition 6.3.2
The coherence level of a set Γ , ` : ℘(Φ) −→ N ∪ {∞} is defined as follows:
`(Γ) =

1 if Γ = ∅ or Γ 6`Λ ⊥
the cardinality of the least
Λ-consistent partition of Γ
up to and includingω
if such partition exists
∞ otherwise
Given the usual notion of a maximal consistent set, we can state more explicitly the
relationship between n-forcing and coherence level of a set andΛ-maximal consistent
sets. We’ll use [∧C]Γ to denote {B ∧ C : B ∈ Γ }, if Γ = ∅, then we let [∧C]Γ = {C}.
Where Σ = [∧C]Γ , we’ll let [∧C]∗Σ = {B : B∧ C ∈ Σ}.
Proposition 6.3.1
The following statements are equivalent
1. Γ `n A
2. `([∧¬A]Γ) > n
3. For any maximal Λ-consistent sets x1, . . . , xn such that Γ ⊆
⋃
{x1, . . . , xn},
A ∈ ⋃{x1, . . . , xn}.
Proof:
(1)⇒(2): Assume that Γ `n A. If `(Γ) > n, clearly `([∧¬A]Γ) > n. So assume that
`(Γ) ≤ n. Towards a contradiction, assume that `([∧¬A]Γ) ≤ n. Then there must
be a consistent n-partition of [∧¬A]Γ . Let pi = {C1, . . . , Cn} be such a consistent n-
partition. Then pi∗ = {[∧¬A]∗C1, . . . , [∧¬A]∗Cn} is a consistent n-partition of Γ . But
Γ `n A, so ∃i(1≤i≤n): [∧¬A]∗Ci `Λ A. This contradicts our assumption that every Ci is
Λ-consistent. So `([∧¬A]Γ) > n as required.
(2)⇒(3): Assume that `([∧¬A]Γ) > n. Let x1, . . . , xn be any maximal Λ-consistent
sets such that Γ ⊆ ⋃{x1, . . . , xn}. Clearly there must be a consistent n-partition of Γ
such that each cell, Ci, is a subset of xi. Let pi = {C1, . . . , Cn} be such a consistent n-
partition. Then pi′ = {[∧¬A]C1, . . . , [∧¬A]Cn} is an n-partition of [∧¬A]Γ . But by our
initial assumption `([∧¬A]Γ) > n, so ∃i(1≤i≤n) : Ci `Λ A. Hence, ∃i(1≤i≤n) : xi `Λ A.
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By deductive closure of maximal consistent sets, A ∈ xi. Hence A ∈
⋃
{x1, . . . , xn} as
required.
(3)⇒(1): Assume that Γ 6`n A. Clearly, if `(Γ) > n, then Γ `n A. So `(Γ) ≤ n. Let
{C1, . . . , Cn} be a consistent n-partition such that ∀i(1≤i≤n) : Ci 6`Λ A. Such a partition
clearly exists, otherwise Γ `n A. Then ∀i(1≤i≤n), Ci ∪ {¬A} is Λ-consistent. We extend
each Ci ∪ {¬A} to its maximal Λ-consistent extension. Hence there exist n maximal
Λ-consistent sets x1, . . . , xn such that Γ ⊆
⋃
{x1, . . . , xn}, but A 6∈
⋃
{x1, . . . , xn}.
Calling `n a consequence relation is well suited since it satisfies the usual proper-
ties of reflexivity, monotonicity, and transitivity (we’ll leave it to the reader to verify
this). And as we show later, it is also finitary. However, stepping back from the partic-
ular logicΛ and looking at things a bit more abstractly, proposition (6.3.1) underscores
the fact that `n generalises the classical consequence relation `. The classical counter-
part to proposition (6.3.1) is the familiar equivalence between (1) Γ ` A, (2) Γ ∪ {¬A} is
inconsistent, and (3) A ∈ x for any maximal consistent extension x of Γ .
Another related generalisation at work is the notion of coherence level. In this
framework, classically consistent sets are simply level 1 sets whereas all classically
inconsistent sets are level n sets, where n ≥ 2. Thus a classically consistent theory,
in the sense of a consistent deductively closed set, is simply a level 1-theory closed
under classical `. It is not difficult to see that just as the closure of a level 1 set un-
der classical ` yields a level 1-theory, closure of a level n set under `n yields a level
n-theory. Thus we may say that `n is a level preserving relation for any set with level
≤ n. Now a theory is said to be trivial iff every formula is a deductive consequence of
the theory. As is well known, closing a level n ≥ 2 set under classical ` yields a triv-
ial theory. Thus as some put it colourfully, classical ` is inferentially explosive with
respect to inconsistent sets. Given these observations, `n provides a possible strategy
for studying inconsistent but non-trivial theories as well as paraconsistent formal sys-
tems in which not every B is a deductive consequence of {A,¬A}. More interestingly,
from an information processing viewpoint n-forcing provides a plausible inferential
strategy to extract information from multiple sources, where n corresponds to the
number of information channels or sources. More detailed discussions of n-forcing
and inconsistency-tolerant reasoning can be found in [99] and [167].
One of the crucial steps in Apostoli-Brown’s proof of the completeness of Kn is
to establish the compactness of `n. But proposition (6.3.1) now makes it clear that
the compactness of `n is an immediate corollary of the compactness of the coherence
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levels of sets. We’ll state the problem of compactness of coherence level in terms of
trace, a kind of generalised filter base, as presented by Jennings and Schotch in [167].
The notion of trace, wemay add, is in fact equivalent to the notion of non-colourability
of hypergraphs. 4
Definition 6.3.3
Let Σ be a collection of finite subsets of a non-empty set Γ . Then Σ is an n-trace over Γ
iff for every n-partition, pi, of Γ , there is a cell C ∈ pi such that some element of Σ is a
subset of C.
Lemma 6.3.1
If Σ and Γ are non-empty finite sets and Σ is an n-trace over Γ , then Σ is an m-trace
over Γ , form < n.
Proof:
We assume that Σ and Γ are non-empty, finite and Σ is an n-trace over Γ . Let Σ = {Ai :
1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Suppose for some m < n, Σ is not an m-trace over Γ . Then there is an
m-partition pi = {Cj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} of Γ such that Ai 6⊆ Cj for all j. Let
pi∗ = {Bl : 1 ≤ l ≤ n, ∅ 6= Bl ⊆ Cj, for some j}
Then pi∗ is an n-partition such that Ai 6⊆ Bl for each Ai and each Bl. But this contra-
dicts the hypothesis that Σ is an n-trace over Γ . Hence, for eachm < n, Σ is anm-trace
over Γ .
Lemma 6.3.2
Let Γ 6= ∅ and Σ be an n-trace over Γ . Then ∃Σ0 ⊆fin Σ such that Σ0 is an n-trace over
Γ .
Proof:
Our strategy is to prove the contrapositive, i.e. if every finite subset of Σ is not an
n-trace over Γ , then Σ is not an n-trace over Γ . We proceed to construct a first order
theory T such that every finite subset of Σ is not an n-trace of Γ iff every finite subset
of T has a model. So by the compactness of first order logic, if every finite subset of Σ
4A hypergraph, G, is a pair, (V(G), E(G)) where V(G) is a set of vertices, and E(G) is a collection of
edges, i.e. a collection of finite subsets of V(G). An n-colouring of a hypergraph G is an n-partition of
V(G). A hypergraphG is n-colourable iff some n-colouring c ofG is such that no edge ofG is monochro-
matic under c, i.e. no edge is a subset of any cell of the partition c. The compactness theorem for hyper-
graphs states that a hypergraph G is n-colourable iff every finite sub-hypergraph of G is n-colourable.
In proving the compactness of trace, we thereby also establish the compactness of hypergraphs.
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is not an n-trace of Γ , then T has a model and hence by the construction of T , Σ is not
an n-trace over Γ . Let
Σ = {Ai : i ∈ I}
For each i ∈ I, let
Ai = {ai1, . . . , aiki}
Make the assumption that every finite subset of Σ is not an n-trace over Γ , i. e. for
each finite subset Σ′ of Σ there is an n-partition of Γ such that no cell in the partition
contains any element of Σ′. Towards the construction of our first order theory T , we
extend the first order language with
• nmany predicate symbols, P1, . . . , Pn, each representing a cell in the n-partition
• for each i ∈ I, introduce constant symbols, ci1, . . . , ciki each naming the corre-
sponding element in Ai.
Let
Θ = ∀x(
∨
1≤h≤n
Phx)
For each i ∈ I, let
Ωi =
{( ∧
1≤h≤n
( ∨
1≤j≤ki
¬Phc
i
j
))
∧Θ
}
Let
Ω =
⋃
i∈I
Ωi
We obtain the first order theory T by adding all elements of Ω as proper axioms to
standard first order logic. But our assumption is that every finite subset of Σ is not an
n-trace over Γ , so every finite subset of Ω has a model. By first order compactness, T
has a model and thus Ω has a model. Hence there must be an n-partition of Γ such
that no cell of the partition contains any element of Σ, i.e. Σ is not an n-trace over Γ .
Lemma 6.3.3
Let Σ be finite, Γ 6= ∅. If Σ is an n-trace over Γ , then ∃Γ0 ⊆fin Γ such that Σ is an n-trace
over Γ0.
Proof:
Assume that Σ is finite and Γ 6= ∅. We’ll show that if Σ is not an n-trace over Γ ′,
∀Γ ′ ⊆fin Γ , then Σ is not an n-trace over Γ . Our strategy is similar to the proof of
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lemma (6.3.2). We proceed to construct a first order theory T such that Σ is not an n-
trace over Γ ′, ∀Γ ′ ⊆fin Γ , iff every finite subset of T has a model. So by the compactness
of first order logic, if Σ is not an n-trace over Γ ′, ∀Γ ′ ⊆fin Γ , then T has a model and
hence by the construction of T , Σ is not ann-trace over Γ . Let I be an index set. For each
i ∈ I, let Γi ⊆fin Γ . Let Σ = {A1, . . . ,Am}. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, let Aj = {aj1, . . . , ajkj}. Make
the assumption that Σ is not an n-trace over any finite subset of Γ , i. e. for each i ∈ I,
there is an n-partition of Γi such that no cell in the partition includes aj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Towards the construction of our first order theory T , extend the first order language
with
• for each i ∈ I, nmany predicate symbols, Pi1, . . . , Pin, each represents a cell in the
n-partition of Γi
• for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, introduce constant symbols, cj1, . . . , cjkj , each name the corre-
sponding element of Aj
For each i ∈ I, let
Θi = ∀x(
∨
1≤h≤n
Pihx)
and
Ωi =
{( ∧
1≤h≤n
( ∨
1≤j≤k1
¬Pihc
1
j
))
∧ . . .∧
( ∧
1≤h≤n
( ∨
1≤j≤km
¬Pihc
m
j
))
∧Θi
}
Let
Ω =
⋃
i∈I
Ωi
We obtain our first order theory T by adding all elements of Ω as proper axioms to
first order logic. But our assumption is that Σ is not an n-trace over Γi, for each i ∈ I,
so every finite subset ofΩ has a model. By first order compactness, T has a model and
thus Ω has a model. Hence there must be an n-partition of Γ such that no cell of the
partition contains any element of Σ, i. e. Σ is not an n-trace over Γ .
Theorem 6.3.1
Trace Compactness: let Γ be a non-empty set and Σ be a collection of finite subsets of
Γ . Then Σ is an n-trace over Γ iff there is a Γ0 ⊆fin Γ and a Σ0 ⊆fin Σ such that Σ0 is an
n-trace over Γ0.
Proof:
(⇐): Assume that Σ0 is an n-trace over Γ0, where Γ0 ⊆fin Γ and Σ0 ⊆fin Σ. To show
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that Σ is an n-trace over Γ , it suffices to show that Σ0 is an n-trace over Γ . Clearly
each n-partition of Γ must also partition Γ0 into n or fewer cells. If an n-partition of Γ
partitions Γ0 into n cells, then by our initial hypothesis, some element of Σ0 is a subset
of some cell in the partition. And if an n-partition of Γ partitions Γ0 intom cells, where
m < n, then by lemma (6.3.1), Σ0 is an m-trace over Γ0, so some element of Σ0 must
also be a subset of some cell of the partition. So either way, some element of Σ0 is a
subset of some cell in each n-partition of Γ . Hence Σ0 is an n-trace over Γ .
(⇒): Assume that Σ is an n-trace over Γ . By lemma (6.3.2), ∃Σ0 ⊆fin Γ such that Σ0 is
an n-trace over Γ . By lemma (6.3.3), ∃Γ0 ⊆fin Γ such that Σ0 is an n-trace over Γ0.
Having now established the compactness of traces, we are now in a position to prove
the compactness of coherence level of sets.
Theorem 6.3.2
Level Compactness: For Γ ⊆ Φ, if `(Γ) > n, then there is a finite subset Γ ′ of Γ , such
that `(Γ ′) > n.
Proof:
Let Γ ⊆ Φ such that `(Γ) > n. Let
Σ = {A : A ⊆fin Γ and A `Λ ⊥}
By our assumption that `(Γ) > n, Σ is an n-trace over Γ . By theorem (6.3.1), ∃Γ0 ⊆fin Γ ,
∃Σ0 ⊆fin Σ such that Σ0 is an n-trace over Γ0. But then every n-partition of Γ0 must
contain a cell which includes some element of Σ0. But Σ0 ⊆ Σ. Hence everyn-partition
of Γ0 contains an inconsistent cell, i.e. `(Γ0) > n as required.
Theorem 6.3.3
Compactness of `n: For Γ ⊆ Φ, A ∈ Φ, if Γ `n A, then ∃Γ0 ⊆fin Γ such that Γ0 `n A.
Proof:
Let Γ ⊆ Φ, A ∈ Φ, such that Γ `n A. Then by proposition (6.3.1), `([∧¬A]Γ) > n.
By theorem (6.3.2), there is Γ0 ⊆fin Γ such that `([∧¬A]Γ0) > n. Hence by proposi-
tion (6.3.1) again, Γ0 `n A.
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6.4 Completeness of n-Forcing
In [11], the completeness of Kn is proven in two stages: the first stage is to show
the compactness of `n using compactness of hypergraph colouring, the second stage
is to show the completeness of `n by presenting an axiomatisation of `n in term of
Gentzen-style sequents. In this section we will present the Apostoli-Brown axiomati-
sation of `n.
Axiom Schema:
[Ref]
A [` nA
Rules Schemata:
Γ [` nA
[Mon]
Γ, ∆ [` nA
Γ [` nA1 · · · Γ [` nAn+1
[RKn]
Γ [` n
∨
1≤i<j≤n+1
(Ai ∧Aj)
Γ [` nA Γ,A [` nB
[N Cut]
Γ [` nB
Γ [` nA `Λ B
[Λ Cut]
Γ [` nB
Given the usual notions of derivation of a sequent and derivable sequent, we obtain
the following result:
Theorem 6.4.1
Completeness for n-forcing (Apostoli and Brown): Let Γ ⊆ Φ, A ∈ Φ. Then
Γ `n A⇐⇒ Γ [` nA
Proof:
see proof of theorem (5.2), p.839, in [11]
6.5 Completeness of Kmn
We are now in a position to show that just as the schema [Kn] yields closure under the
rule schema [RTn], the schema [Kmn ] yields closure under the rule schema
Γ `n A
[RTmn ]
CB[Γ ] `Λ CB[A]
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where CB[Γ ] = {CB[D] : D ∈ Γ } for for some C = (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B).
Theorem 6.5.1
Let Γ ⊆ Φ, A ∈ Φ and C = (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B), then
Γ [` nA =⇒ CB[Γ ] `Λ CB[A]
Proof:
The proof is by induction on the complexity of the derivation of Γ [` nA.
Basis: Γ [` nA is an axiom. Then Γ = {A}. But CB[A] `Λ CB[A]. So CB[Γ ] `Λ CB[A].
Induction Step: Assume that Γ [` nA is obtained as an endsequent by application of one
of the rule schemata, and that the theorem holds with respect to all proper subderiva-
tions therein. There are four cases:
(1) [Mon]: the result is obtained by the induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of
`Λ.
(2) [Λ Cut]: use the induction hypothesis, PL and [RMmn ].
(3) [N Cut]: use the induction hypothesis and PL.
(4) [RKmn ]: Then
A =
∨
1≤i<j≤n+1
(Ai ∧Aj)
such that Γ [` nAk, for each k ≤ n + 1. By the induction hypothesis, CB[Γ ] `Λ CB[Ak],
for each k ≤ n+ 1. So
CB[Γ ] `Λ CB[A1]∧ . . .∧ CB[An+1]
But
CB[A1]∧ . . .∧ CB[An+1]→ CB[ ∨
1≤i<j≤n+1
(Ai ∧Aj)]
is an instance of [Kmn ], hence by PL,
CB[Γ ] `Λ CB[
∨
1≤i<j≤n+1
(Ai ∧Aj)]
follows immediately. This completes the induction.
We now give the canonical model construction for Kmn , and show that every non-
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theorem of Kmn is falsified in the corresponding canonical model.
Definition 6.5.1
The Canonical Model of Kmn ,MΛ = 〈UΛ,RΛ,VΛ〉where
• UΛ = {x : x is a maximal Kmn consistent set}
• RΛ ⊆ ℘(UΛ)m−1 × UΛn+1 is defined by
∀xy1, . . . , yn ∈ U , ∀A1, . . . ,Am−1 ⊆ U , ∀A1, . . . , Am−1, B ∈ Φ,
RΛA1, . . . ,Am−1, xy1, . . . , yn ⇐⇒
∀i(1≤i≤m−1)Ai = |Ai|Λ and (A1, . . . , Am−1, B) ∈ x =⇒ ∃j(1≤j≤n) : B ∈ yj
where C ∈ Φ, |C|Λ = {x ∈ UΛ : C ∈ x} (note that |C|Λ = |D|Λ iff `Λ C↔ D).
• VΛ : At −→ ℘(UΛ) is defined by
∀x ∈ UΛ, ∀pi ∈ At, x ∈ VΛ(pi)⇐⇒ pi ∈ x
Theorem 6.5.2
The Fundamental Theorem for Kmn modal logics: ∀x ∈ UΛ, ∀A ∈ Φ,
|=Mx A⇐⇒ A ∈ x
Proof:
The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. The basis is given by the definition
of VΛ. For the induction step, we assume the induction hypothesis that the theorem
holds with respect to all sub-formulae of A and show that the theorem holds for A.
The cases for the truth functional connectives are trivial, we’ll consider the case where
A = (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B). We need to show that
|=Mx (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B)⇐⇒ (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B) ∈ x
(⇐): follows immediately from the definition ofRΛ and the induction hypothesis that
‖Ci‖MΛ = |Ci|Λ for i ≤ m− 1.
(⇒): Assume that (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B) 6∈ x. By the induction hypothesis, it suffices to
show that ∃y1, . . . , yn ∈ UΛ:
RΛ|C1|Λ, . . . , |Cm−1|Λ, xy1, . . . , yn and ∀j(1≤j≤n)¬B ∈ yj
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We will construct such y1, . . . , yn ∈ UΛ. Let
(x) = {D : (C1, . . . , Cm−1, D) ∈ x}
Claim: `(∧¬B[(x)]) ≤ n
Proof of Claim: Towards a contradiction we assume that `(∧¬B[(x)]) > n. Then by
proposition (6.3.1), (x) `n B. By the rule [RTmn ], x `Λ (C1, . . . , Cm−1, B). By the de-
ductive closure of x,(C1, . . . , Cm−1, B) ∈ xwhich contradicts our initial assumption.
This completes the proof of our claim.
By our claim, ∃pi ∈ ∏n((x)) such that pi = {C1, . . . , Cn} and for i ≤ n, Ci ∪ {¬B} is
Λ-consistent. By Lindenbaum’s lemma, for each i ≤ n, Ci ∪ {¬B} can be extended to
yi ∈ UΛ. It remains to be proven that
RΛ|C1|Λ, . . . , |Cm−1|Λ, xy1, . . . , yn
Let C1, . . . , Cm−1, D ∈ Φ be such that |Cj|Λ = |Aj|Λ for every j ≤ m − 1 and
(C1, . . . , Cm−1, D) ∈ x. Then clearly, for each j ≤ m− 1, `Λ Cj ↔ Aj and `Λ D→ D.
Hence by [RMmn ],
`Λ (C1, . . . , Cm−1, D)→ (A1, . . . , Am−1, D)
But(C1, . . . , Cm−1, D) ∈ x, so(A1, . . . , Am−1, D) ∈ x. Hence,D ∈ (x). But by our
construction (x) ⊆ ⋃1≤i≤n yi. Hence, D ∈ ⋃1≤i≤n yi as required. This completes
the inductive proof of the fundamental theorem.
6.6 Further Work
It is clear that for each fixedm, we have a descending sequence of Kmn logics ordered
by inclusion:
Km1 ⊇ Km2 ⊇ Km3 ⊇ . . .
In [100], Jennings and Schotch show that the limit of the descending sequence of Kn
logics is finitely axiomatisable by PL, [N] and [RM] alone. To show that this is indeed
the case, Jennings and Schotch show that
1. N is determined by a class, C, of locale frames.
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2. Any formula that fails in C also fails in the class of relational frames of rank n+1
where n+ 1 is the arity of the relation.
Since Kn is determined by the class of relational frames of rank n + 1, it follows
immediately from 1. and 2. that every non-theorem of N is a non-theorem of Kn and
hence
⋂
n<ω Kn = N.
Question 6.6.1
For each fixed m, does
⋂
n<ω K
m
n = N
m, where Nm is axiomatised by PL [Nm] and
[RMmn ]?
Chapter 7
Hypergraph Satisfiability
7.1 Introduction
In [112], Kolany introduces the notion of weak satisfiability on hypergraphs, a gen-
eralisation of Cowen’s notion of strong satisfiability on hypergraphs [51], and shows
that the compactness property of weak satisfiability on hypergraphs is, in ZF set the-
ory, equivalent to BPI, i.e. to the statement that every Boolean Algebra contains an
ultrafilter [50]. Kolany’s notion of weak satisfiability provides a graph theoretic rep-
resentation of a wide range of combinatorial problems, including the satisfiability of
propositional formulae. In this chapter, we’ll generalise Kolany’s idea and introduce
the notion of n-satisfiability on hypergraphs. The motivation for such a generalisation
originates in the works [101; 164; 167]. In their study of inconsistency-tolerant logic,
Jennings and Schotch observe that a set of unsatisfiable formulae may be partitioned
into subsets which are satisfiable individually. Consider for instance,
Σ = {p∧ q, ¬p∧ ¬q, p∧ ¬q, r}
Although Σ is unsatisfiable, it can be partitioned into 3 satisfiable subsets but every
partition of Σ into 2 subsets contains at least one unsatisfiable subset. Thus we may
think of Σ as a 3-satisfiable set but not a 2-satisfiable set. More precisely, for a set of
formulae, Σ, we say that it is n-satisfiable iff there is a partition of Σ into n or fewer
satisfiable subsets. For a set of satisfiable formulae, we may conveniently treat it as a
1-satisfiable set. The incoherence level of a set Σ, `(Σ), is then defined as the least n such
that Σ is n-satisfiable, if there is no such n then `(Σ) = ∞; if Σ = ∅ or is satisfiable,
we let `(Σ) = 1. The observations of Jennings and Schotch form the basis for a species
of paraconsistent logics in which the classical rule of ex contradictione quodlibet is not
derivable; i.e. A,¬A 6` B. Thus the Jennings-Schotch’s logics provide one particular
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strategy for reasoning with inconsistent information. More interestingly however, the
Jennings-Schotch’s logics have startling connections with modal logics as well as the
infamous four colour theorem, i.e. every planar graph is 4-colourable. We cannot give
a full summary of their works here. The reader is advised to consult [9; 11; 44] for
details.
Our aim here is to develop hypergraph theoretic counterparts to the notion of
n-satisfiability and the related notion of incoherence level of a set. Our motivation
is partly to continue the theoretical exploration of the connection between paracon-
sistent reasoning and hypergraph theory. But we are also interested in developing a
general framework for visualising logical problems that involve reasoningwith incon-
sistent information. In this chapter, we’ll develop a general notion of n-satisfiability
on hypergraphs which subsumes Kolany’s notion of weak satisfiability. We’ll also
show that the compactness statement for n-satisfiability on hypergraphs is equiva-
lent to BPI in ZF set theory. We give a syntactic characterisation of n-satisfiability on
hypergraphs in terms of a resolution style proof procedure. A general notion of con-
sequence relation based on hypergraphs will also be introduced. We’ll conclude with
a discussion of a conjecture of Cowen relating BPI and complexity theory.
First we recall Kolany’s definitions.
Definition 7.1.1
A hypergraph H is a pair (V, E) where V is a non-empty set of vertices or literals, and
its finite subsets are called clauses; E is a collection of non-empty subsets of V . The
elements of E are called edges. A hypergraph is compact if all edges are finite. A
hypergraph is a graph if ∀e ∈ E, |e| = 2.
Let n ≥ 2. A (vertex) n-colouring of H = (V, E) is a function c : V −→ {1, . . . , n}
such that all edges are non-monochromatic under c. We say that H is n-colourable iff
there is an n-colouring ofH. The chromatic number, χ(H), ofH is the least n such that
H is n-colourable.
We note that if H contains a singleton edge, then H is not n-colourable. We are con-
cerned only with compact hypergraphs without singleton edges here. Kolany’s notion
of weak satisfiability is defined as follows:
Definition 7.1.2
Let H be an arbitrary but fixed hypergraph. Let Γ be a set of literals on H and Σ be a
family of clauses on H. Then Γ weakly satisfies Σ (on H) iff:
1. ∀e ∈ E, e 6⊂ Γ (Γ is consistent)
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2. ∀σ ∈ Σ, Γ ∩ σ 6= ∅ (Γ pierces Σ)
Σ is weakly satisfiable on H iff some Γ ⊆ V weakly satisfies Σ.
It is very easy to visualize Kolany’s notion of weak satisfiability on hypergraphs.
In fact the problem of determining whether a family of clauses is weakly satisfiable
on a given hypergraph is structurally similar to the travelling salesman problem (see
[76]). We forgo formal definitions here and adopt a more intuitive presentation us-
ing descriptions such as points, regions and tours. In figure (7.1), vertices are repre-
sented by black dots and edges are represented by blue lines or blue regions. A family
of clauses, Σ, is represented by red lines or red regions. To determine whether Σ is
weakly satisfiable is simply a matter of finding a tour that
1. passes each red region at least once and
2. avoids passing through every point in any given blue region.
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Figure 7.1: n-satisfiability on hypergraphs.
The green line represents a tour that weakly satisfies Σ. In [112], Kolany proved
the following:
Theorem 7.1.1
Kolany [112]
(1) Let H be a compact hypergraph and Σ a set of clauses on H. Then Σ is weakly
satisfiable iff every finite subset of Σ is weakly satisfiable.
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(2) The compactness theorem (in (1)) for weak satisfiability on hypergraphs is equiva-
lent to BPI (in ZF set theory).
7.2 n-satisfiability on Hypergraphs
To represent the Jennings-Schotch notion of n-satisfiability via hypergraphs, we need
to first extend Kolany’s definition of weak satisfiability. In particular a propositional
formula can be represented by a finite set of clauses, i.e. a finite set of finite sets of
vertices, and a set of propositional formulae can be represented by a collection of finite
sets of clauses. We call a finite set of clauses a formula of a hypergraph. Formulae will
be denoted by A, B, C, . . . etc. We now introduce a generalised version of Kolany’s
notion of weak satisfiability.
Definition 7.2.1
Let Σ be a set of formulae of a hypergraph H = (V, E) and Γ1, . . . , Γn ⊆ V . Then
Γ1, . . . , Γn n-satisfy Σ iff
1. ∀e ∈ E, ∀i ≤ n, e 6⊂ Γi (Γi is consistent)
2. ∀A ∈ Σ, ∃i ≤ n: ∀σ ∈ A, Γi ∩ σ 6= ∅ (each A ∈ Σ is weakly satisfied or covered by
some Γi)
We say that Σ is n-satisfiable on H iff some Γ1, . . . , Γn n-satisfy Σ on H.
Remark 7.2.1 We note that 1-satisfiability of a set of formulae Σ on H is equivalent
to the weak satisfiability of the set of clauses
⋃
Σ. Conversely, if Σ is a collection of
clauses, then the weak satisfiability of Σ on H is equivalent to the 1-satisfiability of
{Σ′ : Σ′ ⊆fin Σ}.
Notice that in our definition we do not require that Γ1, . . . , Γn be distinct, so our
definition says that a set of formulae is n-satisfiable on H iff they are covered by n or
fewer consistent sets of vertices. To illustrate, consider the following example:
Example 7.2.1
V = {u, v,w, x, y, z} E =
{
{u, v}, {w, x}, {y, z}}
Σ =
{{
{u,w}, {z}
}
,
{
{v}, {x}, {w,y}
}
,
{
{u,w}, {y}
}}
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It is straightforward to verify that Σ is neither 1-satisfiable nor 2-satisfiable; but it
is 3-satisfiable, e.g. {u, z}, {v, x, y} and {u, y} 3-satisfy Σ. Alternatively, we may view
our example as a propositional graph with u = p, v = ¬p, w = q, x = ¬q, y = r and
z = ¬r, in which case rewriting every member of Σ in conjunctive normal form, we
have:
Σ′ =
{
(p∨ q)∧ ¬r, ¬p∧ ¬q∧ (q∨ r), (p∨ q)∧ r
}
Clearly, `(Σ′) = 3. In terms of visual representation, we can treat the n-satisfiability
problem on hypergraphs as amulti-dimensional version of the weak satisfiability prob-
lem on hypergraphs. The dimension is given by |Σ| where each A ∈ Σ is a distinct
dimension above the hypergraph H. To determine whether Σ is n-satisfiable on H is
then to find n or fewer tours such that
1. every region from a given dimension is visited by one of the tours, and
2. no one tour passes all vertices of any given edge.
For a set of formulae, Σ, on a hypergraph H, we can define a function analogous
to the incoherence level of Jennings and Schotch.
Definition 7.2.2
Let∞ 6∈ N. Then relative to a hypergraph H, the λH-level of Σ is defined as follows:
λH(Σ) =

the least n such that
Σ is n-satisfiable
if n ∈ N exists
∞ otherwise
In effect, λH(Σ) computes the least number of tours required to achieve (1) and (2)
above for Σ. Moreover, our notion of n-satisfiability on hypergraphs is also closely
related to the ordinary notion of n-colourability of hypergraphs. The λH value of a set
Σ is in fact equal to the proper chromatic number of an appropriate hypergraph.
Theorem 7.2.1
Let Σ be a set of formulae of a hypergraph H. Let HΣ = (VΣ, EΣ) be the hypergraph
with VΣ = Σ and
EΣ =
{
Σ′ ⊆fin Σ : Σ′ 6= ∅ and λH(Σ′) > 1
}
Then λH(Σ) = χ(HΣ).
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Proof:
Let H, Σ, and HΣ be defined as above. Let χ(HΣ) = n. We show that λH(Σ) ≤ n.
Let c be a proper n-colouring of HΣ. For each i ≤ n, let σi = {A ∈ Σ : c(A) = i}.
By remark (7.2.1) and the compactness of weak satisfiability (see [112] p.396 ), it is
straightforward to verify that σi is 1-satisfiable on H. Let Γi 1-satisfy σi on H. To show
λH(Σ) ≤ n, it suffices to show that Γ1, . . . , Γn n-satisfy Σ, i.e. each A ∈ Σ is covered by
some Γi:
A ∈ Σ =⇒ A ∈ σi for some i ≤ n
=⇒ Γi 1-satisfies σi
=⇒ Γi 1-satisfies A
=⇒ ∀α ∈ A, Γi ∩ α 6= ∅
Towards a contradiction, let λH(Σ) = k where k < n. Let Γ1, . . . , Γk k-satisfy Σ. For
each i ≤ k, let γi = Γi ∩
⋃⋃
Σ. Then γ1, . . . , γk also k-satisfy Σ. To show that there is
a proper k-colouring on HΣ, we first define the following sequence of sets:
Σ1 = {A ∈ Σ : ∀α ∈ A, α ∩ γ1 6= ∅}
Σ2 = {A ∈ Σ \ Σ1 : ∀α ∈ A, α ∩ γ2 6= ∅}
...
Σk = {A ∈ Σ \ Σk−1 : ∀α ∈ A, α ∩ γk 6= ∅}
Clearly, Σi ∩ Σj = ∅, for each i 6= j ≤ k. Moreover, Σi is 1-satisfied by γi and thus no
edge of HΣ is a subset of Σi. Now define c : Σ −→ {1, . . . , k} such that c(A) = i iff
A ∈ Σi. Then c is a proper k-colouring of HΣ. This contradicts our assumption that
χ(HΣ) = n. Hence λH(Σ) = χ(HΣ) as required.
It is interesting to note that proper n-colouring problems can also be restated as
n-satisfiability problems. Let H = (V, E) be a hypergraph such that V = {x, y, z, . . .},
then the n-satisfiability of {{{x}}, {{y}}, {{z}}, . . .} on H is equivalent to the proper n-
colourability of H. We can in fact establish the compactness of n-satisfiability directly
from the compactness of proper n-colourability of hypergraphs.
Theorem 7.2.2
A compact hypergraph H is properly n-colourable iff every finite sub-hypergraph of
H is properly n-colourable.
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Proof:
Our proof of trace compactness from the previous chapter suffices (theorem (6.3.1)).
We note however that the Axiom of Choice is not required in the proof.
Theorem 7.2.3
LetH be a compact hypergraph and Σ be a set of formulae ofH. Then Σ is n-satisfiable
iff every finite subset of Σ is n-satisfiable.
Proof:
One direction is trivial. For the other direction, we assume that Σ is not n-satisfiable
on H. By theorem (7.2.1), χ(HΣ) > n and thus HΣ is not properly n-colourable. By
theorem (7.2.2), some finite subhypergraph H′Σ = (VH′Σ , EH′Σ) of HΣ is not properly
n-colourable. Clearly, VH′Σ ⊆fin Σ and VH′Σ is not n-satisfiable on H.
Corollary 7.2.1
Let H be a compact hypergraph and Σ be a set of formulae of H. Then λH(Σ) ≤ n iff
for every finite subset Σ′ of Σ, λH(Σ′) ≤ n.
Theorem 7.2.4
The compactness theorem for n-satisfiability on hypergraphs is equivalent to BPI in
ZF set theory.
Proof:
Since BPI is equivalent to the compactness theorem for first order logic in ZF (see
[20] p.104), it follows immediately from the proof of theorem (6.3.1) that BPI implies
the compactness of n-satisfiability on hypergraphs. For the converse, Kolany showed
that the compactness of weak satisfiability is equivalent to BPI. But the compactness
of weak satisfiability is just a special case of the compactness of n-satisfiability with
n = 1 (see remark (7.2.1)). Hence the desired result follows immediately.
In [112], Kolany gives a partial list of problems in different branches of mathe-
matics that are equivalent to the weak satisfiability of some family of clauses on an
appropriate hypergraph. Many compactness statements in different areas of math-
ematics can in fact be viewed as instances of compactness of weak satisfiability on
hypergraphs. They include:
satisfiability of propositional formulae
Axiom of Choice for finite sets
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let ∆ be a collection of pairwise disjoint non-empty finite sets; then f is a choice
function on ∆ if f : ∆ −→ ⋃∆ and for all δ ∈ ∆, f(δ) ∈ δ.
R-consistent choices (equivalent to BPI in ZF)
let ∆ be a collection of pairwise disjoint non-empty finite sets and let R be a
symmetric binary relation on
⋃
∆; then Π is an R-consistent choice if for all
α,β ∈ Π, αRβ.
graph n-colourability
polynomial equation system solvability over a finite field
(equivalent to BPI in ZF)
systems of distinct representatives
let ∆ be a collection of non-empty finite sets, then an injective function f is a
System of Distinct Representatives for ∆ if f : ∆ −→ ⋃∆ and for all δ ∈ ∆,
f(δ) ∈ δ.
Remark (7.2.1) and theorem (7.2.4) make it clear that any such problem and its
corresponding compactness statement can be restated as an n-satisfiability problem
and a corresponding compactness statement on appropriate hypergraphs.
7.3 Resolution and n-satisfiability
The notion of n-satisfiability is essentially a semantic notion. We nowwish to consider
a purely syntactic characterisation of the same notion. The characterization given
here is analogous to the resolution rule that J. A. Robinson developed for automated
theorem proving.
Definition 7.3.1
Let α1, . . . , αm be a set of clauses on an arbitrary but fixed hypergraph H and let
e = {a1, . . . , am} be an edge of H. Then the set
α =
m⋃
i=1
(αi \ {ai})
is said to result by resolution on e if ai ∈ αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In which case, we write
α1, . . . , αm `e α. If A is a set of clauses on H, the closure of A under the resolution
rule on edges of H is denoted by [A]H.
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Consider again example (7.2.1). It is easy to show that ∅ ∈ [⋃Σ]H; we display two
resolution proofs:
{u,w}, {v} `{u,v} {w} {u,w}, {x} `{w,x} {u}
{w}, {x} `{w,x} ∅ {u}, {v} `{u,v} ∅
In terms of weak satisfiability on hypergraphs, the resolution rule is a sound and
complete rule.
Theorem 7.3.1
(Kolany) Let H be a compact hypergraph and A be a finite collection of clauses. Then
∅ ∈ [A]H iff A is not weakly satisfiable on H.
For a set of formulae Σ onH, we call a function f : Σ −→ n a Σ-n-colouring. Where
i ≤ n, we take f−1[i] = {A ∈ Σ : f(A) = i}. We can now characterise n-satisfiability in
terms of resolution and Σ-n-colouring.
Theorem 7.3.2
Let Σ be a finite set of formulae on a compact hypergraphH. Then Σ is notn-satisfiable
iff for every Σ-n-colouring f, ∃i ≤ n : ∅ ∈ [∪(f−1[i])]H.
Proof:
(⇒) Let f be a Σ-n-colouring such that ∀i ≤ n, ∅ 6∈ [∪(f−1[i])]H. Then by theo-
rem (7.3.1), for each i ≤ n, ∪(f−1[i]) is weakly satisfiable on H. Let Γi weakly satisfy
∪(f−1[i]) on H for each i ≤ n. Then Γ1, . . . , Γn n-satisfy Σ on H.
(⇐): Assume that for any Σ-n-colouring f, ∃i ≤ n : ∅ ∈ [∪(f−1[i])]H. Then by theo-
rem (7.3.1), ∃i ≤ n : ∪(f−1[i]) is not weakly satisfiable on H. Towards a contradiction,
let Γ1, . . . , Γn n-satisfy Σ on H. Define the Σ-n-colouring g, such that
g−1[1] = {A ∈ Σ : ∀α ∈ A, α ∩ Γ1 6= ∅}
g−1[2] = {A ∈ Σ \ g−1[1] : ∀α ∈ A, α ∩ Γ2 6= ∅}
...
g−1[n] = {A ∈ Σ \ g−1[n− 1] : ∀α ∈ A, α ∩ Γn 6= ∅}
Since g is a Σ-n-colouring on Σ, ∃i ≤ n : ∪(g−1[i]) is not weakly satisfiable on H. This
implies that Γi does not weakly satisfy ∪(g−1[i]) and thus Γ1, . . . , Γn fail to n-satisfy Σ.
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Combining theorem (7.2.3) and theorem (7.3.2), we can immediately derive the
following theorem:
Theorem 7.3.3
For a set of formulae Σ on a compact hypergraph H, Σ is n-satisfiable iff there exists a
Σ-n-colouring f such that ∀i ≤ n, ∅ 6∈ [∪(f−1[i])]H.
In terms of complexity, the decision version of our problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 7.3.4
The decision problem for determining whether a finite set of formulae Σ is n-
satisfiable on a compact hypergraph H (H-n-SAT) is NP-complete.
Proof:
It is easy to see that H-n-SAT is at least NP-hard since an instance of our problem is
just SAT which is NP-complete. It is also clear that H-n-SAT∈NP, since a nondeter-
ministic turing machine can guess a sequence (Γ1, . . . , Γn), each of which is a subset of
Σ, and verify in polynomial time whether (Γ1, . . . , Γn) n-satisfy Σ.
7.4 n-Consequence Relations
We have seen that the notion of weak satisfiability can be generalised nicely to the
notion of n-satisfiability. In this section, we’ll develop two notions of consequence
relations based on n-satisfiability on hypergraphs. Again, these are natural generali-
sations of Kolany’s notion of consequence operations based on weak satisfiability (see
[113]).
In the subsequent exposition, we let H = (V, E) be a fixed compact hypergraph
without singleton edges. The set of all formulae on Hwill be denoted byΦ. We’ll use
the usual Σ,A and Σ,∆ to denote Σ ∪ {A} and Σ ∪ ∆ respectively.
Definition 7.4.1
Γ1, . . . , Γn ⊆ V is an n-model of Σ on H iff Γ1, . . . , Γn n-satisfy Σ on H. If in addition,
Γ1, . . . , Γn n-cover E, i.e. ∀e ∈ E, ∃i ≤ n: Γi ∩ e 6= ∅, then Γ1, . . . , Γn is an n+-model of Σ
on H. |=n and |=+n are defined as follows:
• Σ |=n {A} iff every n-model of Σ is an n-model of {A} (on H). The set of n-
consequences of Σ, Cn(Σ) = {A : Σ |=n {A}}.
• Σ |=+n {A} iff every n+-model of Σ is an n+-model of {A} (on H). The set of
n+-consequences of Σ, C+n(Σ) = {A : Σ |=+n {A}}.
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For readability we’ll write Σ |=n A and Σ |=+n A instead. We’ll also omit references to
the underlying hypergraph. Beforewe show that |=n and |=+n are genuine consequence
relations in the sense of [168] (i.e. reflexive, monotonic, and transitive), we’ll first state
some obvious facts based on definition (7.4.1):
Fact 7.4.1
For any Σ and A:
1. every n+-model of Σ is an n-model of Σ.
2. if Σ |=n A, then Σ |=+n A (equivalently, Cn(Σ) ⊆ C+n(Σ))
3. C+n(Σ) = Cn(Σ) ∪ Cn(∅)
Where B is formula and α is a clause on H, we let
B \ α = {β \ α : β ∈ B}
We can now give a characterisation of |=n in terms of resolution and Σ-n-colourings.
Theorem 7.4.1
Let Σ be a set of formulae andA a formula onH, then relative toH, Σ |=n A iff for each
Σ-n-colouring f there exists an i ≤ n such that for each α ∈ A, ∅ ∈ [(∪(f−1[i])) \ α]H.
Proof:
(⇒) Assume that Σ |=n A. Towards a contradiction, let f0 be a Σ-n-colouring such that
for each i ≤ n there exists some α ∈ A with ∅ 6∈ [(∪(f−10 [i])) \ α]H. By theorem (7.3.1),
for each i ≤ n there exists an α ∈ A such that (∪(f−10 [i]))\α is weakly satisfiable onH.
For each i ≤ n, let Γi weakly satisfy (∪(f−10 [i])) \ α. Then each Γi also weakly satisfies
∪(f−10 [i]) and hence Γ1, . . . , Γn n-satisfy Σ. But for each Γi there exists some α ∈ A such
that Γi ∩ α = ∅, so Γ1, . . . , Γn doesn’t n-satisfy A.
(⇐) Let Γ1, . . . , Γn witness that Σ 6|=n A. For each i ≤ n, let σi = {B ∈ Σ :
Γ weakly satisfies B}. Without loss of generality, we may assume that σi and σj, i 6= j,
are disjoint, and each Γi ⊆
⋃⋃
σi. Define the Σ-n-colouring f0 such that for each
A ∈ Σ, f0(A) = i iff A ∈ σi. Towards a contradiction assume that there exists an
i0 ≤ n such that for each α ∈ A, ∅ ∈ [(∪(f−10 [i0])) \ α]H. Then by theorem (7.3.1),
for each α ∈ A, (∪(f−10 [i0])) \ α is not weakly satisfiable on H. But by the initial as-
sumption Γi0 must weakly satisfy ∪(f−10 [i0]) and there must be an α0 ∈ A such that
Γi0 ∩ α0 = ∅. Hence Γi0 weakly satisfies (∪(f−10 [i0])) \ α0 on H.
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Theorem 7.4.2
|=n has the following structural properties:
R: A ∈ Σ =⇒ Σ |=n A
M: Σ |=n A =⇒ Σ,∆ |=n A
T: Σ,A |=n B and Σ |=n A =⇒ Σ |=n B
Proof:
For [R], we observe that every n-model of Σ is also an n-model of A for every A ∈ Σ.
For [M], we observe that every n-model of Σ,∆ is also an n-model of Σ. For [T ], we
observe that every n-model of Σ is an n-model of A and so it is an n-model of Σ,A.
Hence, it is also an n-model of B.
Corollary 7.4.1
Cn is a closure operator on Φ.
In light of fact (7.4.1), properties of |=n and Cn can be transferred directly to |=+n
and C+n . In terms of the level function λH, both Cn and C+n are λH preserving closure
operators.
Theorem 7.4.3
For arbitrary but fixed n ∈ N, for any Σ ⊆ Φ, λH(Σ)n⇔ λH(Cn(Σ)) = n
Proof:
Suppose that λH(Σ) = n. Then there must be an n-model, Γ1, . . . , Γn, of Σ. But any
n-model of Σ is an n-model of A for each A ∈ Cn(Σ), so Γ1, . . . , Γn is an n-model
of Cn(Σ). Hence, λH(Cn(Σ)) ≤ n. But λH(Cn(Σ)) 6< n, lest λH(Σ) < n. Thus
λH(Cn(Σ)) = n as required.
Conversely, suppose that λH(Cn(Σ)) = n. By Inclusion, Σ ⊆ Cn(Σ) and thus
λH(Σ) ≤ n. Towards a contradiction, suppose that λH(Σ) = m < n. Then by the first
part of our proof, λH(Cn(Σ)) = m < n. But this contradicts the leastness of n. Hence
λH(Cn(Σ)) 6< n, i.e. λH(Cn(Σ)) = n.
Finally it is straightforward to show the lattice theoretic properties of quotient sets
formed by equivalence classes of formulae (on H) defined in terms of Cn and C+n .
Definition 7.4.2
Let Σ, Σ′ ⊆ Φ and n ∈ N be arbitrary but fixed. We define the binary relation ≡
over Φ2 by setting Σ ≡ Σ′ iff Cn(Σ) = Cn(Σ′). We let [Σ] = {Σ′ ⊆ Φ : Σ ≡ Σ′} and
H/≡ = {[Σ] : Σ ⊆ Φ}. For any [Σ], [Σ′] ∈ H/≡, we let [Σ] ≤ [Σ′] iff Cn(Σ′) ⊆ Cn(Σ)
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Theorem 7.4.4
Let H/≡ and ≤ be as defined in definition (7.4.2). Then L = 〈H/≡, ≤〉 is a complete
distributive lattice with a minimum: [Σ] = 0 iff Cn(Σ) = Cn(Φ). If Cn is replaced with
C+n throughout in definition (7.4.2), then L is a complete distributive lattice with both
a minimum and maximum, in particular: [Σ] = 1 iff Cn(Σ) = Cn(∅)
Proof:
In light of fact (7.4.1), we only need to consider Cn. It is straightforward to verify that
≡ is an equivalence relation on Φ and thus every element of H/≡ is an equivalence
class modulo ≡. Moreover, ≤ is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. Thus ≤ is a
partial ordering on H/≡.
Let I be an index set of arbitrary cardinality. Let {[Σi] : i ∈ I} ⊆ H/ ≡. We’ll show
that [
⋃
i∈ICn(Σi)] and [
⋂
i∈ICn(Σi)] are, respectively, the greatest lower bound and
the least upper bound of {[Σi] : i ∈ I}:
(1) [
⋂
i∈ICn(Σi)] is an upper bound:⋂
i∈I
Cn(Σi) ⊆ Cn(Σj) for each j ∈ I =⇒ Cn(⋂
i∈I
Cn(Σi)) ⊆ Cn(Cn(Σj))
for each j ∈ I
=⇒ Cn(⋂
i∈I
Cn(Σi)) ⊆ Cn(Σj)
for each j ∈ I
=⇒ [Σj] ≤ [⋂
i∈I
Cn(Σi)]
for each j ∈ I
(2) [
⋂
i∈ICn(Σi)] is the least upper bound:
[Σi] ≤ [∆] for each i ∈ I =⇒ Cn(∆) ⊆ Cn(Σi) for each i ∈ I
=⇒ Cn(∆) ⊆⋂
i∈I
Cn(Σi)
=⇒ [⋂
i∈I
Cn(Σi)] ≤ [∆]
(3) [
⋃
i∈ICn(Σi)] is a lower bound: similar to (1).
(4) [
⋃
i∈ICn(Σi)] is the greatest lower bound: similar to (2).
L is thus a complete lattice. The distributivity of L follows from the fact that ∩ is
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distributive over ∪ and vice versa. To verify that [Φ] is the minimum, we observe that
Cn(Σ) ⊆ Cn(Φ) and [Φ] ≤ [Σ] for any Σ. For the case of C+n , since C+n(∅) ⊆ C+n(Σ) it
follows that [Σ] ≤ [∅] for any Σ. Hence [∅] is the maximum.
Question 7.4.1
Are Cn and C+n algebraic closure operators, i.e. are |=n and |=+n compact?
7.5 BPI and Complexity Theory
In section (7.2) we demonstrate that the compactness statement for n-satisfiability on
hypergraphs is equivalent to BPI in ZF set theory without the axiom of choice. In sec-
tion (7.3), we note further that the corresponding decision problem for n-satisfiability
on compact hypergraphs is NP-complete. Our investigation is partly motivated by
a conjecture from [50; 52]. Cowen notices that methods for proving certain decision
problems are NP-complete have also been used in showing that certain compactness
theorems are equivalent to BPI in ZF. More specifically, let R be a compactness state-
ment that says of a set S and a property P that if every finite subobject of an object in
S has P, then the object has P. Moreover, we assume that R is not equivalent in ZF to
the statement that every object in S has P. This additional assumption is required to
eliminate certain bogus compactness statements. If R is a compactness statement in
the above sense, R∗ will denote the corresponding decision problem which asks of a
finite object in S, does it have the property P; R < BPI will denote that R is weaker
than BPI in ZF, and R ⇔ BPI will denote that R is equivalent to BPI in ZF. In [50]
Cowen gives various examples for R and R∗. But all of Cowen’s examples fall into 3
types: (1) R ⇔ BPI and R∗ is NP-complete, (2) R < BPI and R∗ is polynomial, and (3)
R < BPI and R∗ is NP-complete.
R ⇔ BPI R < BPI
R∗ is polynomial ? +
R∗ is NP-complete + +
Figure 7.2: Known cases of R and R∗ in relation to BPI
But there is no known example of R where R ⇔ BPI while R∗ is polynomial.
Cowen makes the following conjecture:
Conjecture 7.5.1
(Cowen) If R∗ is polynomial, then R < BPI.
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Cowen’s conjecture implies, in particular, that P 6= NP since letting R be the com-
pactness statement for n-satisfiability on hypergraphs gives R ⇔ BPI. But R∗ would
be polynomial if P = NP. Hence any proof of Cowen’s conjecture would be a de facto
proof that P 6= NP.
The conjecture of Cowen also opens a new line of inquiry: of a particular polyno-
mial R∗, we can ask whether the corresponding R < BPI holds. To take one particular
example it is known that 2-SAT, i.e. satisfiability of clauses with at most 2 literals, is
polynomial; the corresponding compactness statement for 2-SAT has been shown by
Wojtylak in [181] to be weaker then BPI.
Question 7.5.1
Let R be the statement that a collection of finite sets has a system of distinct repre-
sentatives iff every finite subcollection has a system of distinct representatives. It is
known that the corresponding R∗ is polynomial. But is R < BPI?
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The study of logic usually begins with one of two approaches. According to what
Priest [139] calls the canonical approach, the aim of logic is to establish a standard for
evaluating arguments – a standard by which we judge whether a conclusion can be le-
gitimately inferred from a body of assumptions. The legitimacy of an inference turns
on the notion of a consequence relation which can be defined proof theoretically in
terms of deduction or semantically in terms of class containment of models. Legit-
imate or valid inferences are those that are sanctioned by our consequence relation
specified in standard proof theoretic or model theoretic ways. The usual complete-
ness theorem of a logic is in turn an assurance that the proof theory and the semantics
capture one and the same consequence relation.
According to the representational approach however, logic is understood as the
study of the relationship between a formal language and its associated domains. It
addresses issues concerning how to express and what can be expressed in a formal
language. Although the two approaches have different aims, they are clearly related.
Amongst the sort of things we want a formal language to be able to express are declar-
ative sentences (in contrast to imperative sentences, e.g. goto s in some programming
languages). The content of these declarative sentences is fixed by their truth condi-
tionswhich in turn inform us that entities or states in the domain are one way but not
another. The availability of sentences bearing truth conditions allows us to be in the
business of reasoning and inference again. If a body of declarative sentences truthfully
represents the domain, we can infer further truthful sentences about the domain.
Given these two approaches to logic, it is not surprising that paraconsistent log-
ics are typically motivated in one of two ways. According to the epistemic account,
declarative sentences in a formal language can be used to represent states of a domain,
in particular they can be used to represent states of the actual world. We may think
of these representations as logical descriptions with empirical contents. Although we
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are the masters of our own language, infallibility is not a given. We make mistakes
and some of them turn up as inconsistencies in our data and theories. As Wheeler
pointed out in [180], some of these mistakes, e.g. measurement errors, are so funda-
mental to the way we interact with the world that any attempt to eliminate them is a
practical impossibility. Our scientific theories and thus scientific reasoning must face
up to the force of inconsistencies. According to this view certain inconsistencies are
just misrepresentations. Since logic is about consequence, it is the logician’s business
to sort out what can be deduced from these misrepresentations. Classical logic is of no
help here since it does not distinguish between different sorts of mistakes and hence
all sorts of mistakes can be inferred. Adopting alternative logics is one way we can
continue to draw inferences under the threat of erroneous data.
According to the ontological account however, not all inconsistent descriptions are
infected with errors or misrepresentations. Instead an alternative hypothesis is that
certain inconsistent descriptions are just correct descriptions of entities or states that
are inconsistent in and of themselves. As Priest would say, some inconsistent infor-
mation or theories are true ([140]). According to the dialetheic thesis the recurrence
of certain paradoxical statements is not to be explained away in terms of mistakes on
our part or defects in our language. Instead the best explanation of the persistence of
these paradoxes is that they truly describe an ontology populated with inconsistent
entities. The implication of the ontological or dialetheic account is that just as we need
alternative logics to reason with potentially erroneous data or theories, we also need
alternative logics to reason with inconsistent entities and states. Once again, classical
logic is of no help since it provides no provision to deal with inconsistent entities or
states.
While dialetheism, the hypothesis that there are true inconsistent theories, is a con-
tentious claim, we have neither defended nor criticised dialetheism in this thesis. We
have taken it for granted that the epistemic account is a plausible motivation for para-
consistency and investigated a variety of inconsistency-tolerant reasoning strategies.
Nonetheless we are in agreement with the dialetheist that not every case of inconsis-
tent description is a case of misrepresentation or error. We have pointed out that there
are situations where the source of inconsistencies is neither rooted in error nor in in-
consistent ontologies. In drawing out these cases, our emphasis is on the practical use
of a logic as a formalism for representation. We have so far steered clear of any un-
due ontological commitment to endorse inconsistent entities or epistemic pressure to
eradicate inconsistencies. Our modus operandi is preservationalism – we look for use-
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ful properties of inconsistent descriptions and find inference strategies that preserve
these properties.
In this thesis we have highlighted the fact that logic is as much about representation
as it is about consequence. In viewing logic as a language for modelling practical and
abstract problems, the emphasis is on the discriminatory power of our language. The
main issue in this thesis is not merely fault tolerant deduction per se or the reality of
an inconsistent ontology. Rather, it is the analysis of the structure and the underlying
combinatorial properties of our logical representation which in turn inform us about
the nature of the situation or problem under consideration. Of course to provide such
an analysis, our logical description must capture the salient features of the problem
at some appropriate level of abstraction. But this is very much a question about the rep-
resentational efficacy of the formal language and the representational fit between the
formal language and the problem domain. In saying this, we do not intend to suggest
that representational issues have nothing to do with deduction. Far from it, deduc-
tion is related to meaning. As is well known, the meaning of a logical connective
can be specified by the use of introduction and elimination rules. So deduction can
be used to ground and fix the meaning of a logical representation. But note that this
way of bringing deduction back into the picture requires no tacit assumption about
epistemic error or inconsistent ontology. We maintain that there are cases in which
a problem domain is best modelled by logically inconsistent descriptions involving
neither epistemic error nor ontological assertion. Of course the representational fit
between a logical description and a problem domain must be evaluated in the con-
text of a machinery for specifying the meaning of the description. In this work we
have not committed to any particular way to accomplish the task. There is no harm in
being a methodological pluralist. Whether one opts for a model theoretic or proof the-
oretic machinery, incompleteness and unsoundness are genuine possibilities. There is
no guarantee that a model theoretic specification must have a corresponding proof
theoretic specification or vice versa.
The usefulness of paraconsistent logics as a way to ground the meaning of formal
languages is perhaps analogous to the usefulness of a scientific instrument. Ancient
astronomers carved out the constellations with their bare eyes, charting the night sky
into distinct heavenly bodies and regions. They did what they could given what was
available at the time. Astronomers in the Renaissance were bestowed with the gift of
the telescope. They could now chart the night skywith finer precision and distinctions
that were not seen by ancient astronomers. Modern astronomers go one step further
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by tapping into the unexplored territory of radio frequencies. Formal languages are
the symbolic constellations for the modern logician. The history of modern logic too
is punctuated with remarkable changes in the discriminatory and expressive power of
logics. Propositional logic delivers the calculus of propositions. But to formalise ‘Every
natural number has a successor’, we had to await for the advent of quantification the-
ory. To formalise ‘A relation is well-ordered if every non-empty subset has a least ele-
ment’, we have to go second-order or employ set theory of some form. 1 At each turn
of this refinement, more can be said and more can be discerned. But at the same time
it is also surprisingly conservative. In classical logics, sentences are sorted into three
distinct classes – those that are tautologous (true in all models), inconsistent (false in
all models), and contingent (true in somemodels and false in somemodels). 2 Even in
a simple classical propositional logic with countably many propositional atoms, there
are at least countably many distinct non-equivalent classes of contingent sentences
– one for each distinct atom. But oddly, there can only be one equivalence class of
tautologous sentences and one equivalence class of inconsistent sentences. Within the
classical scheme a contradiction, (p∧¬p), is indistinguishable from a denial of the ex-
cluded middle, ¬(q∨ ¬q) – no classical model, no classical proof will separate them.
But note that we do distinguish these sentences meta-logically. They are not merely
distinct syntactic tokens of distinct types – while one can be used to assert a contra-
diction the other can be used to reject the law of excluded middle. The distinction also
carries a certain semantic weight.
Our take home message then is this: formal languages which express inconsisten-
cies are rich in structure and expressive power. Our complaint against classical conse-
quence and classical semantics is that they do not make room for the discrimination
of different types of inconsistencies within a formal language. Under the classical
scheme, all inconsistencies are proof-theoretically and model-theoretically equivalent.
But recall that the study of formal languages, standard first order model theory in
particular, is very much concerned with the discriminatory power of languages and
models. To make distinctions, we must be able to partition a language into distinct
equivalence classes. In fact, in a very general sense all formal languages are concerned
with equivalence classes – namely classes that are organised under the ‘sameness-in-
1We dare not say ‘the set theory’ here. As we all know ZF is to be distinguished from ZFC (with
choice axiom), from ZFA (with anti-foundation axiom) from NBG (NBG for von Neumman, Bernays
and Godel, not to be confused with the epithet ‘No Bloody Good’), from (Quine’s) NF. Set theories, like
logics, come in many varieties.
2Given soundness and completeness of classical logics, the reader may use the appropriate proof-
theoretic substitutes for ‘true in all models’ etc.
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meaning’ relation. Indeed this is one of the main goals (and advantages) of the study
of formal languages – given any two expressions in a formal language we want to
provide a systematic and rigorous method to determine if the two have the same
meaning. Logic provides a paradigmatic method of doing this – in fact it provides
two methods, one via proofs the other via models.3 So the inability of the classical
scheme to discern different inconsistencies is a failing on its part to do its job.
Viewing the matter in this light gives us the satisfaction of putting a positive spin
on paraconsistency and turning the tables on the classicist. It is often said that para-
consistent logics are simply too weak to do any real work – they give up too many
classically acceptable rules of inference. Our rejoinder is that sometimes weakness is
also a strength. Recall that in the study of modalities, any finite sequence of ¬, ,
and ♦, strong modal logics such as S4 and S5 have finitely many modalities. More
precisely, S4 has 14 distinct modalities while S5 has only 6. So in terms of the discrim-
inatory power of these logics, we can only express 14 and 6 distinct types of modal
statements. These logics are strong, but they don’t necessarily give us greater distinc-
tion. The comparison between classical and paraconsistent logics is analogous to the
comparison between strong and weak modal logics. Strength in deducibility is not
tantamount to strength in discriminatory power. Paraconsistent logics and semantics
are not merely non-explosive, they also allow us to preserve important distinctions.
Not all inconsistencies are equal and they should not be. Paraconsistent logics are
endowed with the power to discriminate between different inconsistencies. This, we
maintain, is another way to ‘go beyond consistency’.
3We take this to be at least a necessary condition for such a semantic specification. However, it is
debatable whether it is also sufficient. Some may insist that the equivalence relation induced by the
underlying logic must also be a congruence relation. This amounts to the requirement that intersubstitu-
tivity of provable equivalents preserves equivalence. As is well known many paraconsistent logics e.g.
Priest’s LP and da Costa’s C-systems, do not have such a property. We do not wish to settle the issue
here. But we do think that it is a research direction worth further investigation.
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Appendix A
Dunn’s Ambi-Valuation Semantics
Definition A.0.1
Let A and B be truth functional formulae (i.e. zero degree formulae). A tautologically
entails B, A → B, iff there is a disjunctive normal form (DNF) of A = A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An
and there is a conjunctive normal form (CNF) of B = B1 ∧ . . .∧ Bm such that for each
i ≤ n and j ≤ m, Ai is a term and Bj is a clause and Ai and Bj have a common literal.
In Belnap [7], it is shown that the set of tautological entailments is precisely the
first degree fragment of the relevant logics E and R.
Definition A.0.2
A relevant assignment v is a function v : At −→ ℘{1, 0}. A relevant assignment v is
extended uniquely to v over Φ by the following recursion:
1. v(pi) = v(pi) for any pi ∈ At
2. 1 ∈ v(¬A) ⇔ 0 ∈ v(A)
0 ∈ v(¬A) ⇔ 1 ∈ v(A)
3. 1 ∈ v(A∧ B) ⇔ 1 ∈ v(A) and 1 ∈ v(B)
0 ∈ v(A∧ B) ⇔ 0 ∈ v(A) or 0 ∈ v(B)
4. 1 ∈ v(A∨ B) ⇔ 1 ∈ v(A) or 1 ∈ v(B)
0 ∈ v(A∨ B) ⇔ 0 ∈ v(A) and 0 ∈ v(B)
A relevant valuation v is a model of A iff 1 ∈ v(A). We write A |=R B, A relevantly
entails B, iff every relevant model of A is a relevant model of B.
Alternatively, we can define |=R using the four-valued matrices in figure (A.1) in-
stead. We use T for {1}, F for {0} and B for {1, 0} and N for ∅. Taking T and B as the
designated values, we can define A |=R B iff v(A) ∈ {T,B} =⇒ v(B) ∈ {T,B}. The
lattice 4 interpreted as subsets of {1, 0} is given in figure (A.2).
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¬ T F B N
F T B N
∨ T F B N
T T T T T
F T F B N
B T B B T
N T N T N
∧ T F B N
T T F B N
F F F F F
B B F B F
N N F F N
Figure A.1: 4-valued matrices for FDE
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{0} = F
{1} = T
{} = N {1, 0} = B
Figure A.2: The lattice 4 interpreted as subsets of {1, 0}.
Theorem A.0.1
(Belnap[7], Dunn [65]) A→ B ⇔ A |=R B.
Alternatively, FDE can also be characterised as entailment between clauses ( see
Hanson [83] and Levesque [119]). For a clause or a termAwe use lit(A) to denote the
set of literals occurring in A.
Definition A.0.3
Let A and B be truth functional formulae. Then A clausally entails B, A→c B iff there
is a CNF of A, A1∧ . . .∧An, and a CNF of B, B1∧ . . .∧Bm, such that for every i ≤ m
there is some j ≤ n with lit(Aj) ⊆ lit(Bi).
We note that if A and B are already in CNF, then it takes only O(|A| · |B|) time to
determine whether A→c B. Indeed this is the main reason why Levesque [119] finds
clausal entailment an attractive model of quick surface reasoning of an agent.
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Proposition A.0.1
The set of tautological entailments is exactly the set of clausal entailments, i.e. for any
truth functional A and B, A→ B ⇔ A→c B
Proof:
(⇒) Assume that A → B and let A′ = A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An and B′ = B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bm be the
witness. We define A∗ as follows:
A∗ =
i≤n∧
lAi∈lit(Ai)
(lA1 ∨ . . .∨ lAn)
i.e. A∗ is a formula in CNF, C1∧ . . .∧Ck, where each clause Cj is composed of literals
from distinct terms of A′. It is easy to verify that for every j ≤ m there is some i ≤ k
such that lit(Ci) ⊆ lit(Bj) (since all possible combinations of literals from distinct
terms of A′ are represented by clauses of A∗). Hence, A→c B as required.
(⇐) Assume that A →c B and let A′′ = A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An and B′′ = B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bm be the
witnesses. We define A∗∗ similarly as follows:
A∗∗ =
i≤n∨
lAi∈lit(Ai)
(lA1 ∧ . . .∧ lAm)
It is straightforward to verify that every term of A∗∗ and every clause of B′′ have a
common literal. Hence A→ B as required.
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Appendix B
The Pair Extension Lemma in
Analytic Implicational Logics
The role of the Pair Extension lemma in the completeness proof for relevant logics (see
[8]) is analogous to the role of Lindenbaum’s lemma in Henkin completeness proofs
for classical and modal logics. The Pair Extension lemma is in fact a very natural
generalisation of Lindenbaum’s lemma. In the words of Dunn, the Pair Extension (or
Belnap’s) lemma ‘symmetrizes the usual Henkin construction of 1st order classical
logic’ ([66] p. 160).1 Lindenbaum’s lemma says that an L-consistent set of formulae
can always be extended consistently to maximality. The Pair Extension lemma says
that an L-exclusive pair of sets of formulae can always be extended, L-exclusively, to
a pair of sets that is also L-exhaustive. The proofs of both of these lemmata require
constructions, from the original set(s), that can preserve either L-consistency or L-
exclusivity. In these constructions, a certain lattice property of disjunction is assumed.
In particular the axiom of addition, A→ A∨ B, must be a theorem of the logic (see p.
121 [8]). In this note we’ll show that for certain logics withoutA→ A∨B as a theorem
we can still prove the Pair Extension lemma.
An implication, A → B, is said to be analytic if all of B’s sentential variables are
included inA’s sentential variables. An analytic implicational logic is one in which all
implicational theorems are analytic. The first axiomatisation of such a logic is given
by Parry [135]. In [64], Dunn modified Parry’s system by demodalising the system.
Urquhart [178] then studied amodal extension of Dunn’s system. The completeness of
Parry’s original system is finally proven by Fine in [69] thereby answering a question
of Go¨del. In more recent years, certain paraconsistent versions of analytic implicational
logics have been studied by Deutsch [59; 60; 61; 62] and Sylvan (formerly Routley)
1While Dunn attributes the lemma to Belnap, Gabbay [71] gave an independent proof of the analogue
for first order intuitionistic logic with constant domain.
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[176]. The main interest in these newer logics is that they combine features of both
analytic and relevant implication.
We say that an implicational logic L is pair extension acceptable if it satisfies the
following conditions:
Modus ponens `L A→ B and `L A =⇒ `L B
Reflexivity `L A→ A
Transitivity `L A→ B and `L B→ C =⇒ `L A→ C
Conjunction
(a) `L A∧ B→ A `L A∧ B→ B,
(b) `L A→ B and `L A→ C =⇒ `L A→ B∧ C
(c) `L A and `L B =⇒ `L A∧ B
Disjunction `L A→ B and `L C→ D =⇒ `L A∨ C→ B∨D
Distribution `L A∧ (B∨ C)→ (A∧ B)∨ C
We note that the only difference between this definition and the definition of up-
down acceptability given in [8] (p.121) is the property of disjunction. Here we require
neither `L A→ A∨B nor `L B→ A∨B. This is in line with the main drift of analytic
implication. For up-down acceptable logics, disjunction has the following properties:
(∨R) `L A→ A∨ B `L B→ A∨ B
(∨L) `L A→ C and `L B→ C =⇒ `L A∨ B→ C
Proposition B.0.2
Any implicational logic L that satisfies (∨R), (∨L) and Transitivity above also satisfies
Disjunction.
Proof:
(1) `L A→ B (Assumption)
(2) `L C→ D (Assumption)
(3) `L B→ B∨D (∨R)
(4) `L D→ B∨D (∨R)
(5) `L A→ B∨D (1, 3 Transitivity)
(6) `L C→ B∨D (2, 4 Transitivity)
(7) `L A∨ C→ B∨D (5, 6 ∨L)
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We should also note that, with the exception of Modus ponens, all stated condi-
tions are variable preserving. So for instance if A → B and C → D are both theorems
of an analytic implicational logic, then A ∨ C → B ∨ D will also pass the variable
containment requirement.
The following proposition shows that being an analytic implicational logic is com-
patible with being a pair extension acceptable logic.
Proposition B.0.3
There are analytic implicational logics that are pair extension acceptable.
Proof:
The logic S′ defined by Deutsch in [60] is analytic, moreover modus ponens is admis-
sible in S′. It is straightforward to verify that all the remaining rules of pair extension
acceptable logics are validity preserving in the corresponding Kripke semantics de-
fined for S′. Hence by the completeness result of Deutsch all of the rules are derivable
in S′.
We now introduce some key definitions. Let Γ, Γ ′, ∆, ∆′ be sets of formulae and let
L be a logic. Then we say that an ordered pair 〈Γ ′, ∆′〉 extends 〈Γ, ∆〉 iff Γ ⊆ Γ ′ and ∆ ⊆
∆′. A pair 〈Γ, ∆〉 is said to be L-exclusive if for no A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ and B1, . . . , Bm ∈ ∆
do we have `L A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An → B1 ∨ . . . ∨ Bm. A pair 〈Γ, ∆〉 is exhaustive if Γ ∪ ∆ is
the entire language Φ. We are now in a position to prove the following key lemma:
Lemma B.0.1
Let L be a pair extension acceptable logic. If 〈Γ, ∆〉 is a L-exclusive pair, then for any
formula C either 〈Γ ∪ {C}, ∆〉 is L-exclusive or 〈Γ, ∆ ∪ {C}〉 is L-exclusive.
Proof:
Let 〈Γ, ∆〉 be a L-exclusive pair. Towards a contradiction we assume that neither 〈Γ ∪
{C}, ∆〉 nor 〈Γ, ∆ ∪ {C}〉 is L-exclusive. Then there must be some A, A′, B and B′ such
that
1. A = A1 ∧ . . .∧Ai and A′ = A′1 ∧ . . .∧A
′
j where A1 . . . Ai, A
′
1 . . . A
′
j ∈ Γ ;
2. B = B1 ∧ . . .∧ Bm and B′ = B′1 ∧ . . .∧ B
′
n where B1 . . . Bm, B′1 . . . B
′
n ∈ ∆;
3. (a) `L A→ C∨ B and (b) `L A′ ∧ C→ B′
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The following proof suffices to show that (3a) and (3b) implies that A ∧ A′ → B′ ∨ B
is a L-theorem which contradicts the L-exclusivity of 〈Γ, ∆〉.
(1) `L A→ C∨ B (Assumption 3a)
(2) `L A′ ∧ C→ B′ (Assumption 3b)
(3) `L A∧A′ → A (Conjunction a)
(4) `L A∧A′ → C∨ B (1, 3 by Transitivity)
(5) `L A∧A′ → A′ (Conjunction a)
(6) `L A∧A′ → A′ ∧ (C∨ B) (4, 5 Conjunction b)
(7) `L A′ ∧ (C∨ B)→ (A′ ∧ C)∨ B (Distribution)
(8) `L A∧A′ → (A′ ∧ C)∨ B (6, 7 Transitivity)
(9) `L B→ B (Reflexivity)
(10) `L (A′ ∧ C)∨ B→ B′ ∨ B (2, 9 Disjunction)
(11) `L A∧A′ → B′ ∨ B (9, 10 Transitivity)
The key to our proof of the lemma is in line (10) where we appeal to a weaker
condition on disjunction. We should also note that, with suitable modification of our
definitions, we can completely recast our proof in terms of the consequence relation
of L.
We can now officially record the Pair Extension Lemma. The proof is standard, but
we include it for completeness sake.
Theorem B.0.2
Pair Extension Lemma: Let L be a pair extension acceptable logic and 〈Γ, ∆〉 be a
L-exclusive pair. Then 〈Γ, ∆〉 can be extended to a L-exclusive and exhaustive pair
〈Γ ′, ∆′〉.
Proof:
Without loss of generality we may assume that Φ is countable. As usual we give
a fixed enumeration of formulae, A1, A2, A3 . . .. We then define a sequence of pairs
〈Γ0, ∆0〉 . . . 〈Γn, ∆n〉 . . .where 〈Γ0, ∆0〉 = 〈Γ, ∆〉, and given 〈Γn, ∆n〉we define
〈Γn+1, ∆n+1〉 =

〈Γn ∪ {An}, ∆n〉 if 〈Γn ∪ {An}, ∆n〉 is L-exclusive
〈Γn, ∆n ∪ {An}〉 otherwise
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It is straightforward to verify that 〈Γ ′, ∆′〉 = 〈⋃n∈ω Γn,⋃n∈ω∆n〉 is a L-exclusive ex-
tension of 〈Γ, ∆〉. A simple induction on n and our previous lemma guarantees that
〈Γ ′, ∆′〉 is L-exclusive. Clearly it is also exhaustive.
An alternative proof can be given using Zorn’s lemma without the assumption
that Φ is countable. Let C be the set of L-exclusive pairs 〈Γ ′, ∆′〉 such that Γ ⊆ Γ ′ and
∆ ⊆ ∆′. We note that C is not empty since 〈Γ, ∆〉 ∈ C. Then partially order C by ≤
where 〈Γi, ∆i〉 ≤ 〈Γj, ∆j〉 just in case Γi ⊆ Γj and ∆i ⊆ ∆j. Clearly the union of any
≤-chain is an element in C. Hence, every ≤-chain has an upper bound and thus by
Zorn’s lemma, there is a ≤-maximal element in C. It is straightforward to verify that
this maximal element is the required extension of 〈Γ, ∆〉.
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Appendix C
List of Publications
‘Modal (Logic) Paraconsistency’ with Philippe Besnard,
Proceedings of the Seventh European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative
Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, July 2-5, 2003, Aalborg, Denmark;
page 540–511, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2711, Springer-Verlag
‘Reasoning and Modeling: Two Views of Inconsistency Handling’, (under review)
Proceedings of the Third World Congress of Paraconsistency, IRIT, Toulouse,
France 28–31 July 2003
‘Paraconsistent Reasoning as an Analytic Tool’, with Philippe Besnard
The Proceedings of the International Conference on Formal and Applied Practi-
cal Reasoning, Imperial College, London, 18 – 20 Sept. 2000, Logic Journal of the
Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics, volume 9, no. 2, page 233–246, 2001
‘Inconsistency and Preservation’,
PRICAI 2000 Topics in Artificial Intelligence, 6th Pacific Rim International Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, Melbourne, August/September 2000 Proceed-
ings; page 50–60, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 1886, Springer-Verlag
‘FromWeak Satisfiability to n-Satisfiability on Hypergraphs’,
The Proceedings of the 12th European Summer School in Logic, Language and
Information, Student Session, University of Birmingham, 6–18 August 2000,
page 275-285 (CD ROM)
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